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ABSTRACT 
GOTHIC JOURNEYS: IMPERIALIST DISCOURSE, THE GOTHIC NOVEL, AND THE EUROPEAN OTHER 
 
MAY 2010 
 
CHARLES M. BONDHUS, B.A., SAINT ANSELM COLLEGE 
 
M.F.A., GODDARD COLLEGE 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by:  Professor Joseph Bartolomeo 
 
 
 
In 1790s England, an expanding empire, a growing diaspora of English settlers in foreign 
territories, and spreading political unrest in Ireland and on the European continent all helped to 
contribute to a destabilization of British national identity. With the definition of “Englishperson” 
in flux, Ireland, France, and Italy—nations which are prominently featured in William Godwin’s 
Caleb Williams (1794), Ann Radcliffe’s The Romance of the Forest (1791), The Mysteries of 
Udolpho (1794), and The Italian (1797), and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818)—could be 
understood, similar to England’s colonies, as representing threats to the nation’s cultural 
integrity. Because the people of these European countries were stereotypically perceived as 
being economically impoverished victims of political and “popish” tyranny, it would have been 
easy to construct them in popular and literary discourse as being both socially similar to the 
“primitive” indigenous populations of colonized territories and as uneasy reminders of England’s 
own “premodern” past. Therefore, the overarching goal of this project is twofold. First, it 
attempts to account for the Gothic’s frequent—albeit subtle—use of imperialist rhetoric, which 
is largely encoded within the novels’ representations of sublimity, sensibility, and domesticity. 
Second, it claims that the novels under consideration are preoccupied with testing and 
reaffirming the salience of bourgeois English identity by placing English or Anglo-inflected  
  vii
characters in conflict with “monstrous” continental Others. In so doing, these novels use the 
fictions of empire to contain and claim agency over a revolutionary France, an uncertainly-
positioned Ireland, and a classically-appealing but socially-problematic Italy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is undeniable that the last twenty-five or so years have seen an impressive resurgence 
in critical interest in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century English Gothic.  Considering the 
current critical trends in academia, it should not come as a surprise that many scholars who 
write on the Gothic seem to have gravitated towards historically gendered readings of the 
genre.
1
 And while there is no scholarship that I know of which explicitly trumpets itself as “a 
psychoanalytic reading of the Gothic,” there is no denying that the critical tradition of 
psychoanalysis also plays a significant, though rather subtle, role in the existing academic 
literature. 
 Admittedly, it is easy to accept the existing scholarly tradition without much resistance.  
It is quite accurate to say that the Gothic can be readily viewed through the lens of gender, its 
conventions, its queering, and the murky subconscious energy that powers characters’ and 
authors’ subversive moves against the established “spheres” of maleness and femaleness.  And 
while I do believe that this kind of criticism is valid and useful, my interests are more focused on 
the Gothic’s historicity and its role in extending and reifying domestic values. Combining this 
approach with the contributions that gender-based criticism have made to discourse on the 
genre, it is interesting to note that female characters like those found in Walpole’s Otranto, 
Lewis’s Monk, and Radcliffe’s entire oeuvre tended to be pursued by villains within the enclosed 
space of the house, the castle, or the convent, whereas male characters like Godwin’s Caleb 
Williams, Shelley’s Frankenstein, and Maturin’s Melmoth seemed to be pursued across 
                                                 
1
 Some key examples might be George Haggerty’s Queer Gothic. Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006; Donna Heiland’s Gothic & Gender. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004; Diane J. 
Hoeveler’s Gothic Feminism: The Professionalization of Gender from Charlotte Smith to the Brontes. 
Pittsburgh: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998; Eugenia C. Delamotte’s Perils of the Night: A 
Feminist Study of Nineteenth-Century Gothic.  New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990; Kate 
Ferguson Ellis’s The Contested Castle. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989; and Coral 
Ann Howells’s “The Pleasure of the Woman’s Text: Ann Radcliffe’s Subtle Transgressions.” Gothic 
Fictions: Prohibition/Transgression. Ed. Kenneth Graham. New York: AMS Press, 1989, 151-162. 
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continents.  Upon closer examination though, it is has become clear to me that matters are not 
so black-and-white—Caleb Williams is persecuted and monitored by Falkland when he resides in 
the Squire’s house; Radcliffe’s heroines are compelled to take some remarkable cross-
continental journeys; and Victor Frankenstein does experience a sort of “domestic violence” at 
the hands of the Creature. 
 If one reads even casually in the robust field of travel narratives and empire studies, it 
becomes apparent that much of what is addressed therein is relevant to the Gothic. However, 
precious little scholarship has been done connecting these fields.
2
 Admittedly, critics appear to 
be at least aware of the potential of this area of inquiry: Patrick Brantlinger points out how “the 
monstrous, the supernatural, and the terrifying,” in a word, the Gothic, “are typically linked to 
the foreign,” exemplified most notably in Victor Frankenstein’s European travels and in Ann 
Radcliffe’s Italy (153). Although he is writing about gothic texts produced in the Victoria Era—i.e. 
Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886), Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian 
Gray (1890), Marsh’s The Beetle (1897), and Stoker’s Dracula (1897)—Johan Höglund rightly 
claims that “the Imperial Gothic contains a host of ghostly and monstrous figures that not only 
frighten the reader, but also demonstrate the latent fears and desires of imperialist discourse” 
(245). Further, Elizabeth Napier writes in The Failure of the Gothic that romance and travel 
narratives share kinship in the sense that novelists could, and frequently did, draw on their own 
travels or readings of travel narratives (93).  And Dr. Johnson himself, in his typical acerbic 
manner, commented that  
                                                 
2
 To my knowledge, there are no published monographs that examine the eighteenth-century Gothic 
through the lens of postcolonial theory/empire studies.  The closest is Andrew Smith and Gothic Studies 
editor William Hughes’s Empire and the Gothic: The Politics of Genre. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003, which is a compendium of essays on the subject. Also, Laura Doyle’s Freedom’s Empire: Race and 
the Rise of the Novel in Atlantic Modernity, 1640-1940. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008, has a 
chapter on Walpole and Lewis. Finally, Johan Höglund has published an article on the discourses of 
Victorian Gothic and where it intersects with current American Imperialism, entitled “Gothic Haunting 
Empire” in Memory, Haunting, Discourse, Eds. Maria Holmgren Troy and Elisabeth Wenno, Karlstad: 
Karlstad University Press, 2005. 
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[t]he fictions of the Gothick romances were not so remote from credibility as they are 
now thought…Whatever is imaged in the wildest tale, if giants, dragons, and 
enchantment be excepted, would be felt by him, who, wandering in the mountains 
without a guide, or upon the sea without a pilot, should be carried amidst his terror and 
uncertainty, to the hospitality and elegance of Raasay or Dunvegan. (77) 
 
Considering the number of scholars who have alluded to a contact zone between the discourses 
of the Gothic and the discourses of travel and empire, it is rather surprising to me that no one 
has produced a lengthy study on these connections. 
Perhaps part of the reason why scholars have shied away from focusing their research 
on empire and the Gothic is because the connections appear, on the surface at least, to be self-
evident. Late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Gothic is frequently characterized by 
Enlightenment characters’ encounters with obscurity and the terrifying Other; colonial journeys 
to such locations as Africa and India were represented as adventures into the exotic unknown. 
The Gothic is preoccupied with producing a “good” middle-class English domesticity while 
dwelling in the midst of familial darkness and dysfunction; the colonial project—especially in the 
1790s and after—was partly justified by its mission to Christianize and “civilize” “dark” and 
“godless” native peoples.
3
 The Gothic thrives on a simple opposition between “good” characters 
and “evil” characters who can all be readily identified as such by their demeanors and 
physiognomies; imperialist discourse creates a binary of white, moral colonizer and dark-
skinned, heathen colonized. The Gothic represents the triumph of Enlightenment morality and 
“pure, natural” religion over clandestine superstitions; the imperial project constructs the 
triumph of western rationality and technology over eastern savagery. Höglund is quite right to 
conclude that “the Gothic often becomes a repository for imperialist discourse precisely 
because it tends to describe reality in the same reductive way” (253).  
                                                 
3
 Saree Makdisi writes that “the decades around 1800” saw a movement from outright conquest to a 
“moral” empire and more culturally-based imperialism (77). 
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Granted, this catalogue of observations is cursory at best. To further map the current 
critical discussion, I would like to point out that most studies done on the language and 
discourses that empire opened up are focused mainly on how this language shaped and justified 
the colonial project itself and colonizers’ perceptions of the nations that fell beneath their 
immediate purview.
4
 However, I am unacquainted with any scholarship that is actively 
preoccupied with the question of how this language shaped and informed Britain’s popular 
perception of Ireland and continental Europe; and I am certain that there is no such study that 
takes up the Gothic’s intervention in this question. Essentially, I believe that the Gothic, with its 
romantic intra-European journeys and preoccupations with “good” vs. “bad” domesticity 
effectively symptomatizes English writers’ and travelers’ tendency to claim proprietorship over 
and pass judgment on the people and politics of other European nations. Similar to Ansgar 
Nünning in his “Metaphors the British Thought Felt and Ruled By,” I am mainly interested in “not 
the geographical or political extensions of the real British empire but the role of language and 
literature in discursively constructing that mental realm which was called ‘the empire’ or the 
‘imperial idea,’ which was arguably largely an empire ‘of the mind’ or the imagination” (103).  
However, where Nünning is focused on the empire during the Victorian period, and his primary 
agenda is to argue that cultural metaphors deserve more critical attention in historical studies, I 
am interested in what I believe to be a neglected area of critical inquiry: the appearance of 
colonialist discourse in literature and how it colors perceptions of other, predominantly Catholic, 
European cultures. Indeed, Collin Haydon is correct to say that “the main contribution of anti-
                                                 
4
 The biggest examples include George Dekker’s The Fictions of Romantic Tourism: Radcliffe, Scott, and 
Mary Shelley. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, David Spurr’s The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial 
Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration. Durham: Duke University Press, 
1993, and Mary-Louise Pratt’s seminal Imperial Eyes: Studies in Travel Writing and Transculturation. 
New York: Routledge, 1992. My project is greatly indebted to all three of these works. 
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catholicism to [English] national identity in the Georgian era was to construct the European 
continent as fundamentally alien” (33).  
One of my central claims is that colonialist discourse made its way into Gothic fiction via 
a calculated deployment of several overlapping historical discourses, most notably those of 
sensibility, sublimity, domesticity, travel, and foreignness, all of which are also closely tied to the 
rhetoric of empire. The fact that these particular discourses are mainstays in both the Gothic 
and the rhetoric of empire drastically increases what is at stake in the genre, as it implies that 
imperialist ideology pervaded texts that were largely seen as apolitical “thrillers” in their own 
time and psychosexual allegories in ours.  Therefore, a large part of my task must be to examine 
these texts through the lens of these discourses and the imperialist “baggage” that these 
discourses are associated with in an attempt to uncover a narrative of domestic unrest brought 
about by expansion.  
Of course, such a claim implies that the discourses of imperialism were readily available 
to writers and commentators at this time. To support my assumptions, I would first direct the 
reader to Saree Makdisi’s claim that “Britain’s national identity and national culture—Britain’s 
sense of itself and of its very modernity—were by the end of the eighteenth century 
comprehensively shaped by the discourses of imperialism and by Britain’s changing image of 
and relations with its cultural others” (62). In terms of transmission, Kathleen Wilson has related 
how most British newspapers had sections dedicated to imperial matters.  There papers 
generally presented the imperial project in self-serving terms, focusing on trade and 
accumulation in the colonies (241-242). Imperialist rhetoric could also be found in the theatre, 
as many plays that were popular in the period featured stereotyped images of other Europeans 
and their defeat at the hands of rugged English heroes (242). Ultimately, according to Wilson, 
“the discourses of imperialism embedded normative definitions of class, gender, and nation in 
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English culture that shaped men and women’s perception of Britain’s place within the world and 
their own place within the polity” (238-239). To add to Makdisi’s and Wilson’s claims, I would 
like to hypothesize that the increase in British travel at this point in history—when the colonial 
project had achieved a high level of visibility and public acceptance—necessarily implies a level 
of proprietorship over the “foreign” on behalf of the “scenic tourist.” This kind of “citizen-level” 
proprietorship is well-documented, and one can find it most readily in the scenic tourist’s use of 
the Claude Glass when viewing a landscape, and in the ostensibly apolitical art practices of 
William Gilpin, who theorized on the picturesque and painted landscapes which actively 
excluded that which he deemed distasteful, such as images of poverty (Dekker 36). Essentially, I 
am in agreement with David Spurr and George Dekker in contending that the discourses of the 
civilian’s “Romantic tourism” are informed by the discourses of the administrator’s colonial 
enterprise. Hence, I think it is acceptable to assume that the authors I am engaging—all of 
whom were politically informed, albeit to different extents—had ready access to the discourses 
of empire. 
On a side note, one could even say the Gothic’s existence alone is evidence that 
colonialist discourse pervaded the minds of English writers, since the setting of the genre’s texts 
in fanciful pasts at such easily romanticized locations as Italy,
5
 France, Spain, and Switzerland is 
reminiscent of Orientalism (when one thinks of it this way, the classification of Beckford’s 
Vathek as a “gothic” novel seems to make a lot more sense). The Gothic, it would then seem, 
intensifies the more “sensational” aspects of imperial expansion—such as encounters with 
foreignness in the form of ethnic (though certainly not just racial) difference and “alien” cultural 
practice, and colonizers’ moral impact on indigenous peoples—while at the same time 
maintaining a firmly Eurocentric perspective and thus obscuring the fraught nature of colonizer-
                                                 
5
 Kenneth Churchill writes “Gothic Italy was essentially an imaginary Italy” in Italy and English 
Literature: 1764-1930. Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1980, 5. 
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colonized dynamics.
6
 Therefore the Gothic is an ideal place to begin an inquiry considering this 
new approach to the intersection of literary and empire studies. 
More to the point, I have four primary reasons for engaging British attitudes towards 
the Continent vis a vis textual analysis of the Gothic. First of all, as I just discussed, I believe that 
the Gothic represents a coming together of a variety of discourses that were also used to justify 
empire. Second, the texts that I have chosen to close read—William Godwin’s Caleb Williams, 
Ann Radcliffe’s The Romance of the Forest, The Mysteries of Udolpho, and The Italian, and Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein—are all, to a greater or lesser extent, concerned with travel, particularly 
intra-European travel. Third, as discussed above, I believe that the field of Gothic studies has 
been somewhat narrow in terms of its theoretical focus. It is my hope that this treatment 
encourages more scholarly discourse not only on the Gothic’s discursive relationship to empire, 
but also on how the discourses of empire shaped Britain’s perception of other European nations 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Finally, I feel that current 
scholarship’s figuration of the Gothic’s role in British identity-formation in the face of rising 
modernity has made some provocative claims that would be productive to examine against my 
readings. James Watt, for example, writes that the late eighteenth-century’s mania for 
gothic/medievalist texts “served to focus on different aspects of a pre-modern [English] heritage 
that was both strange and native, distant and familiar” (120, my italics).  
This set of seeming contradictions, “strange and native, distant and familiar,” not only 
employs the language of colonialism, but also sounds like the uncanny, a thematic mainstay of 
the Gothic. Watt’s application of the uncanny to Britain’s national heritage raises some 
interesting questions about the politics of the Gothic. How is England situated in relation to its 
feudal past? As England develops its interests in India and elsewhere, how does it perceive other 
                                                 
6
 An exception to this might be Frankenstein, in that it takes the rare approach of allowing the “colonized” 
a first-person voice in the form of the Creature’s narration. 
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European nations culturally? How do these perceptions affect the way England perceives itself? 
And where does the Gothic fit in? I would suggest that the Gothic’s tendency to conjure up a 
“pre-modern heritage” makes it an ideal mode in which to represent the European Other 
because nations like Ireland, Italy, and France possess a racial and cultural similarity to England 
that would not be found in India or Africa, yet the discrete differences that were perceived as 
existing between these nations could be seen as a reminder of England’s feudal, Catholic past—
its former state of pre-modern “primitivism.” Put simply, I would propose that “less progressive” 
European nations could be read as uncanny doubles of England, and that this issue is raised as a 
result of Britain’s need to reevaluate its identity in the face of a rapidly expanding empire. 
Furthermore, if we consider that Gothic plots are typically set in a pre-modern Europe, yet the 
genre’s “good” characters are distinctly eighteenth-century Englishpersons, then we can suggest 
that part of the Gothic’s raison d’etre is to explore the ways by which British modernity can 
triumph over the backwardness of the “Old World”—sort of like the way Western technology 
triumphs over Eastern “magic” one hundred years later in Victorian Gothic texts like Dracula or 
The Beetle (Höglund 246).  Similar to the Bleeding Nun or the armor-clad specter of Alfonso the 
Good, the “past” of late eighteenth-century Continental Europe haunts the “present” of 
“Enlightened” England. 
Considering the tendency of much Gothic criticism to read the genre’s texts—at least to 
an extent—as psychosexual allegories, and considering the increasing application of 
psychoanalytic criticism to empire studies, I feel that an examination of the role that anomaly 
plays both in the Gothic and in empire ought to be addressed in this study. Again, I do not wish 
to discredit or downplay the important and oftentimes fascinating readings of the Gothic that 
scholars have proposed along psychoanalytic axes; rather, I wish to resituate this kind of reading 
into the historical and discursive contexts of imperialism. Accordingly, I have selected the term 
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“anomaly” because this concept implies a type of challenge to established categories that is less 
stringent than Victor Turner’s narrowly-defined “liminality”
7
 and “marginality,”
8
 yet is not as 
amorphous or as strictly psychoanalytic as Julia Kristeva’s “abjection.” Indeed, while anomaly 
can be thought of as a psychological state, it can also be applied, as Mary Douglas has 
demonstrated, in an anthropological—and thus more measurable—context. Therefore, I 
propose that the psychoanalytic dimensions of the Gothic can be read not just in and of 
themselves, but also as mediators for questions of imperialism and imperialism’s shift from 
outright domination to moral reform. More specifically, it is within the realm of so-called “moral 
reform” that we can most readily recognize empire’s contribution to the production of 
individual anomaly, as the imposition of foreign values destabilizes the cohesion of the self and 
calls into question the location—and perhaps even the existence—of the borders that separate 
the self from the Other.  
By way of definition, Mary Douglas defines anomaly in Purity and Danger (1966), as “an 
element which does not fit a given set or series” (38); like “uncleanness” it is “matter out of 
place” (41). More usefully, Douglas describes the anomalous—and the related concept of 
“ambiguity”—in terms of Sartre’s viscosity: “[i]t is like a cross-section in a process of change. It is 
unstable, but it does not flow…it attacks the boundary between myself and it. Long columns 
falling off my fingers suggest my own substance flowing into the pool of stickiness…to touch 
                                                 
7
 In The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (New York: Walter de Gruyter Inc., 1969), 95, Turner 
characterizes “liminars” as being “neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and 
arrayed by law, custom, convention and ceremony.” Though I would agree that English subjects who have engaged/are 
engaging the colonial or European Other are “betwixt and between” ethnic poles, the fact that liminars, as Turner 
explains in Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1974), 233, have a “cultural assurance of a final stable resolution of their ambiguity” renders such a reading 
problematic, as not all of the figures I am engaging—historical or literary— 
are fortunate enough to attain such a stable resolution. 
8
 In Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 233, Turner describes “marginals” as those “who are simultaneously (by 
ascription, optation, self-definition, or achievement) of two or more groups whose definitions and cultural norms are 
distinct from, and often even opposed to, one another.” In some sense, it can be said that English subjects who have 
engaged/are engaging the colonial or European Other fit into this category since these individuals struggle to balance 
the “cultural norms” of Englishness with the norms of other ethnic groups. However, to classify these individuals as 
being members of two or more ethnic groups would require a bit of reaching and an overreliance on metaphor.  
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stickiness is to risk diluting myself into viscosity” (39). The viscous substance is clearly separate 
from the “I,” yet when one touches this substance, the boundary between the self and the alien 
material blurs. Indeed, it does not take much of a leap to claim that an encounter with the 
colonial Other is similarly constructed; the colonizing subject may identify him/herself as 
“English” while the colonized individual is recognized as “not English”—the “I” and “you” are 
assumed to be separate. However, engagement with the colonized “object” causes one to get 
one’s hands dirty, so to speak, as the border between “I” and “you,” English self and foreign 
Other, blurs, thus rendering the “tainted” English subject, in a word, anomalous.  
The same can also be said of England’s engagement with Catholic European countries 
since, as we will see, encounters with Italian, Irish, and French Others could be and often were 
constructed as a denationalizing process. Likewise, all of the novels that this study considers 
feature characters who might be characterized as “anomalous” insofar that their performance 
calls into question the assumptions underlying their ethnic markers. Falkland is a member of the 
English squirearchy, yet his actions are governed by the (archaic) chivalric code of Italy; Caleb 
Williams is quite aware of his English identity and all that it implies, yet he deracinates himself 
repeatedly in the text while attempting to elude Falkland’s persecution; Ann Radcliffe’s heroines 
are nominally French and Italian, yet their sense of morality is grounded in an eighteenth-
century English tradition of female virtue; and Frankenstein is infamous for contesting the 
“man/monster” binary. Hence, “outlandish, foreign-made English[men]” (Godwin 20), Anglo-
Irish Protestants, Frenchified aristocrats, “Jew-Christians” (263), and Gothic heroines who are 
described as southern European but who behave like ideal Englishwomen are “matter out of 
place,” “unstable,” “diluted,” and apparently in danger of being absorbed into the Other. 
Therefore, this study emphasizes the destabilizing, border-violating aspects of anomaly, the 
Gothic’s tendency to take up English concerns about national purity and situate its characters at 
  11
the uneasy nexus of “the civilized and the savage”; it accepts “anomaly” as a handy term for 
denoting this border state without committing to an explicitly psychoanalytic critical narrative. 
To return to more historically-based scholarship, one critical text that has in many ways 
helped to shape the assumptions underlying this study is George Dekker’s The Fictions of 
Romantic Tourism (2005), in which he claims that the Romantic-era tourist is an “alienated 
individual” who is seeking and being denied “authenticity and wholeness.” Victor Frankenstein is 
a key example for Dekker, since the Genevese natural philosopher attempts to move past his 
dissatisfied domesticity by traveling, both literally and metaphorically (17). I am taking Dekker’s 
argument a step further by suggesting that this dissatisfaction with the domestic stems from 
domesticity’s fractured nature, a split that can be attributed to the expanding boundaries of 
empire.  To use Frankenstein as an example, I believe that Victor’s creation of the Monster—the 
basic cause of his subsequent alienation—is indicative of British guilt, the gnawing sense that 
the nation itself has destabilized the domestic sphere via its extensive engagement with the 
colonial Other.  Along these lines, David Spurr suggests that a central problem of empire is the 
threat of the English subject collapsing into the foreign object (78)—the British nation’s fear of 
losing its identity through colonial enterprise and (largely imagined) continental influence.  
While I wouldn’t read Victor’s educational trip to Ingolstadt itself as a colonial journey, I would 
suggest that his subsequent creation of the Monster echoes the imperial process, since it is 
characterized as a “train of progress” and the end result is the corruption and “nativization” of 
the traveler, thus rendering him, like the Monster, “truly” borderless, neither man nor monster, 
a mix between privileged European male and dreadful Other.
9
   
Ironically, the cause of Victor’s destabilization is his refusal to see the self in the 
redacted Other. He does not pity the Monster; he does not want to create the female monster 
                                                 
9
 The same also holds true for the titular, deracinated protagonist in Caleb Williams and his “Italian-ated” 
persecutor, Falkland—an issue I will discuss in much depth later on. 
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out of fear that the two creatures’ “joint wickedness” will destroy the world (128); and, more 
obliquely, he cannot conceive of working on the female monster at home in Geneva (134) but 
rather must travel to Ireland, the realm of the “almost-civilized” to create his “almost-human” 
creature.  Since by middle-class standards the basic production of humanity—reproduction and 
impregnation—occurs within the domestic sphere, this latter move can be seen as a refusal to 
fit the Monster and his potential bride within a domestic framework—a move that could either 
efface threats of alterity or subvert the home. Similarly, the Monster’s desire for a sort of wild 
domesticity in South America with his mate (130) can be read as an insulting parody of proper 
home life, or an ideal example of the domesticated foreigner. However, by focusing on the 
uncanny and subversive possibilities of the Monster’s desired assimilation, rather than on its 
civilizing potential, Victor forces the Monster to remain as a dangerous Other. As we see in the 
text, this failure to defuse threats of alterity is what leads to the destruction of Victor’s own 
household and, ultimately, his self.   
Domesticity’s role in travel, empire, and the Gothic is further complicated when one 
considers that Gothic novels—especially those that feature journeys—seem to be preoccupied 
above all, with a quest for stability and closure, a desire to either establish or reestablish a 
home-based certainty, which itself has been threatened by the intervention of the “foreign.”  
Elizabeth Napier addresses this notion in her introduction to The Failure of the Gothic, and 
William Hughes makes a similar claim in Empire and the Gothic, when he suggests that the 
romantic journey usually begins with destabilization and ends with a return to domestic stability 
(94). The idea that travel—both in fiction and in reality—is a sort of quest for domestic 
constancy gains credence when one considers popular conceptions of travel and tourism in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in conjunction with the various concerns that 
English subjects had about the expanding colonial empire’s impact on middle-class domestic 
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lifestyles and moral values. It is no secret that England’s middle-class was concerned about the 
empire’s ability to import vices and diseases, along with goods and colonial wealth, into the 
private sphere.  In fact, it was a common concern that the nation had “absorbed” its colonial 
territory and thus the horrible foreigner was no longer “other” but an unassimilated part of the 
whole (Demata 28).  
Mary-Louise Pratt’s findings in Imperial Eyes support this notion. “‘Europe,’” she writes, 
“was also constructing itself from the outside in, out of materials infiltrated, donated, absorbed, 
appropriated, and imposed from contact zones all over the planet” (137).  “Surely,” she 
continues, “Europe was as much influenced by as an influence on the tensions which in the 
1780s produced the Indian uprising in the Andes, revolts in South Africa, the Tivadentes’ 
rebellion in Brazil, the revolution that overthrew white rule in Santo Domingo, and other such 
events in the contact zones” (138, 140).  Rather than allowing the British self to collapse into the 
foreign object through passive consumption of foreign goods, I argue, some of the Kingdom’s 
citizens travel and utilize the rhetoric of appropriation to reverse the process so that the foreign 
collapses into the British, thus maintaining “appropriate” power relations. Once difference has 
been effaced, one can then engage in the process of sentimental assimilation by which the 
Other is subsumed into the English identity, a move that Victor Frankenstein resists, Radcliffe’s 
heroines embrace, and Caleb Williams wrestles. 
Another interesting “real world” example of this might be the East India Company’s 
sponsorship of the first English translation of The Bhagavad-Gita in 1785. In his introduction to 
the first edition, Warren Hastings explains the Company’s interest in promoting this translation; 
essentially it is important for the sake of smooth colonial management to develop mastery over 
the culture of the colonized, as such mastery “attracts and conciliates distant affections; it 
lessens the weight of the chain by which the natives are held in subjection; and it imprints on 
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the heart of our own countrymen the sense and obligation of benevolence” (12-13). Makdisi’s 
reading of Hastings’s words brings into relief the notion of borderlessness that I am developing, 
since he sees the Gita’s introduction and the ideology it implies as “a matter of almost absorbing 
oneself into the other, of almost becoming other in order to fuse power and knowledge 
together at the site of contact with subject peoples; it was, in effect, a way to selectively bridge 
the gap—even while otherwise maintaining it—between colonizer and colonized” (67). I find 
this to be a very Gothic moment since there seems to be an uneasy current of ethnic 
destabilization moving beneath the apparent question of “How much must one identify with the 
Other in order to preserve hegemony in a foreign environment?” Indeed, the question that 
resides within this question must be “How much is too much?” There’s a certain level of 
dramatic irony here in that we know that Hastings was not long afterward brought under 
scrutiny, largely because of his perceived “nativism.” The essential danger of projects like the 
translation of the Gita and Sir William Jones’s Asiatick Society of Calcutta (established in 1784 
with Hastings’s approval and encouragement) is that the acknowledgement of another culture’s 
contributions to knowledge implicitly challenges Britain’s cultural purity and superiority.
10
 Like 
Caleb Williams paradoxically dressing up in Irish and Jewish “drag” in an attempt to preserve the 
liberty his Englishness entitles him to, or a Radcliffe heroine subconsciously identifying erotically 
with her persecutor (Howells 156), or Dr. Frankenstein claiming that he is the murderer of 
Clerval (Shelley 153) Britain’s intervention in the affairs and culture of the foreign raises the 
specter of “ethnic impurity” and threatens to break down the binary between colonizer and 
colonized. 
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 Britain responded to these threats in 1793 not just with the trial of Warren Hastings, but also with 
proposed changes to the East India Charter. By 1813, English laws were the only laws of India, Christian 
missionaries were allowed into the country to evangelize, and Indian-blooded colonial administrators were 
used as puppets of the imperial apparatus to enforce English interests (Makdisi 70-71). 
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When the carefully constructed English self is threatened by the colonial Other, it seems 
oddly logical that it should travel in an attempt to rediscover and reassert itself.  Moving a step 
beyond Dekker’s “scenic tourism,” Nigel Llewellyn writes that cultural tourism gave the British 
an opportunity to confirm their prejudices about other nations and a chance to display abroad 
Great Britain’s superiority as a “cleaner,” “more rational,” and “more democratic” nation, an 
impulse that Llewellyn attributes partially to the influence of Hume’s belief that residence in a 
democratic society cultivates taste and allows for impartial judgments (75). More in the context 
of the period, Mary Shelley herself wrote that the ego was “alien to itself” and characterized the 
heart and soul as “undiscovered countries” (qtd. in Schor 237).  In fact, for Shelley, the telos of 
the journey is the “discovery of the self within the other” (241), an impetus which I would like to 
impute both to travel and to the utilization of colonialist discourses in the gothic/romantic 
novel.  
In The Rhetoric of Empire, Spurr identifies eleven overlapping discourses of imperialism, 
one of which he names “appropriation,” a process by which the “Other” world is reconfigured 
according to the colonizers’ desires and contexts.  Colonizers have a “desire to recreate, in these 
unconquered territories or in these unsubdued hearts and minds, one’s own image, and to 
reunite the pieces of a cultural identity divided from itself” (42). Another discourse, 
“insubstantialization” sees the “Other” world as a backdrop for the Westerner’s inner drama; 
history is excluded and the environment is seen as “an immaterial counterpart to the dissolving 
consciousness of the subject” (142). My work—especially where it engages Radcliffe—is 
concerned with these conflicts, since I plan to examine how the aforementioned discourses are 
deployed in literary Gothic texts that feature English (or English-ified) characters who make this 
inner “journey of discovery” by re-inscribing foreign landscapes and individuals with their own 
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values and aesthetics—much like the scenic tourist with his Claude Glass, or Britain’s 1793 
reforms to the East India Charter.  
Furthermore, the fact that the protagonists of these novels tend to represent late 
eighteenth/early nineteenth-century British domestic values makes their connection to English 
travelers and colonizers all the more apparent. One might also add that there is a certain level of 
irony here, as the Gothic was generally castigated as a “foreign” Germanic style of writing 
(Napier vii-viii), and yet at the same time it can also be understood as a nationalistic movement 
that was likely reacting against both real and perceived threats of foreign cultural intervention.  
The romantic medievalism of Radcliffe, the emphasis on outmoded feudal systems in Clara 
Reeve’s The Old English Baron (and, to an extent, Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto) take 
up the spirit of MacPhearson’s Ossian poems and celebrate British/Celtic heritage as a contrast 
to the “French-ified” manners of classical formalism and its uncritical esteem of all things 
Roman—not to mention the farther-flung but still frightening “decadence” of the Far East.  
While I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the Gothic is an out-and-out negation of Neoclassicism
11
 
I would suggest that it seems to have grown, in part, out of disenchantment with the Augustan 
Era’s unfulfilled promises—the Grand Tour had become a trumped-up party for young 
aristocrats; Italy itself was coming to be understood as a fractured collection of city-states, filled 
with impoverished Catholic peasants; and France was of course in the throes of a revolution 
which threatened to consume England (ideologically, anyway).   
The Gothic novel as a genre can therefore be understood as a useful lens for examining 
issues of empire and colonization as they relate to Britain’s relationship with southern Europe, 
since the Gothic is in many ways the enfant terrible of Neoclassicism—by validating xenophobic 
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 By “Neoclassicism” I mean an artistic, literary, and philosophical preoccupation with formalism, Greco-
Roman aesthetics, and all that implies in terms of what socially qualifies as “appropriate” behavior and 
representation. 
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perceptions of places like Italy while at the same time lionizing English virtue, it encourages 
proprietorship.  By this I mean that the Gothic novel shows the “dark side” of southern Europe—
thus invalidating classical ideals to an extent—while simultaneously demonstrating how 
confident ownership of an essentially English history and virtue, rather than uncritical 
conformity to the standards of ancient civilizations, can allow the British to obtain the ideals of 
civilization that were upheld by the likes of Steele and Addison.   
It is especially interesting, and potentially problematic, that in the novels themselves, 
particularly Radcliffe’s, the English-mannered characters tend to be nominally southern 
European. I account for this potential hurdle by reading Radcliffe’s racialization of her characters 
as a somewhat passive-aggressive attempt on her part to exemplify the “universality” of British 
values; if colonized people of color can adopt the culture of their colonizers in the real world, 
Radcliffe seems to be suggesting that the same sort of intervention can occur in southern 
Europe. And it is no accident that this “cultural revolution” is rooted in the efforts of women, 
whose role in the period is to reform the manners of men through example. I discuss this 
dynamic in much more depth in the chapter on Radcliffe.  
In short then, the Gothic can perhaps be seen as representing a shift in tactic, a 
rewriting of England’s relationship to the Continent that accommodates both the changing 
realities of mainland Europe and the risks to national purity that an expanding empire poses. 
It seems self-evident to me that to speak about the foreign in the context of late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain is also to speak about colonialism. And if we are 
to agree with Edward Said’s bold statement that “imperialism and the novel fortified each other 
to such a degree that it is impossible…to read one without in some way dealing with the other” 
(71), then we can conclude that to speak of colonialism is to speak of fiction. When I say that 
Godwin, Radcliffe, and Shelley are engaged in acts of “discursive colonialism,” I am saying that 
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they are writing on the foreignness of the Continent and Ireland, geographic spaces where 
England did not have literal colonies, but which are characterized, in the period’s literature, as 
posing the same social dangers that literal colonies supposedly posed. The obvious risk for this 
project would be for me to accept this assumption uncritically and to treat Italy, France, and 
Ireland (the three countries I believe are most relevant) as actually representing identical 
threats. While it is true that all three of these countries represented in the imagination what 
England might become, and to an extent, what it once was, Italy, Ireland, and France are all 
situated in relation to England in different ways. In the following pages I will highlight these 
differences, relate how Britain’s approach to these nations was informed by the discourses of 
imperialism, and provide the reader with a framework which can be used to contextualize the 
textual arguments that I will be making in later chapters. 
The Best and Worst of Italy 
Italy’s classical heritage made it an appealing destination for English tourists throughout 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. James Boswell quoted Dr. Johnson as having 
once said “[a] man who has not been in Italy, is always conscious of an inferiority, from his not 
having seen what it is expected a man should see. The Grand object of travelling is to see the 
shores of the Mediterranean” (742). While there, tourists performed a kind of cultural labor that 
reflects the processes of “insubstantialization” and “appropriation” that Spurr identifies as 
central discourses of empire. By way of evidence, Shearer West’s summation of northern 
Europe’s attitude towards Italy is worth quoting at some length: 
In historical terms, Italy was stereotyped as the seat of ancient Roman civilization and 
the Renaissance, while in travel literature it was condemned for its backwardness, 
poverty and papal domination. These competing tropes were never really reconciled, 
but led visitors to find ways of appropriating aspects of Italy’s cultural past and 
internalising or nationalising them…with the hegemony of classical ideas, northern 
European cultural identities at the end of the eighteenth century were frequently 
interwoven with the classical past in national cultural and historical narratives, but that 
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cultural past had to be decoupled from its associations with Italy and reinvested in the 
concerns of other nations. (15, 16, my italics) 
 
Essentially, English tourists used travel narratives and fiction to “appropriate” Italy’s past and to 
“insubstantialize” its present condition. For example, in November 1785, famed traveler Hester 
Thrale Piozzi wrote of the artist Piranesi—who painted what Horace Walpole referred to as 
“sublime” images of Rome (Llewellyn 91)—that he “judiciously leads one’s attention away from 
the disgusting sight of that Wretchedness and dirt, which is here every where mingled with 
Monuments of ancient Magnificence” (171). When viewed in this light, Piranesi’s work recalls 
Gilpin’s edited landscapes, and the general British tendency to selectively dehistoricize Italy 
anticipates James Stuart Mills’s far more outrageous claim in The History of British India (1817-
36) that India’s lack of written records means it has no history and therefore must be given one 
by the British occupiers (Makdisi 1-2). My goal here is not so much to draw a perfect parallel 
between India and Italy, separated by a straight axis of “discursive colonialism” vs. “literal 
colonialism”—that would of course be a fool’s errand—but to draw attention to the fact that 
the discourses deployed in the “frontlines” of the empire did have relevance, whether 
consciously recognized or not, to the ways by which English travelers configured Italy. To further 
clarify the difference here, I ought to remind readers that Mills’s claim, Hastings’s introduction 
to the Bhagavad-Gita, and Makdisi’s reading of Hastings’s words present a clear picture of 
dehistoricizing a nation for the sake of preserving imperial hegemony. By the same token, I must 
emphasize that the English traveler’s dehistoricization of Italy does not carry the same kind of 
overt political charge. Essentially, where Britain’s designs on India’s history were intended to 
streamline direct colonial governance and maximize the material spoils of empire, the traveler’s 
cultural labor in Italy was intended to glean symbolic spoils in the form of cultural capital. It 
would be incorrect to read my argument as a claim that Italy was a sort of “India in the West” 
simply because on a larger scale, India’s situation in relation to Britain was drastically different 
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from Italy’s. Again, I must reemphasize that my intent is to see how certain discourses of the 
British Empire were applied to similar yet still very different ends in England’s engagement with 
other European nations. 
To return to the matter at hand, Grand Tourists in particular “configured” contemporary 
Italy as full of “poverty, corruption, and an extremely underdeveloped intellectual life” and 
bemoaned this contrast to its classical heritage and wonders (Agorni 105-106). As a result, 
privileged travelers saw their sojourn in Italy as an opportunity to compare the burgeoning 
British Empire with the ancient Roman one, to claim ownership of classical Italy’s lost heritage, 
and to vow that Britain would never experience a similar deterioration (Buzard 40).
12
 Naturally, 
Italy’s fall from its classical past was generally blamed on its so-called lack of political freedom 
(Agorni 106-107) and its Catholicism. Indeed, visitors as early as Addison in 1701 used their time 
in Italy to renew their appreciation of England (106), and Chloe Chard maintains that Grand 
Tourists in Italy were seeking the familiar in their exploration of classical ruins, and the foreign in 
their viewing of the contemporary culture (82).  
It is also commonly recognized that northern Europeans saw Italy, particularly anything 
south of Naples, as a “wild” place dominated by backward-looking honor codes, bloodthirsty 
banditti, hired assassins, and misguided notions of chivalry. Hester Thrale Piozzi characterized 
the Italian territories
13
 as a place where one cannot become truly subjective, “where wit and 
beauty are considered as useless without a long pedigree; and virtue, talents, wealth, and 
wisdom, are thought of only as medals to hang upon the genealogical tree, as we tie trinkets to 
a watch in England” (50). Creuze de Lesser wrote while travelling in 1801 and 1802 that 
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 The idea that London was the new Rome dates back at least to the beginning of the century. John Toland 
wrote in 1700 that London is “a New Rome in the West” that deserved “like the old one, to becom [sic] the 
soverain Mistress of the Universe” (qtd. in Eglin 101). 
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 The truth of the matter is that the notion of “Italy” as a unified whole is definitely an outsider concept.  
The geographical land mass that is referred to as “Italy” was actually a collection of provinces, some of 
which were directly controlled by colonial powerhouses like Spain.  Sicily itself was highly Gothicized as a 
mysterious island overrun by banditti (Agorni 108). 
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“L’Europe finit á Naples…La Calabre, la Sicile, tout le reste est de l’Afrique” (qtd. in Chaney 102). 
The Baroque ornamentation of certain varieties of Italian art and architecture—particularly 
those which were found in the southern city of Lecce—was pejoratively labeled “Gothick” by 
various English critics, including Grand Tourist Colen Campbell in 1715. Edward Chaney goes so 
far as to say that the term “Gothic” was deployed by the English in the eighteenth century to 
describe any “rule-breaking” aesthetic, particularly the Baroque (318). Clearly, the notion of a 
“Gothic Italy” maintained credence throughout the century, as Walpole set The Castle of 
Otranto there in 1764, thus setting off a deluge of “Italian Gothic” texts. Roderick Marshall 
writes that “Walpole’s shining example made it almost impossible that the terror novel, once it 
became widely practised, should not gravitate to Italy for its ruined castles, torture chambers, 
ruthless assassins, insistent ghosts, and beleaguered virgins” (246). 
 Essentially then, Britain imagined Italy, particularly its southern regions, as an exotic 
place whose glorious past had been effaced by the intervention of aggressive Catholicism, 
poverty, passion, superstition, and political despotism. It was England’s job to reclaim the 
classical heritage of Ancient Rome and make it its own. Indeed, England’s internal conflict over 
Italy was a profound one, since to the rest of Europe Italy represented taste and artistic 
achievement, and while Britain wished to claim its share in the European circle, it also wanted to 
preserve its emerging, modernist identity, not to mention its cultural authority. Therefore, it 
was necessary that England embrace Italy’s “glorious” heritage while at the same time roundly 
condemning its “degeneration” to its current state. One of the more recognizable sites of this 
conflict can be seen in the English Royal Academy, founded in 1768. 
 I contend that the Royal Academy represents a key example of British cultural 
imperialism over Italy, since England essentially used the Academy to claim Italian art practices 
and theory as its own while gradually developing a policy of exclusion for Italian scholars and 
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artists. Considering the Academy’s eventual exclusion of Italians, it is ironic that even the 
architectural design of the physical Academy was Italianate (West 125). The truth of the matter 
was that the English Royal Academy had been based on both French and Italian academies, and 
“the English, whether they liked it or not, were dependent upon Italy for models of art theory 
and practice” (119), not to mention faculty: at its inception, the Royal Academy was largely 
staffed by Italian artists who had travelled to England. While Italian artists were drawn to the 
ever-modernizing, commercially dominant Great Britain in search of audiences and patrons, 
they were marginalized by public opinion first for “perceived superiority to English artists and 
later for their superfluousness” (117). Threatened by the perceived dominance of its Italian 
members—its founders included Francesco Bartolozzi, Agostino Carlini, Giovanni Cipriani, and 
Francesco Zuccarelli—the English heads of the Royal Academy—including first president Sir 
Joshua Reynolds—began to refuse to appoint foreigners to its cabinet in the late 1780s, even 
preferring to leave key positions vacant for years (136). 
  While I wouldn’t go so far as to say that they are corollaries, I can’t help but note a 
parallel—in spirit at least—between the Royal Academy and Sir William Jones’s Calcutta-based 
Asiatick Society. In addition to promoting Oriental literature and culture for its own value and 
bringing it back to Europe as an intellectual commodity, Jones started publishing Asiatick 
Researches in 1788 (Makdisi 67-68). As we saw earlier, Jones’s Society and Hastings’s translation 
of the Bhagavad-Gita can be read as subtle attempts to achieve dominance over a culture—
indeed, Orientalist literature in the eighteenth century started as idle entertainment, but it 
quickly became politicized. When the English translation of Beckford’s Vathek appeared in 1786 
as an unauthored translation of a genuine Arabic manuscript, translator Reverend Samuel 
Henley included a preface and notes on “Oriental culture.” Makdisi claims that this and 
subsequent examples of “annotated” Orientalist literature essentially allowed the European 
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reader to see himself as being knowledgeable about—and therefore having authority over—the 
Orient. For Makdisi, this marked a shift in how the British approached Eastern cultures—rather 
than simply a fantasy world of sexy Arabian Nights (although it was still that, too), “knowledge” 
of the East gave English readers another opportunity to define themselves as different from 
(and, of course, better than) Easterners. Essentially, Orientalism became a tool meant to 
improve cultural mastery and thus streamline imperial governance (65-66). While the British 
assimilation of Italian art theory and practices proceeded through a different channel, I contend 
that the process and its ultimate goals were similar. I will examine this and other aspects of the 
Anglo-Italian relationship and its representation in my readings of Godwin’s Caleb Williams in 
chapter 2 and Ann Radcliffe’s novels in chapter 3.  
Ireland—the Privileged “Colony” 
In 1720, Philip Yorke, later Lord Hardwicke, gave a speech in the English House of 
Commons on the state of the Irish nation. In it, he essentially states that “The subjects of Ireland 
were to be considered in two respects, as English and Irish, that the Irish were a conquested 
people, and the English a colony transplanted hither and as a colony subject to the law of the 
mother country” (Killeen 9). Sixty years later, the English traveler Arthur Young wrote in his A 
Tour of Ireland with General Observations on the Present State of that Kingdom that  
[t]he age has improved so much in humanity, that even the poor Irish have experienced 
its influence, and are every day treated better and better. But still the remnant of the 
old manners, the abominable distinction of religion, united with the oppressive conduct 
of the little country gentlemen, or rather vermin of the kingdom…subject them to 
situations more mortifying than we ever behold in England. (181) 
 
Yorke’s comments near the beginning of the century and Young’s near the end sketch an 
interesting picture of Ireland as it was understood by the English in the 1700s. Where Italy and 
its heritage represented both the best and the worst of what Britain could potentially become, 
Ireland was perhaps recognized as a sort of “gothic double” for England: a modernizing kingdom 
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that could be seen as a sort of quasi-colony; a place where one traveler can observe that the 
houses “had much useful furniture, and some even superfluous…in short most of the articles 
found in a middling English cottage” (180) while at the same time claiming that “the landlord of 
a Irish estate, inhabited by Roman Catholics, is a sort of despot who yields obedience, in 
whatever concerns the poor, to no law but that of his own will” (181). In the British imagination 
then, the Irish at this time were “becoming English,” or “English, but not quite.”  
Indeed, Ireland’s pseudo-colonial status was articulated as early as 1698, when William 
Molyneux published The case of Ireland’s being bound by acts of parliament in England. While 
the point of this book was to argue that Ireland was not “a dependent colony like the English 
territories in America, but a self-contained political entity, united to England only by a shared 
allegiance to the crown” (McBride 243), the fact that Molyneux felt the need to address this—in 
a text that was reprinted nine times between 1706 and 1782—implies that Ireland’s political 
status relative to England was murky at best throughout the century. Even today Ireland’s 
position in relation to the colonial project is difficult to calculate and often overlooked by 
scholars. Joanne Tompkins notes that “Ireland’s complex location as England’s oldest colony, 
meanwhile, frequently means that it is forgotten in assessments of (post)coloniality” (504).  
Young’s judgments of the Irish are quite generous when compared to those made by 
George Cooper in Letters on the Irish Nation Written During a Visit to that Kingdom in Autumn of 
the Year 1799. His summation is worth quoting at some length:  
The native of that country, the descendants, as it seems probably, of its aborigines, still 
remain the same rude barbarians that our earliest accounts describe them. I shall have 
little difficulty in describing this character, as it may be depictured in the same few 
words with that of all nations who have been seen in a state of ignorance and barbarity. 
If we study the manners of the ancient Germans, in Tacitus; or of the Tartar tribes, as 
described by the French missionaries and travellers [sic]; or of the modern American 
Indians, as they have been often seen by our colonists in the North and our 
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circumnavigators in the South; it is impossible that we should not be struck with the 
resemblance which they bear to each other. (189, my italics)
14
 
 
Cooper’s acerbic comparison of the Irish to the Tartars and the American Indians is quite 
telling—like Britain’s perception of southern Italy, Ireland and its people are practically identical 
to the “savages” of Tartaric Germany and North America. I say “practically,” because Cooper 
quickly qualifies his statements by situating Irish society within the ill-defined, off-the-cuff 
categorization “semi-barbarism” (190). In this, we see not only an example of colonialist 
discourse used to characterize and judge the European Other, but also an uncomfortable 
attempt to position the Irish person as the “barbaric” aboriginal who nevertheless has the 
potential to become the “civilized” Briton. Although “[t]he polished minority of the [Irish] nation 
is one hundred years behind England in refinement, and the rude majority of it is at least five” 
(193), Cooper claims to “not know of any country where the character of the people is more 
fitted by nature, than is that of the Irish, for the highest attainments in moral or intellectual 
excellence” (194), a claim that he bolsters by citing the existence of such Anglified Irishmen as 
Swift, Sterne, Congreve, and Burke. However, the figure of the Anglified Irishman is far from 
synonymous with the figure of the native Englishman; in fact, the Anglo-Irish occupied a very 
problematic spectrum of positions. 
 Linda Colley has famously and contentiously stated that “Protestantism was the 
foundation that made the invention of Great Britain possible” (54). As for the “Protestant 
ascendancy” of Ireland, they were quite ready and willing to see themselves as a minority, 
embattled by the sheer numbers of Catholic Irish and the strength of the existing traditions. Ian 
McBride writes that  
[w]hile the Britons of the larger island defined themselves against the despotic 
monarchies of the continent, however, their Irish brethren were more concerned with 
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the internal threat represented by the native Irish population, obdurately attached to a 
bloodthirsty creed which had apparently inspired a series of conspiracies, rebellions and 
massacres. A protestant sense of chosenness thus interacted with memories of the 
religious and ethnic conflicts of the seventeenth century to form a distinctive garrison 
mentality. (238) 
 
McBride also argues that while “Irish protestants had all the makings of fully-fledged Britons” 
(241), this stubborn attachment to an English identity was more characteristic of that early wave 
of Anglos who had immigrated to Ireland in the seventeenth century. And yet, even the so-
called “New English” of the 1680s were still seen by native Britons as politically suspect and 
ethnically impure because of their Catholicism, Irish mannerisms, and tendency to support 
Charles I (and later James II) (Barnard 207).   
 While subsequent generations of “New English” largely rejected their Jacobite roots and 
gained political power as Irish parliamentarians and hierarchical figures in the newly established 
Church of Ireland, it is impossible to see the “Protestant Ascendancy” as in possession of 
unlimited privilege, especially when they are situated in the larger context of Great Britain as a 
whole. Toby Barnard maintains that “all but the grandest and most anglicized Irish protestants 
were recognizable and comic to smart Londoners” (216), a statement that is exemplified in 
Richard Lovell Edgeworth’s (1744-1817) memoirs, where he recounts the hardships and 
prejudice he encountered in England for his tendency to speak with a brogue (I., 47-50, 62-63). 
Similarly, Samuel Madden (1686-1765) wittily commented that the Anglo-Irish were “envied as 
Englishmen in Ireland, and maligned as Irish in England” (96). Furthermore, McBride maintains 
that “by the 1770s,” both Irish-Protestant converts and Anglo-Irishmen were “moving towards a 
more insular definition of an Irish nation which played down denominational divisions,” and that 
“traditional stereotypes of the Irish as bellicose and bibulous were expanded to include the 
protestant gentry in the first half of the eighteenth century” (242, 246).  
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In light of all of this, I would suggest that the Anglo-Irish class provides an intriguing 
example of anomalousness in the sense that it represents a creolized culture brought about by 
the union of the dominant civilization with an aboriginal “Other.” This claim is a key component 
of my reading of Caleb Williams in chapter two, since I consider the titular character’s Irish 
disguise as an ethnicized metaphor for his larger sense of ethnic anomaly and persecution. 
While it is true that his disguise as an Irish beggar who walks with a “shuffling, clownish gait” 
identifies him more immediately with the figure of the “purebred” Irish-Catholic peasant, his 
literal status as an Englishman who has been “ethnically demoted” begs a provocative 
comparison to the Anglo-Irish gentry, who as I have demonstrated above, were quite often—
and for good reason— suspected of being more Irish than Anglo. 
 To return to Young and Cooper, while it would be unfair to draw definite conclusions 
about the Anglo opinion of the Irish peasantry in the late eighteenth century based on the 
reports of two travelers, one must bear in mind three things. First, in his introduction to 
Cooper’s Letters, John Harrington writes that “Cooper’s opinions are distinctly of their time…for 
their enlightened emphases on the Irish as simply behind the English on some Platonic scale of 
progress and on the paternal role English improvers must perforce adopt to protect the Irish 
from their own nature” (185); essentially, Cooper’s opinions are an accurate barometer for 
measuring the political viewpoint of the “enlightened” Englishman. Secondly, one must recall 
that the problematically situated yet politically empowered Irish-Protestants saw the “spread of 
pure Christianity” as “inextricably linked to the progress of civility, and for Irish protestants 
civility signified the language, learning, customs and common law of their mother country” 
(McBride 240), a claim that McBride has culled from the 1698 text, An essay for the conversion 
of the Irish. McBride also cites other Anglicization efforts in Ireland, most notably the 1733 
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founding of the Charter School movement and Samuel Madden’s 1738 text Reflections and 
resolutions proper for the gentlemen of Ireland (240-241). 
Finally, one must also acknowledge that Cooper’s perspective and the implications I 
have outlined were more or less institutionalized by this point. The development of an 
independent Irish Legislature in 1782 problematized relations between Ireland and England, and 
the Irish regency crisis of 1788-9 shook England’s faith in Ireland’s capacity for self-government 
(Geoghegan 1-3); in 1793, Ireland’s political situation inspired the second Earl Camden—who 
would become the lord lieutenant of Ireland in 1795— to declare in a letter that “Ireland must 
be our province if she will not be persuaded to a union, and if she would, she ought and would 
enjoy complete and reciprocal benefits with this country” (Castlereagh correspondence i, 156). 
King George III and Prime Minister William Pitt’s solution to the Irish problem was to push for 
union, a concept that was politically favored in England throughout the 1790s. 
 The Act of Union (eventually passed in 1800) was conceived partly as a way to involve 
Ireland in the empire; however the power dynamics inherent in this movement are rather 
murky. Although it is true that “Ireland’s diminishing status from kingdom to colony was obvious 
to observers [and] the union was to be the vehicle for reversing this dependency,” the Union 
can also be understood as a way to reverse “the dangerous notions of independence, to give 
both Ireland and Britain a harmony of interest within the empire” (Geoghegan 7). Historians 
acknowledge how problematic and ultimately unknowable England’s motives were. Declan 
Kiberd notes that unification was seen by contemporaries as either “a benign offer of 
membership in one of the greatest organizations in human history” or “the most insidious of all 
oppressive tactics” (251). On one side, Patrick O’Farrell wrote in the 1970s that the union was 
“an urgent and naked assertion of British power,” (67) a claim that he shared with Erich Strauss, 
who believed it “was designed to perpetuate Irish subjugation” (65). But more recently, Patrick 
  29
Geoghegan contests the notion that the Union was about British hegemony over the Irish; 
rather, he maintains that it was intended “to create a united kingdom that would be at the heart 
of the empire. Ireland was to be elevated from being a dependent periphery country to become 
a component of the dominant center” (7). I am in agreement with Geoghegan in that I read 
England’s clamor towards unification as a desire to consolidate its power base and strengthen 
the imperial center. But at the same time, I believe that English policy-makers also proposed the 
Union with the intent to establish firm control over its neighboring isle. Geoghegan’s language, 
that Ireland “was to be elevated…to become a component of the dominant center,” implies that 
Ireland’s position would be similar to that of a vassal state, or perhaps a privileged colony. This 
reading is borne out by Geoghegan’s later claim that “Pitt’s proud design for the Irish people 
was to raise their status within the empire after humbling them first by destroying their 
parliament” (8), a move that was effectively the reverse of Pitt’s equally arrogant contention in 
1784 that “We may keep the parliament but lose the people.” And considering Pitt’s power and 
influence, it is difficult to dismiss these claims as empty braggadocio: Lord Hawkesbury declared 
in 1794 that “Mr. Pitt has hitherto been absolute, and other members [of the cabinet] have had 
no more to do than to give their opinions and submit to his, unless Lord Grenville chooses to 
make a stand” (156); James Harris, the first Earl of Malmesbury, wrote in his diary in 1801 that 
Pitt had “absolute power,” brought about by years of having not “a single check of adversity” (iv, 
35, italics reflect original emphasis).
15
 
 To return to the main point of this chapter, my purpose in relating all of this history is to 
demonstrate how Ireland was discursively situated, both politically (through the machinations of 
Pitt and company) and culturally (through the figurations of travelers like Young and Cooper) as 
a pseudo-colony in the 1790s and earlier. The fact that Ireland is afforded some level of privilege 
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in that it was most likely configured as a potential “component” of the imperial center has 
important ramifications for my discussion of Caleb Williams in the next chapter.  
 As a final note, there are two pertinent aspects of the Anglo-Irish relationship that I 
have not yet discussed. The first is Cooper’s tendency in his travel letters to associate Ireland’s 
“degeneracy” with aristocratic malfeasance and what he perceives to be a subscription to the 
old codes of chivalry. This will be discussed in the next chapter, when it is more immediately 
relevant. The second is the fact that part of the impetus for unification was the outbreak of the 
French Revolution and the war between England and France that started in 1793.  
The Gothicization of France
16
 
 Because the uprisings in France destroyed the tyrannical and aristocratic Ancien Regime, 
the British’s initial response to the outbreak of the Revolution in 1789 was largely positive. The 
general sentiment is well-represented in the following remarks, made on July 28, 1789 by 
Samuel Romilly, a member of the Society of Constitutional Information, to his friend Etienne 
Dumont in Geneva: 
I think myself happy that [the Revolution] has happened when I am of an age at which I 
may reasonably hope to live to see some of the consequences produced. It will perhaps 
surprise you, but it is certainly true, that the Revolution has produced a very sincere and 
very general joy here. It is the subject of all conversations; and even all the newspapers, 
without one exception, though they are not conducted by the most liberal or most 
philosophical of men, join in sounding forth the praises of the Parisians, and in rejoicing 
at an event so important for mankind. (1: 356) 
 
 Although most English radicals and moderates found themselves caught up in the 
glorious promises of the Revolution, conservatives were far more skeptical. Where the liberal 
poet and English national Helen Maria Williams referred to 1790’s Festival of the Federation in 
Paris as “the most sublime spectacle, which, perhaps, was ever represented on the theatre of 
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this earth” (1.1.2), Burke described the same event in his famous Reflections on the Revolution 
in France in far less flattering terms: 
Several English were the stupefied and indignant spectators of that triumph. It was 
(unless we have been strangely deceived) a spectacle more resembling a procession of 
American savages, entering into Onondaga, after some of their murders called victories, 
and leading into hovels hung around with scalps, their captives, overpowered with the 
scoffs and buffets of women as ferocious as themselves, much more than it resembled 
the triumphal pomp of a civilized martial nation. (159) 
 
Burke’s explicit comparison of the exultant French to North American “savages” is of course 
similar to the comparison that George Cooper would later draw between Native Americans and 
the Irish in 1799. Also reminiscent of Cooper is Burke’s initial claim that “[s]everal English were 
the stupefied and indignant spectators of that triumph.” Here we again have a stock image of 
the colonialist gentleman acting as a sort of voyeur, shocked at (and perhaps a bit tantalized 
by?) the native people’s breach in propriety.  
 Historically, it is commonly understood that much of the reason for Britain’s 
conservative reaction to the Revolution can be attributed to the fear that England could sink 
into the same revolutionary quagmire that the French had. The fact that England had 
experienced its own revolution almost exactly one hundred years prior played a large role in 
maintaining these fears. In 1795, the Annual Register responded to the clash between Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France and Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man, stating: 
These two famous performances revived, as it were, the royal and republican parties 
that had divided this nation in the last century, and that had lain dormant since the 
Revolution in 1688. They now returned to the charge with a rage and animosity equal to 
that which characterized our ancestors during the civil wars in the reign of King Charles 
the First; and it remained a long time in suspense, whether this renewed contest would 
not be attended with the same calamities: so eager were the partizans of the respected 
tenets contained in those performances, to assert them with unbounded vehemence. 
(267) 
 
Commemorative and progressive organizations like the London Revolution Society, and populist 
radical groups such as the London Correspondence Society (LCS) and its provincial corollaries, 
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while initially not thought of as particularly problematic, came to represent a threat to the 
English government as the 1790s progressed. These groups “identified themselves with France” 
in the sense that the liberties they were requesting and being denied in Britain were seemingly 
being made available to the revolutionary masses on the other side of the channel (Royle 14). 
However, it is important to note that the majority of radical or Jacobin societies were not 
interested in perpetuating violence or advocating the destruction of the monarchy; rather they 
supported parliamentary reform and universal suffrage for adult men—regardless of property—
in the hopes of better popular representation (Woodcock 25). And yet, the fact that these 
popular societies generally represented themselves and were represented by the government as 
upholders of “French ideas and the extremist views expressed in the second part to Paine’s 
Rights of Man” (Royle 15), it should come as no surprise that they were singled out as threats. In 
light of these popular societies’ leftist sympathies and the corresponding ways they were 
perceived, combined with their self-professed political ties to 1688, and with the Annual 
Register’s above-cited invocation of the Glorious Revolution in relation to popular debate in the 
1790s, I would suggest that England’s own revolutionary past had a hand in the governmental 
and loyalist fearmongering that took place throughout the decade. By this I simply mean that 
commemorative groups’ tendencies towards radicalism helped to conflate the ideologies of 
1688 with the ideologies of 1789 in the minds of English policymakers. 
Indeed, such societies were rendered increasingly suspect as the Revolution continued 
and tensions—both internal and with France—grew. Popular uprisings brought about by food 
shortages and resultant high bread prices were common in eighteenth-century England, as were 
riots against new technologies that threatened job security (11). During the time frame of the 
French Revolution alone, bread riots occurred in 1794, 1799, 1801, and were generally 
indicative of other internal problems such as popular opposition to the war with France (Emsley 
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47, 52). When two men were tried and convicted for conspiring to assassinate King George III in 
1794’s “Popgun Plot,” radical groups lost many members (46), presumably out of fear of 
governmental persecution.
17
 William Pitt and the loyalists were likely eager to blame the 
nation’s problems on the so-called “British Jacobins,”— and this would have surely reinforced 
the (largely harmless) radicals’ tendency to characterize the generational, aristocratic lords and 
policymakers as tyrants—a sentiment that Godwin would articulate in the character of Falkland 
in 1794’s Caleb Williams. 
 While the mere existence of active Jacobin societies seemingly validated governmental 
fears of French corruption and potential revolution in Britain, less overtly political Francophilia 
also played a significant role in the British construction of France as a cultural threat. Robin 
Eagles has written that, in the years leading up to the French Revolution, “much that was 
adopted by the English élite as their own was continental in origin, and its subsequent aping by 
the middling sorts meant that English culture as a whole was coloured by the attitudes, fashions, 
and opinions of France” (4), and even more provocatively “aristocratic Francophilia both directly 
and indirectly filtered through to those who wished to ape them, or provoked those who could 
not support such an attitude, and made France the touchstone against which English culture 
could be defined” (12-13, my italics). However, the perceived Francophilia of the aristocracy had 
far reaching implications not only for Anglo-French relations and how Britain perceived itself but 
also for the imperial project. Kathleen Wilson has written that “the aristocratic state was 
identified with ‘French influence’ and corruption at home, and timidity, effeminacy, and 
ignominy abroad” (250). This argument is most succinctly supported, she maintains—both in her 
“The Good, the Bad, and the Impotent” and in The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and 
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Imperialism in England—through a reading of Reverend John Brown of Newcastle’s Estimate of 
the Manners and Principles of the Time, published in either 1757 or 1758:  
‘The internal strength of a Nation will always depend chiefly on the Manners and 
Principles of its leading Members,’ Brown argued, the ‘luxurious and effeminate 
Manners in the higher Ranks, together with a general defect of Principle…operate 
powerfully, and fatally’ in national conduct and affairs, producing a ‘general Incapacity’ 
in ‘the national Spirit of Defence’ that ‘seems to have fitted us for a Prey to the Insults 
and Invasions of our most powerful Enemies.’ An effeminate nation is ‘a Nation which 
resembles Women,’ Brown concluded, devoid of courage, liberty, principle and 
endurance, opposed to public-spiritedness and martial valor, and destined for 
international ignominy and derision. (Sense 187) 
 
While Brown’s opinions were controversial at the time, Wilson also cites “a variety of observers, 
from almanac writers and journalists to playwrights, philanthropists and village shopkeepers 
[who] decried the nation’s corrupted and ‘effeminate’ spirit, which…resulted in displays of 
national ‘impotency’ abroad and ignominious imperial decline like that evinced in 1754-7” 
(188).
18
 Interestingly, empire could be seen as a cure to this aristocratic “cultural treason,” 
partly because the valor of middle class colonial militias—as in the Seven Years’ War—was an 
exemplar of national character (“The Good” 250). Therefore, the “Frenchification” of the British 
polity could be perceived as a threat to the maintenance and expansion of empire, yet it could 
also be seen as further justification for the imperial project and its role in maintaining English 
identity in the face of the foreign “Other.” Indeed, Wilson has convincingly argued that 
discourses of patriotism were inextricably linked with those of empire, since “empire” was a 
place where the middle class labored “to becom[e] more independent and self-contained as a 
nation, rejecting ‘foreign’ influences, circumscribing degeneracy, and introducing English virtue 
wherever the latter dared to tread” (254-55). 
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 Earlier I stated that Italy, Ireland, and France, though positioned in drastically different 
ways, can be seen, to a certain extent, as uncanny doubles of England. When Louis XVI was 
executed in 1793, for example, Bishop Samuel Horsley connected the French king’s death to 
Charles I’s, stating to the House of Lords on the anniversary of King Charles’s death: “This foul 
murther, and these barbarities, have filled the measure of the guilt and infamy of France. O my 
Country! read the horror of thy own deed in this recent heightened imitation! lament and weep, 
that this black French treason should have found its example, in the crime of thy unnatural 
sons!” (144) While it was certainly all too easy to represent France as “Other” after 1793’s levée-
en-masse and the rise of the Terror, 1789-1792 represent an interesting period when the 
Revolutionary France could be seen as unsettlingly similar yet blasphemously different from 
Britain, particularly in the French revolutionaries’ figuration of liberty. Royle relates how English 
liberties could be connected to the concrete—“roast beef, white bread, and no wooden shoes at 
the most basic; Magna Carta and trial by jury at a more elevated level”—while the Jeffersonian 
ideals that the French were after appeared to be more “abstract” (153).  Among the English 
loyalists, Burke is of course the most remembered opponent of so-called “natural rights.” When 
noted Revolution sympathizer Dr. Richard Price addressed the London Revolution Society in 
1789, he honored the memory of 1688 and invoked three specific aspects of the Glorious 
Revolution as particularly praiseworthy: 
 First; The right to liberty of conscience in religious matters. 
 Secondly, the right to resist power when abused. And, 
 Thirdly; The right to choose our own governors; to cashier them for misconduct;  
 and to frame a government for ourselves. (qtd. in Cobban 61) 
 
Burke vehemently disagreed with Price’s summation of 1688 in his Reflections, claiming that the 
Glorious Revolution had not created any of the governmental reforms cited in Price’s third 
point. He argued instead that the Revolution of 1688 had proven that “political structures rest 
on natural order rather than on natural rights, and that the Glorious Revolution had in fact been 
  36
a conservative act which sustained the traditions of the English people by creating a balanced 
structure of king, lords, and commons and thus giving a political expression to natural order” 
(Woodcock 21). Most notably however, Burke used Price’s claims as a basis for his own 
arguments against what he perceived to be “meaningless” abstract rights, and went on to “insist 
that that such rights as existed for man in society were inherited and embodied in constitutional 
precedent…In Burke’s opinion the English Constitution had evolved and mellowed over 
centuries; it contained no notions of abstract or natural rights, it needed no drastic reformation 
and certainly no innovation” (Emsley 34).  
Ultimately then, I would suggest that a big part of the reason why the French call for 
“liberté, égalité, et fraternité” was so dangerous to the British élite was because the radicals 
were able to rhetorically frame (however inaccurately) the French Revolution as kith and kin to 
the Glorious Revolution. Such rhetoric not only situated England uncomfortably close to France 
in terms of history and politics, but also could potentially serve to validate the radical opinions 
of English Jacobins. Indeed, in the early days of the Revolution, “most of those who did take an 
interest in events in France viewed them as weakening the old enemy and, possibly, leading the 
French to enjoy constitutional benefits similar to those enjoyed in Britain for a century” (Emsley 
33, my italics). By way of example, Helen Maria Williams defended her embattled patriotism by 
claiming that she was merely celebrating a spread of liberty that was similar to Britain’s own 
(Kennedy 77), and Deborah Kennedy suggests that the Reverend Dr. Price’s early support of the 
Revolution was inspired in part by its similarity to the Glorious Revolution (55). Therefore, the 
radicals’ early enthusiasm for the Revolution, brought about by its ostensible comparability to 
English notions of liberty, is key to understanding the anti-French sentiment that swept England 
in 1793 and beyond. By carrying out a Revolution in the name of Enlightenment principles, and 
then “allowing” those very principles to get twisted into something as violent as the Terror, or as 
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parodic and bizarre as the Cult of Reason, France became on a certain level a warped, chaotic 
image of England and its ideals, an “Other” that could ostensibly consume its alleged progenitor. 
These concerns were certainly not entirely unfounded, as British radical societies existed (albeit 
marginally and generally peacefully) throughout the 1790s, the number of French exiles to 
Britain climbed in 1792 (Royle 16-17), France declared war on England in 1793, Irish patriots 
were encouraged by the French Revolution to clamor for a more representative parliament and 
religious freedom (21), and some members of the United Irishmen hoped to see French troops 
land on their shores as potential allies. 
Therefore, French liberty needed to be characterized as monstrous. The famous political 
cartoon The Contrast (1792), for example, depicts “a dignified picture of a matron-like woman as 
the allegorical figure of British Liberty, placed next to a horrific image of a blood-thirsty and 
muscular hag representing French Liberty” (Kennedy 105). The text of the cartoon offers British 
liberty as “Religion, Morality, Loyalty, Obedience to the Laws, Independance [sic], Personal 
Security, Justice, Inheritance, Protection of Property, Industry, National Prosperity, and 
Happiness” while French liberty is represented as “Atheism, Perjury, Rebelion [sic], Treason, 
Anarchy, Murder, Equality, Madness, Cruelty, Injustice, Treachery, Ingratitude, Idleness, Famine, 
Nation & Private Ruin, and Misery.” Relatedly, Burke’s xenophobic response to the Festival of 
the Federation can be read as a resisting of the radicals’ eager tendency to conflate English 
liberty with the new French liberty. Similar to how travelers like Cooper and Yorke used the 
discourses of foreignness to distance Britain from the slowly modernizing Ireland, or the way 
that Addison and the Grand Tourists castigated Italy’s poverty and Catholicism while at the same 
time reappropriating its classical heritage, Burke and his ilk represented England’s southern 
neighbor as monstrous and savage, a “heathen” nation masquerading as a western civilization. 
However, whereas Italy could be seen as both the best and the worst of what the British Empire 
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could become, and Ireland could be read as an embarrassing reminder of England’s premodern 
heritage that nevertheless had potential to become a “component” of Britain, France became a 
warped parody of English ideals that threatened to replace the “genuine article”—much like the 
fictive fear of a Gothic doppelganger murdering and taking the place of the original individual. 
 In this vein, it is interesting to read the French Revolution as a metonym for England’s 
growing disenchantment with the dashed ideals of classical civilization. Like Neoclassicism, the 
Revolution was based on “Enlightenment” principles such as freedom, equality, and personal 
liberty, but also like Neoclassicism the Revolution terminated in a failure of ideology, the broken 
promises of an idealistic dogma, and the replacement of those promises with horror, violence, 
and fear of encroaching savagery. It is impossible to miss the increasing “Gothiciziation” of 
English discourse about France as the latter moved into the Terror. Kennedy relates how in the 
very first letter of the third volume of her correspondence from France, the normally 
Francophilic Williams writes of Robespierre’s “countenance of such dark aspect” and the fact 
that he “regulates the most ferocious designs with the most calm and temperate prudence” 
(1.3.7). Similarly, John Moore noted that “[f]ew Men however can look fiercer than Robespierre; 
in countenance he has a striking resemblance to a cat-tiger” (Kennedy 101, original italics).  
These dramatic depictions would perhaps be most at home in one of Ann Radcliffe’s 
novels! Consider Radcliffe’s description of the villainous Montoni in The Mysteries of Udolpho, 
who is partly characterized by the “fire and keenness of his eye, its proud exultation, its bold 
fierceness, its sullen watchfulness” (157), or the appearance of Schedoni in The Italian, whose 
“figure was striking, but not so from grace…His was not the melancholy of a sensible and 
wounded heart, but apparently that of a gloomy and ferocious disposition…his eyes were so 
piercing that they seemed to penetrate, at a single glance, into the hearts of men” (43). I am not 
alone in this assessment either, as Kennedy refers to “the persistent evocation of the monstrous 
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to describe Robespierre’s supporters and their work,” (113) and Elizabeth Bohls describes 
Williams’s diction as similar to the “discourse of Gothic” in how it represents the “savage, 
subhuman quality” of Robespierre’s agents (130). 
 Again, what I am ultimately trying to do here is account for France’s political condition 
and England’s perceptions of it in the late eighteenth century. What is of most importance for 
our purposes is the fact that British critics of Revolutionary France often deployed both the 
discourses of the Gothic and the discourses of empire when discussing that nation, in an 
attempt to distance England ideologically from France and its failed attempt at restructuring the 
country based on a “twisted” interpretation of liberty.  
* * * * * * * * * * * *  
The next chapter will be focused on Caleb Williams, and the way that Godwin uses the 
prevailing discourses on Italy, Ireland, and the imperial project to make a case for the corrupting 
influence of the foreignized English aristocracy on British domesticity. It would seem that much 
of my argument here will be grounded in the seemingly oppositional politics of radical and 
conservative writers, whose feelings about domesticity were largely influenced by both imperial 
expansion and the French Revolution. I find it interesting that radicals and anti-Jacobins alike 
both valued domesticity and both simultaneously valued and castigated sensibility, yet did so for 
different reasons. I have decided that it will be fruitful to frame my readings of the texts and my 
readings of empire within this opposition. Specifically, I understand the anti-Jacobins as seeing 
domesticity as an extension of Burke’s universal law—for this camp, good private behavior 
breeds good public behavior (Johnson 184). Godwin, on the other hand, saw domesticity as the 
only place where people could interact rationally, since they would be away from the ubiquity of 
authority figures in the public space—“because the public sphere, unlike the hearth, is imagined 
as continuous with the marketplace in which the citizen as consumer, immersed in the practice 
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of monadic, hedonistic subjectivity, indulges in the pleasures of demagogic solicitation and 
group identification” (McCann 65-66). In terms of colonialism, I believe this implies that the 
conservative mainstream regarded Britain’s “benevolent” empire as embarking on the “noble” 
project of legislating morality and promoting the universal law to the universe. The danger, of 
course, would be that which was seen in India—corruption breaking out overseas and finding its 
way back home. Godwin would undoubtedly have opposed this venture since it would wed 
public, authoritarian law to the private, subjective home on an international scale. Burke’s call 
for a “sympathetic identification” with India attests to his (somewhat) anti-colonial attitude and 
bespeaks his well-reasoned opposition to the enterprises of the East India Company. While such 
a sentiment may have perhaps appealed to Godwin’s sense of “universal benevolence,” I believe 
he also readily recognized Burke’s sympathy as a sort of “Trojan horse” which concealed the call 
for a common morality. Therefore, I would claim that Godwin attacked Burke’s notion of 
sympathy through Caleb Williams, in which Falkland’s “sympathetic identification” with Italy 
leads to his loss of a virtuous English identity, which in turn causes the violent domestic 
disruption that is central to the novel’s conflict.   
The third chapter will be concerned with how the heroines of Ann Radcliffe’s The 
Romance of the Forest, The Mysteries of Udolpho, and The Italian seek to dispel the creolized 
self and restabilize the primacy and purity of English domestic values while traveling within 
Europe. I maintain in this chapter that, because the protagonists of these novels are eighteenth-
century middle-class folk in their behaviors and attitudes, yet nominally southern European, that 
they are essentially occupying a diaspora. They are forcibly brought into this diaspora by 
recognizably “foreign” villains, and yet they seize upon these opportunities to promote a 
conservative model of English domesticity while abroad.  The “corrupting influences” of Paris 
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and Italy play a large role here, as do the discourses of the sublime, sensibility, travel, and of 
course domesticity.  
The fourth chapter will detail how Frankenstein highlights the tension between 
gentrifying the colonized Other to preserve national integrity and leaving it in an anomalous 
state that threatens to turn around and render the English subject himself ethnically 
destabilized. Travel, particularly intra-European travel, plays a large role here, as do domesticity 
and the sublime. By tracing these varying approaches to the question of foreignness and 
domesticity, I hope to contribute to the slowly growing body of scholarship on the Gothic’s 
nationalistic implications and its level of engagement with the foreign. 
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CHAPTER I 
PRODUCING OTHERNESS AT HOME: MALFEASANCE AND DERACINATION IN CALEB WILLIAMS 
If the law is in the Other, my fate is neither power nor desire, it is the fate of an estranged 
person: my fate is death. 
-Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror 
In his summation of “The Impact of the French Revolution on British Politics and 
Society,” Clive Emsley explains that “what the 1790s did was to demonstrate the legal powers 
available to the British government to maintain itself, and the limits on the boasted rights of 
Englishmen when the government and the ruling élite perceived itself under threat” (58, my 
italics). William Godwin’s Caleb Williams or Things as They Are (1794) provides an interesting 
fictional reflection of this statement in the sense that it presents the reader with several 
scenarios in which a member of the “ruling élite perceive[s] [him]self under threat” and 
responds hegemonically.  
Admittedly, very little scholarship has been performed on many of the moments in 
Caleb Williams that I want to examine—no one seems to have done a close reading of Caleb’s 
sojourn in the robbers’ den, for example, the dynamics of which form a key pivot for my 
arguments. This is not to say, of course, that there is any lack of scholarly interest in Godwin’s 
most well-known novel; many critics have recently published provocative studies on Caleb 
Williams.
19
 Truthfully, this work tends to defy genre categorizations; Monika Fludernik has 
                                                 
19
 For example, Nicolle Jordan has written on the problem of public opinion in “The Promise and 
Frustration of Plebeian Public Opinion in Caleb Williams” in Eighteenth-Century Fiction 19.3 (2007): 243-
66. Ingrid Horrocks performs a Bahktinian reading by considering the dialogic narratives of Caleb Williams 
in “More than a Gravestone: Caleb Williams, Udolpho, and the Politics of the Gothic” in Studies in the 
Novel 39.1 (2007): 31-47. Daniela Garofalo addresses the intersection of violence, power, and sensibility-
encoded-as-“male weakness” in “‘A Left-Handed Way’: Modern Masters in William Godwin’s Caleb 
Williams” in European Romantic Review 17.2 (2006): 237-44. Elaine Ayers considers Caleb Williams’s 
failure to obtain an independent self against the more traditionally Gothic narrative of Emily Melvile in 
“Repeating ‘A Half-Told and Mangled Tale’: Reading Caleb Williams Through Emily Melville” in English 
Language Notes 42.4 (2005): 24-43. 
  43
commented that it has been read as an “English Jacobin novel,” canonized as a “Romantic 
novel,” remarked on as the first “spy novel,” considered in relation to the “Gothic novel,” (857) 
and has even been called “one of the first fictional studies of abnormal psychology” (Bode 96, 
qtd. in Fludernik 857). However, none of the extant scholarly literature directly engages the 
notions of domesticity, nationhood, and deracination that I am considering. It is particularly 
surprising that no one has produced a work examining the roles and representations of 
domesticity in Caleb Williams, and the lack of scholarship on the complicated question of race in 
this novel is baffling. Furthermore, Caroline Reitz’s “Bad Cop/Good Cop: Godwin, Mill and the 
Imperial Origins of the English Detective” (2000), which has helped me in many ways to situate 
my arguments, is the only study I know of that performs a lengthy analysis of the novel through 
the lens of imperialism. Some works consider the sublime in Caleb Williams
20
 and these are 
engaged below when appropriate.  
 While part of the goal of this study is to explore how the discourses raised by the 
imperial project affected English representations of the European continent, it is just as—if not 
more—important to consider how the values of the European continent were perceived as 
infiltrating England itself. This dialectic has already been sketched in historical terms in the 
previous chapter, so the current task is to consider how these relationships are represented in 
the literature of the 1790s. 
 While this study is not the first to consider Caleb Williams through a Burkean lens,
21
 it is, 
to the best of my knowledge, the first to pair a reading of Godwin’s novel specifically with 
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 Most notable among these are prolific critic Monika Fludernik’s “William Godwin’s Caleb Williams: 
The Tarnishing of the Sublime” in ELH  68.4 (2001): 857-97, and “Spectacle, Theatre, and Sympathy in 
Caleb Williams” in Eighteenth-Century Fiction 14.1 (2001): 1-30, as well as David Hogsette’s “Textual 
Surveillance, Social Codes, and Sublime Voices: The Tyranny of Narrative in Caleb Williams and 
Wieland” in Romanticism on the Net (2005): 38-39. 
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 Marilyn Butler and Gavin Edwards, for example, have read Caleb Williams at least partly in relation to 
Burke’s Reflections, while Monika Fludernik and Robert Kaufman have read Godwin’s novel against 
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Burke’s India policies. Fludernik is mostly correct to claim that critical readings of Caleb Williams 
tend to be either “political interpretations which try to reveal the arguments of Political Justice 
(1793) in the novel…or analyses that focus on Caleb’s psychology, his narrative unreliability, and 
his relationship to Falkland” (857). While both of these approaches are certainly valuable in their 
own ways, they are also certainly not mutually exclusive, and this study invokes both traditions. 
In my reading, politically we see Godwin extending Burke’s claims about colonial 
mismanagement in India to make a point about aristocratic hegemony in England. To make this 
argument, Godwin situates Caleb’s antagonist, Squire Falkland, at an interesting philosophical 
nexus, positioning him somewhere between the English man of virtue and the Italian man of 
chivalric honor. Where Burke claims that the managers of the East India Company are corrupted 
by avarice during their time abroad and that they bring that corruption back home to England’s 
domestic sphere, Godwin claims through Falkland that the English aristocracy are corrupted by 
their time in Italy on the Tour, and that they bring archaic notions of honor and status back to 
England and use these values to justify impinging on the “free and natural rights” of the 
common people. However, this move also has psychological implications in that it essentially 
forces Falkland to occupy an ethnic position without clear boundaries, a place where the threat 
of the English self telescoping into the Italian Other is ever present—and it is because of this 
anomalousness that Falkland persecutes Caleb, and it is because of this persecution that Caleb 
himself becomes ethnically destabilized. Furthermore, certain actions that these characters 
perform as a result of their murky status—Caleb’s prosecuting Falkland in open court at the end 
of the novel, for example—perform a political function in that they destabilize commonly-held 
notions of class and power relations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Burke’s Enquiry. Furthermore, Fludernik cites “Boulton, Butler, McCracken and Storch [as] hav[ing] all 
suggested [that] Falkland is a close counterpart of Edmund Burke” (858). 
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The question of sublimity is not as pressing in Caleb Williams as it is in the works of 
Radcliffe and Shelley. “Sublimity in the novel,” according to Monika Fludernik, is “directly 
associated not with landscape but with moral indications of divinity: virtue, and particularly 
benevolence and magnanimity. It is also, though ambivalently, linked with greatness as 
instanced in great men, particularly Alexander the Great” (867, my italics). This, along with the 
fact that sublimity consistently works against the “unvirtuous” Caleb (unlike Victor Frankenstein 
or Radcliffe’s heroines) leads me to suggest that Falkland’s sublimity can be read as a tool that 
he uses to maintain his position in the social hierarchy. It would be belaboring a rather obvious 
point to account for all of the moments in Caleb Williams when Falkland is coded as sublime, as 
these moments on their own do not accomplish much more than a reinforcement of Falkland’s 
status as an overwhelming power. Hence, this chapter will not be engaging this particular 
discourse’s intersection with imperialism simply because there is no substantive connection. 
All of this matters for Caleb since it is Falkland’s Italianate sense of honor that causes 
him to persecute his former ward, who possesses a damning secret that could destroy the 
Squire’s reputation. The textual evidence overwhelmingly suggests that it is as a direct result of 
Falkland’s sublime, seemingly omnipotent surveillance that Caleb is forced to travel indefinitely 
through a sinister England where every person could be a spy for his persecutor, and it is as a 
direct result of Falkland’s sustained maltreatment that Caleb must deracinate himself through 
disguise, first as an Irish beggar and then as a Jewish merchant. In the words of James 
Thompson, “Great Britain becomes one huge Panopticon” (239).Therefore, this chapter argues 
that the aristocracy’s reliance on misplaced values, brought about by identification with the 
continent, transforms Britain into an unrecognizably foreign place—more like “tumultuous” 
Europe than the unique bastion of virtue and civilization that it had constructed itself as—and 
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undercuts the “natural rights of Englishmen” like Caleb to the point where it is questionable as 
to whether or not they are even still Englishmen.  
Finally, this chapter also argues that it is not just English liberty that is threatened here, 
but also the very notion of English civilization itself. The key “loss of civilization” moment for 
Caleb Williams occurs near the end of the novel, when he states that all of his “benevolence” 
(read “sentiment”) has “turned to gall” as a result of Falkland’s harassment (350). I claim this in 
light of Katherine Hill-Miller’s provocative assertion that sympathy is “the essential civilizing 
ingredient” (70), a statement she makes in her monograph on the work and father-daughter 
dynamic of Mary Shelley and William Godwin.
22
 Even before Caleb’s “gall” though, we see 
multiple examples of the destruction of sympathy, since almost every single person he 
encounters, whether stranger or former friend, sees Caleb as an irredeemable villain unworthy 
of benevolence. This plays out most significantly in the interlude between Caleb and Laura, the 
Welsh woman who appears as not just a mother figure for the embattled protagonist, but also 
as a chance to escape his nightmare by retiring to a realm of pastoral domesticity, as Caleb at 
one point fantasizes about marrying her eldest daughter. Laura’s violent rejection of Caleb—for 
whom she once had sympathy—when she is exposed to Falkland’s lies destroys any potential for 
domestic bliss, which in turn signifies a closing off of the fundamental unit of middle-class 
society. Hence, the intervention of the foreign in the formation of the ruling élite’s value system 
sparks a complex series of decivilizing events, ultimately terminating in the undoing of both the 
individual and the society. 
In sum, this chapter is largely framed by a political-historical narrative, exemplified by 
Burke’s concerns about the importation of foreign corruption and Godwin’s redeployment of 
that dynamic. Essentially, this chapter considers a historical nexus where Burke’s well-informed 
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 This is not a new idea. Though critical of its “demasculinizing” potential, Adam Smith acknowledged in 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments that “delicate sensibility [is] required in civilized nations” (209). 
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arguments about colonial mismanagement in India are taken up by Godwin, who in turn extends 
them to criticize the local aristocracy for the perceived destruction of “English values,” a move 
that he makes by troping Italy as the source of malfeasance rather than, say, hereditary 
privilege. The real heart of Godwin’s concerns, though, lies not with the aristocracy, but with 
their subjects, as the primary focus of the novel is on how the gentry’s oppression of the lower 
classes effaces English identity and virtue. To elaborate on the nature of Godwin’s extension, I 
would say that on a national scale, the Hastings debacle destabilized England’s identity as a 
virtuous empire and raised questions about its alleged moral superiority; Godwin could then 
readily shift such concerns about England’s virtue onto members of the aristocracy, whose 
political and material benefit from an increasingly corrupt colonial enterprise—along with their 
perceived lavishness and decadence—made them easy to construct as foreignized Others, the 
internal source of corruption, dynamically similar to the “boys” returning from India. However, 
the aristocracy’s members’ clear ethnic status as Englishmen problematizes any attempts to 
paint the ancien regime as inexorably Other, thus casting them into an anomalous position. 
Caleb Williams, this chapter contends, takes notice of the upper class’s ethnic/behavioral schism 
and extends it to the middle class, demonstrating how the unstable position of the aristocracy 
can be readily transmitted to the “common people” via abuse of power. Perhaps most 
importantly, this divide between nationality and performance takes the overt form of 
deracination, as seen in Falkland’s Italianation and Caleb’s subsequent adoption of Irish and 
Jewish disguises. It is these moments of deracination that most clearly make the case for 
empire’s discursive role in the perceived decay of English virtue and national character.  
Finally, before delving into the many texts that concern us, it would be best to 
remember Godwin’s own words in his unpublished essay “Of History and Romance”: 
The writer of romance then is to be considered as the writer of real history; while he 
who was formerly called the historian, must be contented to step down into the place of 
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his rival, with this disadvantage, that he is a romance writer, without the arduous, the 
enthusiastic, and the sublime license of imagination, that belong to that species of 
composition. True history consists in a delineation of consistent, human character, in a 
display of the manner in which such a character acts under successive circumstances, in 
showing how character increases and assimilates new substances to its own, and how it 
decays, together with the catastrophe into which by its own gravity it naturally declines. 
(372, my italics) 
 
George Haggerty reads this statement quite accurately as an exciting and radical challenge to 
“the accepted view of history” (109). I have cited it here because it provides a useful frame for 
the current analysis. If Godwin could read “romance” as not just a mediation of history, but as 
history itself, then the many historical currents which run through and inform the narrative and 
discursive elements of Caleb Williams are that much less distinguishable from the elements 
themselves. Indeed, this perspective informs not just the current chapter but, to an extent, this 
study as a whole. 
Burke, Godwin, and the Discourses of Corruption 
According to Caroline Reitz, Caleb Williams demonstrates “that the way of coping with 
the domestic disruption posed by the rise of an organized police force was to explore the 
character of English authority in the colonies” (175). Basically, this means that Godwin’s novel 
helped pave the way for James Stuart Mill’s later arguments in the History of British India (1821), 
that an organized police force was necessary in England’s “lawless” colony. In essence, India was 
to be the place where Britain could experiment with a police force before introducing such an 
institution to skeptical Londoners who feared the loss of their freedoms at the hands of law 
enforcement officials; Godwin, according to Reitz, “uses the colonies to imagine a new—and 
newly acceptable—kind of English authority” (176). While arguments over the nature of law 
enforcement may not appear to be immediately relevant to our purposes, what is most 
important here is Godwin’s criticism of the nature of “English authority,” and how such debates 
“generated the logic that what was wrong within England became visible only when one looked 
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outside of England” (176). The former point highlights Caleb Williams’s status as a critique of the 
ruling élite, and the latter point validates my contention that English authors were aware of a 
discursive relationship between colonial and domestic problems and were ready to address this 
correspondence in fiction. Again, as evidenced by Mary-Louise Pratt’s and others’ dialogic 
readings of Britain and its empire, it is more or less impossible to talk about the home in this 
period without talking about the colonies, or vice versa.
23
   
In terms of colonialism, it is rather difficult to pinpoint Godwin’s position on the imperial 
project—as if anyone’s perspective on the situation was fixed and unproblematic at this (or any) 
time. As a leading proponent of natural rights, it seems likely that Godwin would have 
recognized the injustice of subjugating a people under colonial rule; and yet, his perspective on 
the wider world was certainly naïve and Eurocentric in 1789 when, as a member of the 
Revolution Society, he congratulated the French and advised “that, as the world’s leading 
countries, France and Britain should work together and promote the cause of freedom 
worldwide” (Woodcock 15). Furthermore, Reitz relates how the impeachment of Warren 
Hastings struck a powerful chord in Godwin, who, along with James Mill, was concerned about 
“England’s precarious claims to civilization” (177-178), an attitude which I believe expresses a 
deeper concern for the maintenance of England’s constructed supremacy than it does for the 
rights and dignity of indigenous peoples.  This reading is borne out in the novel itself. At one 
point Caleb expresses his disapproval of aristocratic excess and its connection to the colonial 
project, stating that “provinces are ransacked for the gratification of [man’s] appetite, and the 
whole world traversed to supply him with apparel and furniture. Thus vast is his expenditure, 
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 Mirella Agorni, for example, writes that “Foreign and domestic are inescapably linked to each other in 
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and the purchase slavery. He is dependent on a thousand accidents for tranquility and health, 
and his body and soul are at the devotion of whoever will satisfy his imperious cravings” (187).
24
 
This passage is reminiscent of the oft-cited perceived correlation between imperial spoil and 
indolence/effeminacy. However, Godwin subtly moves this rather unremarkable discourse in a 
fresh direction by employing the rhetoric of freedom. Those who claim a share of imperial spoil 
without actually laboring in the colonies—note the use of passive voice: “provinces are 
ransacked for the gratification of his appetite”—are “enslaved” not only by their gains but also 
by the providers of these spoils, those who “will satisfy [their] imperious cravings.” In support of 
this, Kathleen Wilson writes that direct participation in the empire was understood as a cure to 
aristocratic “cultural treason” and effeminacy, a perspective that gained currency in the wake of 
Britain’s American wars with the French, during which colonial militias had served with honor 
and distinction (250). Essentially, the empire came to be constructed as a place where the 
virtuous middle class worked on “becoming more independent and self-contained as a nation, 
rejecting ‘foreign’ influences, circumscribing degeneracy, and introducing English virtue 
wherever the latter dared to tread” (255). Hence, it seems that Godwin, like many of his 
contemporaries, was primarily concerned with empire insofar as how international relations 
impacted England and its primacy. More specifically, his concern seems to have been with how 
foreign enterprises further corrupted the ruling élite, which, as we shall see, contributed to 
impede the progress of an ideology of individual liberties. 
In many ways though, it was Caroline Reitz’s reading of the justice system in Caleb 
Williams that inspired my examination of this novel’s connection to empire. In her work, she has 
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palace you must never enter, to sleep under a ruined weather-beaten roof, while your master sleeps under 
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(2.5.12, my italics). 
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effectively mapped out a link between the novel and a historical concern that is connected with 
the empire, most succinctly summarized in her claim that “Caleb Williams is littered with the 
‘structure of attitude and reference’ toward empire that Edward Said considers part of the 
culture of imperialism” (180). She supports this statement by citing Falkland’s plantation 
interests, the “clear imperialist implications” of his obsession with reputation, and Falkland and 
Caleb’s heated discussion about Alexander the Great. However, though she effectively 
deconstructs the ideological parallel between corruption in England and corruption in India, she 
fails to account for the role that class politics plays in the creation and maintenance of 
hegemony. Considering the facts that Godwin represents the justice system as a puppet for 
Squire Falkland, and that Falkland’s wrongful behavior is often and consistently imputed to his 
“Italian” traits, it is just as important to consider the following: aristocratic malfeasance was a 
component of systemic injustice, the aristocracy itself was linked ethically and behaviorally to 
“the foreign European,” and discourses of “the foreign European” were in turn enabled and 
made relevant by the problems of empire.  
To further support this contention, it is important for us to trace how the discursive link 
I am identifying grows rhetorically out of the discussion that Burke and others were having 
about the problems in India. It is worthwhile, therefore, to cite a rather lengthy excerpt from 
Burke’s “Speech on Fox’s East India Bill”: 
There is nothing in the boys we send to India worse than in the boys whom we are 
whipping at school, or that we see trailing a pike or bending over a desk at home. But as 
English youth in India drink the intoxicating draught of authority and dominion before 
their heads are able to bear it, and as they are full grown in fortune long before they are 
ripe in principle, neither Nature nor reason have any opportunity to exert themselves 
for remedy of the excesses of their premature power…Their prey is lodged in England; 
and the cries of India are given to seas and winds, to be blown about, in every breaking 
up of the monsoon, over a remote and unhearing ocean. In India all the vices operate by 
which sudden fortune is acquired: in England are often displayed, by the same persons, 
the virtues which dispense hereditary wealth. Arrived in England, the destroyers of the 
nobility and gentry of a whole kingdom will find the best company in this nation at a 
board of elegance and hospitality… They marry into your families; they enter into your 
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senate; they ease your estates by loans; they raise their value by demand; they cherish 
and protect your relations which lie heavy on your patronage; and there is scarcely an 
house in the kingdom that does not feel some concern and interest that makes all 
reform of our Eastern government appear officious and disgusting, and, on the whole, a 
most discouraging attempt. (209) 
 
Burke’s invective against the East India Company’s managers demonstrates the clear and 
present danger these men and their imbibement of “the intoxicating draught of authority” 
supposedly represent to the nation; the acute paranoia of the last sentence of this excerpt is a 
particularly striking example of concerns about foreign-bred malfeasance infiltrating the 
domestic and thus corrupting not only the marketplace, but also systems of transmission and 
inheritance.  
In the realm of England and Caleb Williams, political radicals who were critical of Burke’s 
infamous Reflections on the Revolution in France still applauded his impeachment of Hastings 
(Reitz 177), Godwin himself characterizing the governor-general of India as “a despotic and 
imperious veteran,” leader of a “memorable band of East Indian culprits” (Marken 22, 24). Of 
Burke and the impeachment itself, Godwin wrote “he closes this long and splendid career with a 
great public prosecution, the example of which may wash away the stains of Britain, and ensure 
security and peace to generations yet unborn” (20). Writing on James Stuart Mill’s History of 
British India, Reitz comments that Mill’s recounting of the Hastings trial, particularly where 
Nuncomar’s execution was brought to light, “sounds like a Caleb Williams plot summary: servant 
accuses master thereby becoming the accused.” She even spends approximately half a page 
reading Hastings for Falkland in order to claim that “the single crime of Hastings/Falkland is to 
obstruct the spirit of inquiry through a strategy of preemptive criminalization” (186). Though 
introducing such a “neat” correlation between history and fiction is risky for all but the most 
hard line Marxist scholars—and I do think that Reitz pushes the envelope here—I am less 
interested in her ultimate claim than the fact that it helps to support the contention that the 
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discursive elements of the India problem could conceivably be translated into a work of fiction 
that was concerned, above all else, with the political situation in England. Considering this, and 
his enthusiastic approval of the impeachment proceedings, it is not much of a leap to claim that 
Godwin would subtly use the same kind of arguments as Burke in his writing of Caleb Williams in 
order to highlight the crimes and shortcomings of the local aristocracy. Furthermore, Godwin 
also notably argued that an English spirit of curiosity would help to cure malfeasance in India in 
the sense that a movement towards open, detective-style inquiry would go a long way towards 
helping to check the East India Company’s abuses of power (180). This notion, of course, is 
fictively explored in Caleb Williams’s dogged pursuit of the truth regarding Falkland’s guilt or 
innocence in the murder of Tyrrel, and lends further credence to the idea that the social justice 
themes of Caleb Williams are deeply inflected by the India situation.  
However, it must be emphasized that Caleb Williams is not somehow secretly a novel 
about India. It is unquestionably a novel about England—but an England that Burke and his 
peers perceive as being in decay largely as a result of the degeneracy of the privileged younger 
sons returning from India. Yet, rather than directly engaging the problems stemming from the 
East India Company, Caleb Williams extends Burke’s concerns to make an original claim about 
the injustice perpetuated by the ruling elite. Essentially, Godwin borrows from a politically 
charged situation to advance his own radical agenda. And since he is focusing his criticism on the 
aristocracy, it makes sense that he should choose Italy, the ideological source of aristocratic 
privilege, as the originating site of corruption in Caleb Williams. By concluding that Falkland’s 
behavior is the result of his absorption into Italian culture, Godwin is using popular—albeit 
stereotypical—perceptions of Italy and what it represents to England to make a compelling 
point about domestic injustices: not only is the aristocracy corrupt, it is corrupt to the point that 
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its members no longer have the right to claim the marker “Englishman” because, in Godwin’s 
view, “Englishman” is synonymous with “personal liberty.”  
In order to make more sense of Godwin’s motives, it is important to consider the 
historical extent of the aristocracy’s influence on the lower classes. Previously, we saw Robin 
Eagles’s contention that the English élite had adopted “continental,” particularly French, 
“attitudes, fashions and opinions,” and that this continentalism was “ap[ed] by the middling 
sorts” (4).  Kathleen Wilson addresses a kindred notion when she writes that empire 
could serve as a potent symbol of the innate superiority of the national character in 
which all social classes could share…the Others generated by the imperial project were 
never limited to those outside the national boundaries. Empire mediated notions of 
class that were articulated in and through conceptualizations of the dangerous and 
hostile forces lurking in the domestic polity. Aristocratic ‘effeminacy’ and corruption, for 
example, presented a distinctive threat to a virtuous polity, for they seeped into the 
body politic from above, through social and cultural patronage and political power, 
corroding both national manners and martial might. (255, my italics) 
 
For Wilson then, literal empire created a discourse through which “dangerous and hostile forces 
lurking in the domestic polity” could be articulated, and it is through “social and cultural 
patronage and political power” that the aristocracy rained corruption on the middling classes. 
Relatedly, Ingrid Horrocks has identified Godwin’s purpose as being “to show how power is 
enforced through the threat of violence and how the law and every level of society are 
implicated in that violence” (41, my italics). In the context of the period, Godwin himself 
commented in the highly political Preface to Caleb Williams that “[i]t is now known to 
philosophers that the spirit and character of the government intrudes itself into every rank of 
society” (1), and Caleb closes out the first chapter by commenting that “[m]y heart bleeds at the 
recollection of [Falkland’s] misfortunes as if they were my own. How can it fail to do so? To his 
story the whole fortune of my life was linked; because he was miserable, my happiness, my 
name, and my existence have been irretrievably blasted” (10, my italics). Therefore, Godwin 
focused his critique primarily on the aristocracy because he recognized its prominent role in 
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systemic injustice—at best, it acted as a bad moral example to the “middling classes”; at worst, 
it actively oppressed its dependents. And by configuring the aristocracy as an Italian-inflected 
institution, Godwin was able to mobilize popular stereotypes of Italy to drive home the point 
that the ruling classes were contributing to the effacement of England’s national character and 
virtue—a move that was enabled by Burke’s discourse on the dangers of exposing England’s 
sons to the degenerate culture of the East India Company. 
As for the actual effect that the gentry’s malfeasance had on its dependents, one ought 
to consider the epigraph that opened this chapter, Kristeva’s assessment of law and abjection: 
“if the law is in the Other, my fate is neither power nor desire, it is the fate of an estranged 
person: my fate is death” (87). She makes this statement in response to the Oedipus story, 
referring to the king’s slippage from monarch to subject as he violates the “incest prohibition.” 
Along these lines then, I read Caleb Williams’s “fall” from Englishman to deracinated subject and 
his subsequent “estrangement” from his society—all of which is brought about by the 
intervention of Falkland and his alliance with the Law—as a multilayered, abjectifying move. 
Since Falkland and his world essentially control the law, Caleb’s “fate” can only be one of loss 
and alienation, a fate that plays out in his isolation from civilizing “sympathy” and his 
deracinated, destabilized identity.  
 “Different Species of Aristocracy”: Falkland and Tyrell 
Before discussing Caleb and his persecution, we must first develop a better, narrower 
sense of Falkland and the dialogic nature of his “Italianate” and “English aristocratic” markers. 
Indeed, the novel makes much of his “Italianation,” and much of it is expressed in the language 
of colonial conquest’s fallout. After his narration of Falkland’s life in volume one, the old servant 
Collins blames his master’s dejection on the “idle and groundless romances of chivalry” and 
editorializes the difference between false and true honor—romantic knight-errantry versus 
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one’s refusing to “expose you or myself to unnecessary evil” (98). Much like a colonizer, Falkland 
accepts and rejects aspects of the Italian, chivalric honor code as he sees fit (10), yet Collins still 
notes that “perhaps no Englishman was ever in an equal degree idolised by the inhabitants of 
Italy” (10-11), a statement that, by virtue of the verb “idolised,” situates Falkland as somehow 
“god-like” among the “lesser” Italians. Indeed, the fact that Falkland’s “undaunted spirit and 
resolute temper gave him a decisive advantage” when encountering a certain species of 
arrogant Italian who “regard[s] almost the whole species as their inferiors” (11) bears out the 
notion that Falkland’s British resourcefulness grants him the authority to “manage” the natives 
successfully.  
Of more immediate interest, he performs cultural labor while in Italy, teaching the 
beautiful young Lucretia English so that she can better appreciate British poetry (12), and later 
placating her jealous lover Malvesi with rational discourse. The true brilliance of the Malvesi 
episode, though, lies in its avoidance of mapping Falkland and Malvesi along clear axes of 
“Englishness” and “Italianness.” After calming his assailant, Falkland tells Malvesi:  
I feel the utmost pleasure in having thus by peaceful means disarmed your resentment, 
and effected your happiness. But I must confess you put me to a severe trial. My temper 
is not less impetuous and fiery than your own, and it is not at all times that I should have 
been thus able to subdue it. But I considered that in reality the original blame was mine. 
Though your suspicion was groundless, it was not absurd. (15, my italics)
 25
 
 
For the most part, this is the language of self-possession, rationality, in a word, “Englishness.” 
The first sentence is quaintly polite to the point of being ridiculous, while the last two sentences 
are dominated by reason and a “mature” willingness to share the blame in what was clearly a 
misunderstanding. However, the italicized portion of Falkland’s monologue betrays a streak of 
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 The “fiery and impetuous temper” to which Falkland alludes is not his inborn temperament, as a casual 
reading of the above passage might suggest, but one that has been constructed by his immersion in chivalry. 
Collins relates to Caleb how Falkland “was once the gayest of the gay...[and his gaiety was] chastened with 
reflexion [sic] and sensibility, and never lost sight either of good taste or humanity...[yet his] youth, 
distinguished from its outset by the most unusual promise, is tarnished. His sensibility is shrunk up and 
withered by events the most disgustful to his feelings. His mind was fraught with all the rhapsodies of 
visionary honour” (9). 
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“wildness,” a foreshadowing of his darker, “uncivilized” nature that casts doubt upon his 
character. This is borne out in the second paragraph of Falkland’s harangue, as he confesses that 
he would have accepted Malvesi’s challenge to a duel if the challenge had been issued publicly 
because “the laws of honour are in the utmost degree rigid…if the challenge had been public, 
the proofs I had formerly given of courage would not have excused my present moderation; 
and, though desirous to have avoided the combat, it would not have been in my power” (15-16).  
Here, Falkland betrays a sense of honor that is centered on status and reputation; a sense of 
honor that was instilled in him by the “heroic poets of Italy,” the reading of whom caused him to 
“[believe] that nothing was so well calculated to make men delicate, gallant and humane, as a 
temper perpetually alive to the sentiments of birth and honour” (10). Nevertheless, Falkland just 
as quickly shifts his rhetoric into a rational context by dictating the “moral” of his and Malvesi’s 
near-encounter: passion and a sense of honor trump reason and free will when one is faced with 
an immediate threat to reputation; therefore, Malvesi should learn a lesson about the dangers 
of precipitancy (16)—the “colonizer” imparts his wisdom to the “colonized” and appropriate 
power relations are apparently maintained. However, although he has averted a literal duel 
here, I would say that Falkland has also betrayed the presence of a duel in his own breast—a 
duel between “rational English” and “chivalric Italian” ideologies. Indeed, this episode is one of 
the clearest indicators of Falkland’s ethnic destabilization. 
 It is likely not a coincidence that Falkland’s troubles begin in earnest almost immediately 
upon his return from the Tour. His neighbor, the brutish Squire Tyrrel, instantly despises him as 
an “outlandish, foreign-made Englishman,” who he hyperbolically believes “would have 
[humanity] exchange those robust exercises which made us joyous in the performance and 
vigorous in the consequences, for the wise labour of scratching our heads for a rhyme and 
counting our fingers for a verse” (20). While this characterization of Falkland does not overtly 
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invoke Italian stereotypes—though referring to Falkland as an “outlandish, foreign-made 
Englishman” can only refer to his Italian influence since Italy is the only foreign country that 
seems to have had any impact on his character—it most definitely labels him as effeminate, 
especially in comparison to the robust and athletic Tyrrel. Indeed, Tyrrel is quick to draw the 
familiar connection between effeminacy and national weakness; we are told that the Squire 
thought  
[m]onkeys were as good men as these. A nation of such animals would have no chance 
with a single regiment of the old English votaries of beef and pudding. He never saw any 
thing come of learning but to make people foppish and impertinent; and a sensible man 
would not wish a worse calamity to the enemies of his nation than to see them run mad 
after such pernicious absurdities. (20) 
 
Since Tyrrel apparently believes that Falkland would somehow impose his values on others, this 
episode recalls Wilson’s scholarship on Rev. Brown’s and others’ fears that aristocratic 
effeteness would spread to the underclasses and endanger England’s naval—and therefore 
colonial—dominance (“Patriotic” 187-188). In terms of the current question, Tyrrel’s perception 
of Falkland is significant for a number of reasons.  
First, Godwin’s tying these fears to the conduct of a landed gentleman who is not even a 
member of the “high” aristocracy brings the problem closer to the middle class. Second, the 
particular set of fears that it invokes—effeminacy equals national weakness—had its genesis 
much earlier in the century, with Reverend Brown writing Estimate of the Manners and 
Principles of the Time in the late 1750s when concerns about national wellbeing were tied to the 
deteriorating situation in North America. For Godwin to raise these concerns in 1794, long after 
Britain had lost the North American colonies, and while it was at war with France, and Burke was 
hotly contesting the rightness of England’s actions in India, is to place Falkland and his 
weaknesses in the same context as the imperial failure and political turmoil that threatened and 
threatens to destabilize England’s constructed image of primacy and virtue. And finally, the fact 
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that Falkland’s foibles are implicitly linked to his Italian conduct shifts this entire discourse into 
the milieu of continentally-generated corruption. 
 While it is true that this opinion is held by the highly unsympathetic Squire Tyrrel, this is 
not particularly problematic if one eschews questions of the (un)reliability of character in favor 
of focusing on the discursive situation. Indeed, this is the better approach to take because the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of Tyrrel’s assessment is less important than the fact that such an 
assessment can realistically be made and, as a result, raise the issues enumerated in the 
previous paragraph. Concerns about character can be even more strongly dismissed if one 
considers that Tyrrel himself is as much a caricature of aristocratic monstrosity as Falkland is 
later, albeit of quite an opposite temper. Though he “might have passed for a true model of the 
English squire” (16), Tyrrel was raised by an overly indulgent single mother, and as a result, grew 
up with very little formal education. His substantial physical vigor is described in suspiciously 
monstrous terms, as he is alternately characterized as a “whelp-lion” (17), “that hero of 
antiquity, whose prowess consisted in felling an ox with his fist, and devouring him at a meal” 
(17), “a tyger” (18) a “rural Antaeus” (18), a “wild beast” (19), and one whose “courtship was 
like the pawings of an elephant” (21). The bestial extremity of Tyrrel’s character becomes 
particularly relevant if one jumps ahead in the text for a moment, and considers Daniela 
Garofalo’s assessment that  
[t]he murder of Tyrrel functions on a historically significant level as the shift from an 
overtly patriarchal culture to a more modern and superficially benign power. Modern 
patriarchal figures abjure public violence and present themselves as the impartial and 
just administrators of a universal law, while founding their power on a violence that 
remains hidden, yet suspected. (238-239) 
 
Along these lines, I would therefore suggest that Tyrrel, like Falkland in book three, is more of a 
type than a three-dimensional character—though admittedly Falkland’s breakdown in the 
courtroom in the published ending does somewhat bring him back from the flat role of 
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“omnipotent tyrant”—and as such recognizes Falkland as a new kind of patriarch. In this 
reading, we do not see two rival squires so much as we see two rival systems of oppression, and 
ultimately the replacement of the overt one with the covert one.   
 This is not to say, however, that Godwin somehow “prefers” Tyrrel to Falkland. Indeed, 
he placed all members of the wealthy, landed class into the broad category of “aristocracy” in 
Political Justice, dismissively writing that “[i]t is not necessary to enter into a methodical 
disquisition of the different species of aristocracy, since, if the above reasonings have any force, 
they are equally cogent against them all” (2.5.15) Though Tyrrel’s physical strength and 
tendency towards gruffness characterize him as a “beef and pudding Englishman,” he cannot be 
looked upon as some sort of model of Englishness because he is clearly not virtuous. From the 
moment the brutish Squire is introduced, Godwin paints him as “insupportably arrogant, 
tyrannical to his inferiors, and insolent to his equals” (17). When Tyrrel quarrels with his 
dependent, Hawkins, and the latter prepares to take legal action against the Squire, Godwin 
bemoans Hawkins’s inevitable failure, commenting that “[w]ealth and despotism easily know 
how to engage those laws as the coadjutors of their oppression which were perhaps at first 
intended [witless and miserable precaution!] for the safeguards of the poor” (72). Furthermore, 
Tyrrel’s imprisonment of his cousin Emily Melville because she refuses to marry the coarse 
Grimes is a page directly out of the Gothic playbook; indeed, Emily Melville’s fortitude 
anticipates Radcliffe’s Emily St. Aubert, and Tyrrel’s astonished yet gruff response to Miss 
Melville’s firmness (54-55) calls to mind a Montoni or a Montalt. 
 At first glance, the decidedly “un-Frenchified” Tyrrel’s crimes may appear to 
problematize our current reading of the novel since, through Tyrrel, Godwin prevents the reader 
from seeing the problem of aristocracy as being reducable exclusively to continental influence. 
However, the point of this chapter is certainly not to claim that Godwin is trying to make the 
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case that continentally-inflected corruption is the sole cause of malfeasance. Rather, the point is 
to support the notion that Godwin deploys discourses of foreign influence to help highlight his 
main points about social injustice and class’s role in it. Considering Garofalo’s troping of Tyrrel 
and Falkland, I would suggest that Godwin is saying that the problem of aristocratic hegemony 
has always existed—indeed, Book V, chapters 10-13 of Political Justice suggest this, especially 
since Godwin sees fit to compare the aristocracy to the much more historied monarchy at the 
opening of chapter 13 (II. 14)—but the current aristocratical character is that of a covert, 
continentally-influenced Falkland. 
 This reading is borne out when one considers the narrative of Emily Melville and Elaine 
Ayers’s incisive reading of “Caleb’s story [as] in large part a structural duplication of Emily’s” 
(25)
26
. In addition to citing similarities in their upbringings—both lose their parents at an early 
age, both are essentially pressed into servitude to a lord because of financial insecurity, etc.—
Ayers points out that both Caleb and Emily occupy a privileged position in relation to their 
masters, as both can be somewhat open with their employers (27). Both are also made 
miserable by household servants with homonymous names, with Tyrrel forcing Emily to marry 
Grimes and Falkland oppressing Caleb through Gines. Provocatively, Ayers notes that Gines was 
named “Jones” in the first edition of Caleb Williams, and reasonably concludes that Godwin 
made this revision to clarify the parallelism of the two narratives “thereby underscoring their 
[Grimes and Gines’s] role as the gentry’s agents of persecution” (27). Furthermore, Emily and 
Caleb are both placed in a position of alienation, and both claim to prefer death to their present 
oppressed conditions (27-28). Of most interest though is Ayers’s problematic claim that both 
Caleb and Emily “encounter their masters’ profound antagonism to the extent that they become 
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 Those interested in the inevitable “gender trouble” that such a reading invokes ought to refer to the article 
itself. The issues of “gender queering” that Ayers raises are provocative, though not particularly relevant to 
this study. 
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prisoners in domestic employment, much like Richardson’s Pamela” (26). While it is true that 
Falkland essentially imprisons Caleb within “domestic employment” after the latter discovers 
the former’s secret, Caleb’s forced containment within Falkland’s home is only a small part of 
the novel—his imprisonment in the county jail and subsequent wanderings are far more 
prevalent. And Emily’s being imprisoned because of her refusal to be obedient to her kinsman’s 
demand that she marry an odious man owes much more to Clarissa than it does Pamela.  
What is significant about this reading for our purposes is what it evokes in terms of 
aristocratic forms. If Emily can be associated with Pamela (or Clarissa), then Tyrrel can be 
associated with overtly oppressive fictional villains, like Mr. B or the Harlowes, who were drawn 
fifty years earlier (Pamela was published in 1740, Clarissa in 1748). This in turn supports 
Garofalo’s contention that Tyrrel represents an older, more overt form of malfeasance. As for 
Falkland, even if we are to accept Ayers’s elision of him with Tyrrel along the axis of Pamela, we 
must remember that Tyrrel is ostracized by the community for his treatment of his cousin, 
whereas Falkland is consistently applauded regardless of what he does, while Caleb is 
demonized as a thief and an ingrate. Therefore, Godwin seems to be claiming that Falkland’s 
brand of aristocratic hegemony is ultimately the more destructive one, as his Italianate airs and 
gallantry have bedazzled the population and obscured his true character. Indeed, this appears to 
have been Godwin’s intent, as he claimed in his 1832 “Account of the Composition of Caleb 
Williams” that Falkland’s murder of Tyrrel “should be seen in some measure to have arisen out 
of his virtues themselves. It was necessary to make him, so to speak, the tenant of an 
atmosphere of romance, so that every reader should feel prompted almost to worship him for 
his high qualities. Here were ample materials for the first volume” (337, my italics). Hence, 
volume one of the novel can be read as being largely about constructing Falkland as a “wolf in 
sheep’s clothing,” so to speak—a “worshipful” character whose crimes were not only concealed 
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by, but also to an extent enabled by, his chivalrous virtues. In this address, Godwin implicates his 
readership in systemic injustice, effectively claiming that their tacit acceptance of charismatic 
members of the gentry like Falkland perpetuates hegemony.  
This kind of reading has not escaped the attention of contemporary critics, either. 
Nicolle Jordan considers the problematic nature of public opinion in Caleb Williams, claiming 
that “rather than revolving around the individual, the novel emphasizes the process by which 
public opinion stymies individual integrity and leads to the gross miscarriage of justice” (244). 
Indeed, the public’s overwhelmingly positive opinion of Falkland does lead “to the gross 
miscarriage of justice” in the sense that Caleb essentially suffers for Falkland’s crimes. Public 
opinion, according to Jordan, is a powerful force in the novel, not only because it is public 
opinion that keeps Caleb in check and Falkland in power, but also because populist 
sympathies—at least initially—imply a “happy ending” to volume one. After Emily Melville’s 
death, all members of society see Tyrrel as a pariah. The narration informs us that 
[i]t evidently appeared that, though wealth and hereditary elevation operate as an 
apology for many delinquencies, there are some which so irresistibly address 
themselves to the indignation of mankind, that, like death, they level all distinctions, 
and reduce their perpetrator to an equality with the most indigent and squalid of his 
species. (92) 
 
Emily Melville’s nurse advises Tyrrel that “[a]ll the world will abhor and curse you…The meanest 
beggar will spurn and spit at you” (91), a moment that Jordan claims “foretells how the narrative 
will continually strive to include the non-elite within the ranks of those who comprise public 
opinion” (247). The fact, then, that Tyrrel is held accountable for his actions implies that the old 
methods of overt hegemony and the more classically “Gothic” villains are being challenged and 
held accountable by an increasingly aware and empowered public. However, the Falkland’s of 
the world continue to escape justice. Jordan writes that  
[b]ecause the novel’s emotional energy initially derives, in part, from Caleb’s profound 
admiration and sympathy for his master, the reader is compelled to respect an 
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aristocratic ethos that is continually undermined by another storyline. This narrative 
structure creates an emblematic tension between veneration for noble sensibilities and 
indignation at the ways in which these sensibilities oppress the very public that sustains 
them. (263) 
 
And in the case of Caleb Williams, Godwin unquestionably locates the source of these “noble 
sensibilities” within Falkland’s time in Italy and his reading of Italian heroic poets. Hence, it is 
safe to conclude that Godwin is indeed deploying the trope of continentally-inflected corruption 
to impugn the current hegemonic practices of the aristocracy. 
A Note on Texts and Identity Construction 
 In fairness, it is certainly true that Falkland is not the only character who is constructed 
by the texts he reads. Godwin scholars tend to be quick to point out that Caleb is also an avid 
reader of romances. Fludernik writes that “both Caleb and Falkland imbibe the poison (of 
chivalry and curiosity) from their reading of romances which celebrate the sublime genius of 
great men” (863), and suggests that “[t]he system of romantic inequality…corrupts and ruins 
both the master and the servant, the oppressor and the slave. It forces the master to exercise 
his power to the hilt…and it forces the oppressed to become artful in their legitimate defence, 
thereby corrupting their (supposedly) native innocence and truthfulness” (887). While this 
reading is certainly supportable, one must bear in mind that it somewhat elides the “romance of 
chivalry” that Falkland reads with the “stories for boys” variety of romance that Caleb reads. 
Essentially, Caleb’s favored stories feature “feats of activity…in which corporeal ingenuity or 
strength are the means resorted to for supplying resources and conquering difficulties”; Caleb 
“panted for the unraveling of an adventure, with an anxiety, perhaps almost equal to that of the 
man whose future happiness or misery depended on its issue” (4). Falkland, meanwhile, is 
interested in “the manners depicted by these celebrated [Italian heroic] poets…[and] the 
sentiments of birth and honour” (10).  
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While Fludernik’s reading situates the two characters appropriately—the knightly 
Falkland “exercise[s] his power to the hilt” and the plucky Caleb “become[s] artful”—she does 
not take into account the ethnic implications of these two very different varieties of “romance.” 
The values that Falkland imbibes from his reading are, as I have discussed at length, clearly 
continental and “Other.” However, the “corporeal” tales of adventure that Caleb reads seem to 
gesture more readily towards the independent, rugged masculinity that Michele Cohen 
identifies in “Manliness, Effeminacy, and the French: Gender and the Construction of National 
Character in Eighteenth-Century England” as a valued characteristic of eighteenth-century 
middle-class English manhood, since it was meant to set Englishmen apart from the perceived 
foppery of the French
27
. This type of “corporeal adventure” also recalls post-Restoration, pro-
colonial stage dramas which, as Wilson reminds us, generally depicted rugged and manful 
English characters outwitting dandyish Europeans (242). Therefore, while it is true that Caleb is 
just as influenced by his reading as Falkland is, it is also important to remember that the two 
types of romance under scrutiny here also gesture towards the characters’ constructed 
nationalities.  
Finally, while one can appreciate Fludernik’s (887) and Jonathan Sachs’s (263) 
contention that both characters’ are essentially undone at the end of the novel as a result of 
their romance-reading, I think that such an interpretation is a bit of an oversimplification—Caleb 
and Falkland cannot be equated with each other so neatly. Falkland’s subscription to chivalry 
seems to be produced rather than innate, and it is essentially the root cause of many of the 
novel’s conflicts—there would be no secret for Caleb to discover if Falkland had never murdered 
Tyrrel; Falkland would not have murdered Tyrrel if the latter had not violated his sense of honor 
by attacking him in public; and the text clearly states that Falkland’s sense of honor came 
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 Despite his interest in this type of literature, Caleb’s class, innate respect for Falkland’s “virtues,” and 
enthusiastically professed love of learning situates him quite differently than Tyrrel. 
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directly from his reading (10). However, where Falkland’s reading produces his innate character, 
Caleb’s innate character seems to inform his choice of reading. Though as a boy he was not 
“particularly athletic in appearance or large in [his] dimensions” we are told that he was 
“uncommonly vigorous and active. [His] joints were supple, and [he] was formed to excel in 
youthful sports” (4), and it is his “excellence in these respects” that influences him to “read of 
feats of activity.” Furthermore, the insatiable curiosity that proves to be his downfall is not 
instilled by his reading, but rather is what motivates him to read. He claims “I was desirous of 
tracing the variety of effects which might be produced from given causes. It was this that made 
me a sort of natural philosopher…[i]n fine, this produced in me an invincible attachment to 
books of narrative and romance” (4, my italics). And despite the misfortune that befalls him as a 
result of his curiosity, it would be difficult to claim that Caleb’s curiosity is some kind of 
mirroring flaw to Falkland’s honor when one considers Godwin’s pro-inquiry stance in Political 
Justice.  Along this line, Reitz compellingly claims that  
[b]oth Godwin and Mill argued in the aftermath of Hastings that the legitimacy of 
English civilization both at home and overseas could only be restored if the public were 
guided by “a spirit of investigation” (Godwin, Political 82), a “homebred understanding” 
(Godwin, Political 552) embodied in an “enlightened inquirer” (Mill 6: 7) who could 
“detect the artifices” of “mysterious government” (Godwin, Political 552) and perform 
the “investigation of…those complicated scenes of action” (Mill 1: xxv) which imperiled 
the English virtues of reason and truth, justice and benevolence. (178) 
 
Hence, while Caleb’s innate curiosity may be a fatal flaw in the context of the novel, it cannot be 
compared to Falkland’s decidedly learned honor because, in this reading, Caleb’s opening of 
Falkland’s trunk is essentially a radical quasi-patriotic act, while Falkland’s chivalrous behavior is 
an aping of an outmoded and harmful system. 
The English Bastille and Civilized Thieves: A Foreignized Homeland 
 Now that we have a decent grasp of Falkland’s—and by proxy, the aristocracy’s—
relationship to the imperial project, it is time to consider the Falkland-Caleb relationship in more 
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depth. Earlier I claimed that the ruling élite represent a threat to personal liberty because Burke 
and his fellow anti-Jacobins saw individual, natural rights as dangerous. This was largely because 
the idea of “natural rights” was tied to the “new French philosophy,” a system that was 
understood as damaging to the family because of its fixation on “self-determination and 
advancement” (Johnson 181).
28
  I have also stated that, for Godwin, personal liberty is 
synonymous with Englishness, a claim that is most concisely exemplified in Caleb’s proud 
statement “I am an Englishman; and it is the privilege of an Englishman to be sole judge and 
master of his own actions” (159).  
It is interesting and ironic that this is spoken in response to Falkland’s summons to what 
turns out to be a sham trial, which ends in Caleb being imprisoned on a false charge of theft. 
Since Falkland’s motivation for suppressing his former servant is to preserve his own reputation, 
which Caleb has the power to destroy, we can conclude that Godwin’s hero’s right to be “sole 
judge and master of his own actions” is curtailed by the unjust machinations of a corrupt 
aristocracy. Nevertheless, Caleb still maintains a sense of his independence, even when the 
“trial” is revealed to be merely another snare. Similar to Radcliffean heroines’ determination to 
meet their tribulations with fortitude, Caleb declares, “If I am to despair of the good will of other 
men, I will at least maintain the independence of my own mind” (173). Therefore, Falkland’s 
persecution of Caleb Williams can be read as an attempt to strip Caleb of what Godwin would 
have understood as his birthright as an Englishman.  
This is a central problem of Caleb Williams: Falkland’s sense of aristocratic honor has 
compromised his status as a “true” Englishman because it has caused him to value an archaic 
chimera over true justice. And since Falkland’s “Englishness” is damaged, then the “Englishness” 
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 Relatedly, Robert Kaufman has written in “The Sublime as Super-Genre of the Modern, or Hamlet in 
Revolution: Caleb Williams and His Problems.” Studies in Romanticism. 36.4 (1997): 541-74, that “in 
Burke’s opinion, certainly, the French Revolution precisely destroys the social fabric in the name of the 
isolate individual” (552). 
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of the “middling” classes to whom he is a hero of virtue is also rendered suspect. As a result, 
England itself becomes for Caleb an unfamiliar nation full of threats. In this, I see Godwin 
invoking the popular view of the Italy-England dialectic that Shearer West, Mirella Agorni, and 
others have catalogued,
29
 that eighteenth-century Italy (and especially Rome) represented a sort 
of “fallen grandeur,” a fate at which England and its empire could conceivably arrive if the 
aristocratic privilege and faulty honor codes that characterized the Italian territories were to 
shape the law of the land and allow the oppression of the common people.   
Examples of the “foreignized homeland” are numerous in Caleb Williams. Thomas, the 
servant of Mr. Forester, who is a relative of Falkland’s, is so shocked at Caleb’s treatment in 
prison—at this point, Caleb is bound standing upright and is even required to sleep in this 
position—that he challenges England’s claim to be “a Christian country” (202). Indeed, Thomas’s 
reaction to the condition of Caleb’s prison is worth quoting at some length: 
Zounds, how I have been deceived! They told me what a fine thing it was to be an 
Englishman, and about liberty and property, and all that there; and I find it is all a flam. 
Lord, what fools we be! Things are done under our very noses, and we know nothing of 
the matter; and a parcel of fellows with grave faces swear to us that such things never 
happen but in France, and other countries the like of that. (202) 
 
Marilyn Butler writes that Political Justice and Caleb Williams were both “designed to achieve 
change and also designed to refute the case for the status quo familiarized, above all, by Burke” 
(242). It is no accident that Thomas, a servant, is one of the only characters who sees “things as 
they are.” Considering Godwin’s audience and purpose—he wrote Caleb Williams to make the 
ideas he put forth in Political Justice more accessible— it is important that Thomas, a member of 
a disadvantaged class who has been sold the rhetoric of English justice, realize that “liberty and 
property…is all a flam.” Indeed, this is more than just empty bluster on Thomas’s part. When 
Caleb reminds his cruel jailors that he is innocent until proven guilty, for example, he is shocked 
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 See the Introduction of this study. 
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when they advise him to “keep such fudge for people who knew no better…they knew what 
they did, and would answer it to any court in England” (197). It is even more significant that 
Thomas notes that he is told that “such things never happen but in France, and other countries 
the like of that”—a statement that is perhaps Caleb Williams’s most apparent criticism of Burke 
and the anti-Jacobins. Hence, England has not just violated its proclaimed ideals; it has become 
identifiable with a France that is, at the time of Godwin’s writing, in the midst of the Terror. This 
reading’s relevance becomes even more apparent when one considers Caleb’s scorn for those 
who claim that “England has no Bastille” (181).  
Thomas, in fact, goes so far as to facilitate Caleb’s escape from his prison, exclaiming as 
he sneaks the captive a file and a chisel “I know I am doing wrong; but, if they hang me too, I 
cannot help it: I cannot do no other” (203). This moment marks the beginning of an interesting 
inversion in the text: not only are lawmakers and enforcers criminals, but criminals themselves 
are just. For, after escaping from prison, Caleb is able to find shelter with a gang of robbers who 
follow a code of honor that resists and is represented as more authentic than Falkland’s. Mr. 
Raymond, the de facto captain of the thieves, explains “our profession is the profession of 
justice…[w]e, who are thieves without a license, are at open war with another set of men, who 
are thieves according to law” (216).  
There is an interesting pun in this passage that sheds some light on how the thieves are 
positioned in relation to “justice.” When Raymond states that “our profession is the profession 
of justice” he could be deploying reflexive rhetoric (“we are an x, an x of y”) with both 
“profession’s” referring to the thieves’ vocation; on the other hand, the second “profession” 
could refer to a proclaimed credo, in this case a firm belief in principles of justice. The 
effectiveness of this word-play lies in its ability to compound the reader’s perception of the 
brigands’ justness. If the thieves believe in justice, then that is strange enough, particularly in 
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light of all the injustice that has been perpetrated in the novel by their supposed “betters.” Yet, 
to position Mr. Raymond and his band as actual representatives of justice, whose very work is 
tied up in the enactment and maintenance thereof, is to suggest that England’s legal system has 
been subverted, since it is criminals who uphold these ideals and the legislators—“thieves 
according to law”—who violate them. This reading is borne out elsewhere in the text, most 
notably when the brigands cry out, “if fidelity and honour be banished from thieves, where shall 
they find refuge upon the face of the earth?” (224) Further, noted Caleb Williams scholar David 
McCracken, who edited Norton’s 1977 edition of the novel, comments that this passage “seems 
to be the parody of a celebrated saying of John King of France, who was taken prisoner by the 
Black Prince at the battle of Poitiers” (224 fn. 1) Allegedly, when visiting England in 1364, King 
John stated “if truth were banished from all other mortals, it ought still to find refuge in the 
breast of a king” (qtd. in McCracken 350). According to this reading then, the thieves have 
appropriated the rhetoric of royalty and appointed themselves the new vanguards of justice.  
Of further interest is Mr. Raymond’s statement to his compatriots that “a thief is of 
course a man living among his equals; I do not pretend therefore to assume any authority 
among you” (216). Indeed, there is a strange sort of class leveling in the robbers’ den, as Caleb 
notes that some of the bandits have “the air of mere rustics, and others that of a tarnished sort 
of gentry” (215). As for Mr. Raymond himself, his deportment “had in it nothing of boorishness,” 
and Caleb observes that his benefactor “was thoroughly imbued with the principles of 
affectionate civility” (213). Mr. Raymond does in fact turn out to be one of Caleb’s only 
sympathizers, and he is to such an extent that Caleb sees him as a potential father-figure 
(215)—a position that Falkland had once occupied. Fludernik goes so far as to remark that Mr. 
Raymond is a “focal character who shares a structural position with Falkland as object of Caleb’s 
admiration, but he is also comparable to Caleb himself, since they are both outcasts and heroic 
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fighters against the despotism of the powers that be” (859). It is particularly interesting that Mr. 
Raymond’s outstanding qualities are his “civility,” as well as his “compassion and…fine feelings” 
(216), as these qualities are synonymous with sympathy, and sympathy, we recall, can be 
understood as the “primary civilizing ingredient.” Therefore, even though he is a criminal, Mr. 
Raymond can be understood as being more “civilized,” and likely therefore more “English,” than 
the elevated yet deracinated Falkland. And because of his “civility” and the honorable nature of 
most of his company, Raymond’s den becomes, for a time, a comfortable domestic arrangement 
for Caleb, who ironically notes that “the state of calamity to which my inexorable persecutor 
had reduced me, had made the encounter even of a den of robbers a fortunate adventure” 
(230). The fact that Caleb is by and large safer—and certainly happier—living in the den says a 
lot about the state of domesticity in England. Indeed, Godwin seems to construct the robbers’ 
hideout as a paradise of autonomy, hidden away from the scrutiny of authority figures and 
infused with the principles of political radicalism. Its denizens  
could expatiate freely wherever they thought proper. They could form plans and 
execute them. They consulted their inclinations. The did not impose upon themselves 
the task, as is too often the case in human society, of seeming tacitly to approve that 
from which they suffered most; or, which is worse, of persuading themselves that all the 
wrongs the suffered were right; but were at open war with their oppressors. (218) 
 
Here, the thieves certainly possess the “self-determination” and desire for “advancement” that 
Johnson represented as a core component of “natural rights.” This is quite different from 
Falkland’s authoritarian home, which Caleb gothicizes as “a dungeon” and “one of those 
fortresses, famed in the history of despotism, from which the wretched victim is never known to 
come forth alive” (151). Crediting the scholarship of Pamela Clemit, Kenneth Graham, and 
Barbara Benedict, Ingrid Horrocks has written that “Godwin found in Radcliffe's version of the 
gothic a model in which the psychology of a gothicized household could be used to represent 
abuses in society more generally” (33). Therefore, Falkland’s established home is indicative of 
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injustice and abuse of authority, while the makeshift robbers’ den—at least tentatively—
represents a more liberal, democratic sphere. 
However, let me just as quickly point out that it would be a gross oversimplification to 
read Mr. Raymond and his band simply as a foil to Falkland because they, like him and like 
Caleb, occupy a notably anomalous position. Happy as he is to be free of Falkland’s scrutiny, 
Caleb has his doubts about his new home; on the one hand, he recognizes the den as “the seat 
of merriment and hilarity,” yet at the same time “their trade was terror, and their constant 
object to elude the vigilance of the community.” Caleb notes that, as a result of their business, 
“the influence of these circumstances was visible in their character. I found among them 
benevolence and kindness; they were strongly susceptible of emotions of generosity. But, as 
their situation was precarious, their dispositions were proportionately fluctuating. Inured to the 
animosity of their species, they were irritable and passionate” (218). Caleb reiterates his 
uncertainty later in the text, claiming that “the uncommon vigour of their minds and acuteness 
of their invention in the business they pursued, compared with the odiousness of that business 
and their habitual depravity, awakened in me sensations too painful to be endured” (229).  
What is most interesting about Caleb’s reading of the thieves’ is their appearance as an 
uncanny corruption of the English middle-class and its values. Though they possess the positive 
Protestant values of “benevolence,” “kindness,” and “generosity” they are also “irritable and 
passionate.” Though they possess “vigour” and “invention” and utilize these qualities to make 
their “business” prosper, their “trade is terror.”
30
 This is especially significant since many of the 
“brothers,” Mr. Raymond in particular, have entered this “profession” as a result of aristocratic 
tyranny (220). I would read this then as a specific example of the destabilization of the ruling 
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 While I do not wish to spend too much time on an ultimately unprovable metaphorical reading, I think 
that the “business” of the robbers’ den and Caleb’s reaction to it could conceivably be read alongside a 
historical recounting of the East India Company’s corrupt business practices and the reaction of English 
commentators. 
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classes contributing to the destabilization of the middle-class: though industrious and 
compassionate, as good eighteenth-century British entrepreneurs ought to be, Caleb’s hosts still 
have the tempers and aims of banditti. Put simply, they defy categorization. 
Considering the role of foreign influence in the production of this anomalousness, it 
should not come as a surprise that Caleb’s main antagonist while in the robbers’ den is a woman 
whose complexion is described as “swarthy, and of the consistency of parchment” (214). Upon 
observing her animosity towards him, Caleb notes that “persons of her complexion seem unable 
to exist without some object upon which to employ the superfluity of their gall” (219). This 
woman, whose “swarthiness” and hot temper imply a Mediterranean background, attempts to 
murder Caleb and, because of her “Amazonian” strength, almost succeeds (231). While I 
wouldn’t go so far as to read the matron as a substitute for Falkland—she certainly does not 
possess his privilege, influence, history, or biological ethnicity—she is certainly an extension of 
Falkland’s power in the sense that she is a member of the public whose animosity towards Caleb 
is produced, in part, by the machinations of Falkland and the justice system: she is only aware 
that Caleb is a wanted man because of a circulating handbill that identifies him as such. Her 
indirect association with Falkland and her act of physical violence also recalls Horrocks’s claim 
about how “power is enforced through the threat of violence and how the law and every level of 
society are implicated in that violence” (41). She is further linked to Falkland in that she 
reinforces the threat of the foreign lurking within the domestic polity. Not only are she and her 
protégé Gines—who later acts as Falkland’s spy and man hunter—disrupters of Caleb’s pseudo-
domestic security within the robbers’ den, but also it is her threats to turn Caleb over to the 
courts that forces him to flee in haste and in deracinated disguise. Essentially, this “swarthy 
sybil” (229) wields such power over the supposedly “English” Caleb Williams that he has no 
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choice but to disguise himself as an Irish mendicant in order to avoid detection by an unjust 
justice system.  
“English, but not quite”: Deracination and Border States 
Caleb’s deracination is a centerpiece of this novel, as it is one of the clearest 
demonstrations of aristocratic hegemony’s destructive influence on the nationalized English 
body. Having chosen to disguise himself as a foreign beggar before leaving the robbers’ refuge, 
Caleb describes his “costume change” in notable detail: 
I selected the worst apparel I could find, and this I reduced to a still more deplorable 
condition by rents that I purposely made in various places…I had rendered my 
appearance complete, nor would any one have suspected that I was not one of the 
fraternity to which I assumed to belong. I said, This is the form in which tyranny and 
injustice oblige me to seek for refuge; but better, a thousand times better is it, thus to 
incur contempt with the dregs of mankind, than to trust to the tender mercies of our 
superiors! (233-234, my italics) 
 
I find it interesting that Caleb reminds the reader, in the portion I have italicized, that his 
present state of affairs is the result of aristocratic tyranny. He also makes the same kind of 
statement when he describes his adoption of a brogue, claiming that “[s]uch are the miserable 
expedients and so great the studied artifice, which man, who never deserves the name of 
manhood but in proportion as he is erect and independent, may find it necessary to employ for 
the purpose of eluding the inexorable animosity and unfeeling tyranny of his fellow man!” (238) 
I would claim that by being so didactic here, Godwin is ensuring that the link between class 
slippage, deracination, and aristocratic hegemony is clearly established for the reader—Caleb’s 
loss of Englishness is a direct result of Falkland’s malfeasance, a malfeasance which has its 
genesis in Italian honor codes. Therefore, the aristocracy’s adoption of continental values 
contributes directly to the unraveling of national integrity, as played out by a member of a non-
elite class.  
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 In the same way that Godwin’s decision to attribute Falkland’s guiding values to Italian 
influence was quite calculated, it is no accident that Caleb disguises himself specifically as an 
Irishman. As I established in the introduction, Ireland can best be understood in the 1790s not 
only as a “privileged” pseudo-colony, but also as an uncanny double for England—a reminder of 
Albion’s heritage as a rural, Catholic nation. George Cooper for example, who traveled to Ireland 
a mere five years after the publication of Caleb Williams, articulated the uneasy resemblance 
between Ireland and premodern England by looking through a lens of papal influence. He 
claimed that  
the effect of Catholic superstition on the Irish is to plunge their minds in the darkness 
and gothic ignorance of the 13
th
 century. Had Great Britain still continued to the prey of 
papal tyranny, it is probable that it would have been at present buried in that same 
gloomy ignorance. We should not have been able to boast of our Bacon, our Locke, or 
our Newton. (192, my italics) 
 
Here, Cooper acknowledges England and Ireland’s shared heritage, proclaims England’s cultural 
superiority, and locates the source of that superiority in the Reformation. It is unsurprising that 
Ireland’s Catholicism should be singled out as a primary cause of its “Otherness” and cultural 
inferiority—as I pointed out in the Introduction, Collin Haydon has commented that “the main 
contribution of anti-catholicism to national identity in the Georgian era was to construct the 
European continent as fundamentally alien” (33), a statement which he claims can also be 
applied to Ireland, though this attitude was most apparent later, in the nineteenth century (34). 
However, it is even more interesting to consider how Cooper cites outmoded codes of 
conduct and the corruption of the Irish gentry as causes of the peasantry’s poverty.
31
 The 
excesses of chivalry are responsible for “the slack system of morality which is so observable in 
Ireland” (187), and it is this lack of morals among the gentry that prevents an outpouring of 
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 Naturally, the foibles of Ireland’s aristocracy are only part of the reason for widespread poverty among 
the peasantry. Hence, it is very telling that Cooper—an Englishman—should oversimplify matters in this 
way. 
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charity. Cooper also maintains that the moral bankruptcy of the aristocracy leads to a general 
“indolence” among the Irish people, since “there is nothing which is so calculated to palsy the 
arm of virtuous industry as the pride of birth” (192), and he might as well be describing Falkland 
when he writes “with the rich, a relaxed system of morality is aided by the artificial varnish of 
fashionable manners and those advantages which I have allowed that the laws of honour may 
and do carry with them, notwithstanding their mixture of evil” (193).  
Caleb’s beggar disguise obviously identifies him with a poorer class of Irishman, one that 
would be recognizable as victimized by the gentry. While his clothing and bearing are obvious 
indicators of this, my point is further borne out by the fact that Caleb learned how to speak with 
a brogue while in prison (238), in the company of other men who were, by and large, 
incarcerated merely for being “victims of suspicion” (180). Caleb’s identification with the 
oppressed Irish underclass is striking not only because he literally is a victim of the gentry but 
also because his victimization is what caused him to disguise himself as a legibly oppressed 
individual to begin with. I would suggest therefore that Caleb’s Irish persona not only calls his 
own nationality into question, but also brings Falkland’s foreignness into sharp relief by 
correlating the latter with the Anglo-Irish oppressors. To clarify, I would not go so far as to say 
that Godwin is shifting tactics here and attempting to represent Falkland as “Irishified”—at this 
point, he has put too much labor into explicitly connecting Falkland with Italy to make such a 
move. Rather, there is an interesting subtextual dynamic going on that can be read as a 
reinforcement of the novel’s themes of deracination and foreignization. Essentially, Godwin is 
subtly—and perhaps unintentionally—framing the Falkland-Caleb conflict within the context of 
class struggle in Ireland. Whether or not this is a conscious move on the author’s part isn’t 
particularly relevant. What does matter is that this move connects Godwin’s fiction more closely 
to historical concerns about how England was shaped by its colonies and dependents, and how 
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this influence rendered “precarious” the nation’s “claims to civilization.” Put plainly, Caleb’s 
dressing himself up as a disadvantaged Irishman invites the reader to parallel English aristocratic 
hegemony with Irish aristocratic hegemony. Such a juxtaposition forces to the surface buried 
doubts about English civilization’s presumed superiority to Irish civilization, and the source of 
these doubts lies in the behavior of an ethnically destabilized aristocracy. 
The link between English and Irish oppression becomes still more apparent when one 
considers what Cooper omits—namely, that at this time the Irish gentry was largely Anglo-Saxon 
and Protestant. This omission is not too surprising in light of the fact that Ireland’s Anglo-
Protestant ascendancy generally defined itself as a distinct class that was neither entirely English 
nor entirely Irish.
32
 Cooper’s failure to recognize the Irish aristocracy’s Anglo connections is 
another example of Samuel Madden’s witty summation that these individuals were “envied as 
Englishmen in Ireland, and maligned as Irish in England” (96). As established in the introduction, 
the Anglo-Irish were problematically situated during the 1790s. Though they were by and large 
wealthy, Protestant, and politically powerful, they were still seen as somehow “less than 
English.” While they were certainly more Anglo than Ireland’s Catholic peasantry—who, as I 
have claimed, were represented both popularly and politically as “English, but not quite”—they 
were still stereotyped as “bellicose and bibulous” (McBride 246) and certainly “Other.” Hence, 
the Anglo-Irish can perhaps be best thought of as “creolized”—a problematic unification 
between a dominant culture and an aboriginal group. While the Anglo-Irish would certainly 
provide an interesting case study for scholars examining the complicated intersections of 
privilege and disadvantage, I am primarily interested in considering how Godwin’s invocation of 
this group, and the borderline status it implies, contributes to the destabilization of the novel’s 
characters. 
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 This statement is developed and supported at length in the Introduction of this study. 
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While it’s true that Caleb’s disguise identifies him more readily with the Irish-Catholic 
peasantry in terms of class and (lack of) privilege, he is still not literally Irish, and this is key to 
my reading. Even though he performs a version of “Irishness,” Caleb remains an Englishman not 
only in blood but also in spirit; he may speak with a brogue, but he still uses plain, “manly” 
speech in an attempt to counter the power-tainted rhetoric of the public sphere that persecutes 
him (McCann 75). Like Falkland, who performs “Italianness” but remains English in the literal 
sense, Caleb’s problematic national identity renders him borderless. Considering the largely 
discursive nature of  Caleb’s and Falkland’s border-shifting—Caleb learns to represent himself 
via speech and dress as various members of oppressed ethnic minorities, and Falkland is largely 
constituted by a pre-established set of “foreign” behavioral laws—it is useful to read Falkland’s 
Italian mannerisms and Caleb’s various ethnic disguises semiotically, as a force that is 
triangulated through the discourses of imperialism and is ultimately indicative of domestic—
both national and “private”—instability.  
We have already considered the semiotic’s role in the destabilization of national identity 
in a historical context—Edgeworth’s brogue’s rendering him an object of derision in London and 
Barnard’s subsequent contention that “all but the grandest and most anglicized Irish protestants 
were recognizable and comic to smart Londoners” (216) can be read as an example of symbolic 
language symptomatizing anomaly. And language’s role in border-crossing is also pretty clear in 
Caleb Williams. Falkland, as we saw in the Malvesi episode, brings together the languages of 
English reason and Italian courtliness, essentially representing his anomalous self through his 
mixing of discourses and hence, ideologies. Caleb’s use of disguise, which translates not just into 
physical appearance but also into his speech patterns, can be read as a semiotic shift akin to 
that of the historical Anglo-Irish, most notably in the sense that his inflections may change, but, 
as McCann has pointed out, the content of his speaking does not. This rejection and 
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reconfiguration of language certainly does indicate a “dangerously” anomalous state, as it is 
through their discourse performances that Falkland and Caleb are most apparently rendered 
borderless, and it is Falkland’s very borderlessness that produces a culture of oppression and 
uncertainty in England, and Caleb’s borderlessness that exemplifies this culture. As for the 
historical Anglo-Irish, one can always recall McBride’s claim that by the 1770s Anglo-Irishmen 
were “moving towards a more insular definition of an Irish nation [read ‘culture production’] 
which played down denominational divisions” (242). In essence, the Anglo-Irish became 
recognizable as a creolized subculture. 
More in terms of the narrative itself, it is interesting that, when preparing to flee to 
Ireland, Caleb notes that “Ireland had to me the disadvantage of being a dependency of the 
British government, and therefore a place of less security than most other countries which are 
divided from it by the ocean. To judge from the diligence with which I seemed to be pursued in 
England, it was not improbable that the zeal of my persecutors might follow me to the other 
side of the channel” (239). However, the reader never discovers for certain whether or not 
Ireland falls within Falkland’s purview. Despite Caleb’s depending on his “conscious disguise” 
and “Irish brogue” “as a rock of dependence against all accidents” (240), he is arrested before 
making his escape simply because his disguise causes him to be mistakenly identified as a 
different wanted man. In terms of narrative, this moment is easily dismissable as a 
contrivance—it is pure coincidence that two Irishmen robbed the Royal Mail while it was en 
route from Edinburgh, and it is pure misfortune that Caleb supposedly resembles one of the 
suspects. The bounty hunters who seize Caleb declare that his “accent, together with the 
correspondence of [his] person, would be sufficient to convict [him] before any court in 
England” (240), yet when he reads the description of the suspect, Caleb discovers that the 
wanted man is not only shorter than him, but also of a different complexion (242). Even more 
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dramatically, when brought before the justice of the peace, Caleb drops his brogue and resolves 
to speak in his natural voice, a rhetorical move that ought to eliminate any uncertainty about his 
innocence in the matter at hand. Though both the magistrate and the bounty hunters quickly 
begin to question their assumption that Caleb is the man they are seeking, they still resolve to 
send him off to Warwick, where his supposed accomplice is being imprisoned, for the purposes 
of positive identification. Despite Caleb’s expostulation spoken as usual “with an earnestness” 
that is mistaken for “insolence” (244), the judge remains implacable. 
The seeming illogicalness of the magistrate’s decision can be accounted for if one reads 
Caleb’s circumstances as indicating a failure of boundaried categories: Caleb is not guilty of the 
crime that he has been accused of, but it is clear to the judge that he is not innocent either, and 
his lack of innocence is established through his inability to fit into demarcated groupings. The 
judge and the bounty hunters are unable to fathom, for example, how one who appears to be a 
beggar has come into legitimate possession of fifteen guineas. More provocatively, there is a 
disconnect between his beggarly “habiliments” and his skin, which is discovered to have “all the 
sleekness of a gentleman” (243). And of course there is the matter of his disappearing brogue. 
Given the nature and larger themes of the novel, Caleb’s position as one whose markers cannot 
be easily read is conflated with guilt; as a being who defies categorization, he must be accused 
and contained. 
Furthermore, Caleb’s initial capture can also be linked to his anomalousness in the sense 
that this episode is essentially about boundary violation and containment. He is arrested while 
on board a ship that is preparing to launch for Ireland and, as a result, is thwarted in his attempt 
to flee the country. Reading this moment against his later encounter with Gines at the harbor 
produces some provocative results. Close to the end of the novel, Caleb again tries to flee 
England by ship, this time to Holland, and is intercepted by Falkland’s shifty man hunter. Gines 
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explains that Falkland has determined that Caleb is free to wander England, Scotland, and 
Wales, but if he attempts to take to the sea he will be arrested immediately. In fact, Gines 
specifically states  
[i]t is my business now, do you see, for want of a better, to see that you do not break 
out of bounds…beware the salt seas…[y]ou are a prisoner at present…a prisoner within 
the rules; and the rules with which the soft-hearted squire indulges you are all England, 
Scotland and Wales. But you are not to go out of these climates. The squire is 
determined you shall never pass the reach of his disposal. (313, my italics)  
 
At first glance, Caleb’s inability to leave Great Britain seems to problematize his status as one 
who is borderless. Indeed, what we can conclude from these episodes is that it’s one thing for 
Caleb to cross the figurative “bounds” of race, class, and ethnicity, but it is quite another for him 
to cross the more literal “bounds” of the channel.  However, since Falkland (via Gines) 
constructs Great Britain as Caleb’s “prison,” and because a crossing of the channel would put 
Caleb beyond “the reach of [Falkland’s] disposal,” crossing the literal boundary of “salt water” 
would, presumably and somewhat paradoxically, resolve Caleb’s anomaly, as there would be no 
further need for him to perform “Irishness,” and hence he would no longer occupy an ethnically 
unstable position.  
In support of this, I consider Joanne Tompkins’s provocative challenge to Homi Bhabha 
and other postcolonial critics who claim, along a psychoanalytic axis, that “[a] contingent, liminal 
identity is, for a colonized subject, a useful tool for manipulating power relationships and 
relocating one’s self in a subject position(s) of one’s own choosing” (502). While it is true that 
Caleb is not a colonized subject per se, the fact that first, his identity has been repressed and 
constituted by the influence of a foreignized patriarch, and second, that he constructs himself as 
a colonized individual with his Irish disguise, positions him in a similar fashion. Indeed, Caleb’s 
use of disguise also calls to mind Bhabha’s far more famous concept of colonial mimicry, which 
he describes as “the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that 
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is almost the same, but not quite” (122, original italics). Bhabha refers to this state as one of 
“ambivalence” in which the “colonial subject” who performs the act of mimicry becomes “a 
‘partial’ presence,” meaning that the mimicking subject is both “‘incomplete’ and ‘virtual’” 
(123). Bhabha’s description of colonial mimicry is certainly reminiscent of Caleb in that his 
disguise renders him “virtually” Irish and, by extension, only “partially” English—“almost the 
same, but not quite.” Likewise, Tompkins’s contention that “the latent disorderly nature of the 
abject refuses both the neat, easy categorisations of colonizer/colonized and the free-flowing, 
shape-shifting movement across boundaries” (506) is strikingly relevant to Caleb Williams, 
particularly since “colonizer” Falkland is just as “abject”—to borrow Tompkins’s terminology—as 
“colonized” Caleb, and all of Caleb’s “shape-shifting” ultimately leads to failure. Although 
Tompkins is using the terms liminality and abjection rather than anomaly, her argument applies 
to my own in that all of these terms are being used in their current contexts to parse out the 
position of a “border” subject in relation to his movement through and across boundaried 
space. I therefore cite Tompkins’s findings to suggest that Caleb’s status as one who is 
uncategorizable does not give him “carte blanche” to cross boundaries in an attempt to 
reestablish an independent subject position. Caleb’s violating the boundaries of ethnicity is 
acceptable in Falkland’s world because it is the primary mechanism by which Caleb is kept in an 
anomalous, disempowered position. As a deracinated Englishman—read “colonized subject”—it 
is part of Caleb’s nature to remain unsettled and perpetually in search of a satisfactorily 
constructed self. However, a literal border-crossing remains out of the question, as it would 
presumably free Caleb from persecution and undercut the primacy of Falkland’s power. Indeed, 
Judith Butler writes that “all social systems are vulnerable at their margins, and…all margins are 
accordingly considered dangerous” (132). Hence, Caleb can occupy the margins of ethnicity, 
since such occupation keeps him in a position of vulnerability, yet he cannot pass through the 
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physical margins of Falkland’s sovereignty, since to do so would be to call into question his 
master’s “omniscience.” The anomalous subject’s border-crossing potential then, only applies to 
the immaterial and the metaphoric—psychological borders can be crossed, yet physical 
boundaries are impassable. 
 “He writes them all to my mind extremely fine, and yet he is no more than a Jew”: Anti-
Semitism, Anomaly, and Caleb Williams 
 In 1805, Benjamin Silliman, an American on errand in London, observed of the Jews: 
“this dispersed and despised people exhibit a living proof of the truth of prophecy…and are a 
striking monument of the wrath of God; they are every where mingled with the nations, and yet 
remain separate” (qtd. in Katz 293). Along similar lines, Frank Felsenstein maintains that the 
eighteenth-century English image of the Jews—especially Ashkenazi peddlers—was that they 
were all vagabonds; that  
[l]ike the Wandering Jew of legend, they are to be seen as perpetual aliens whose raison 
d’être may only be signalized through their difference from the host group and their 
apparent incapacity to assimilate…[t]heir outlandish garb and lowly status are to be 
seen as markers of their perpetual alienation, the fulfillment of biblical prophecy that in 
the countries to which they have been dispersed they may find no ease or rest. (64, 65) 
 
Indeed, considering the Jewish diaspora’s long history of marginalization and the controversy 
surrounding Jewish readability or lack thereof—particularly when inhabiting Christian countries 
like England—it is not thematically surprising that Caleb disguises himself as such. Nor, 
considering the stereotypical image of the Jewish peddler as a trickster and a fence (Felsenstein 
70-71), is it surprising that Caleb “learns” his Jewish disguise from one of the robber brethren. 
His “talent of mimicry,” which helped him to contrive a brogue earlier, now allows him to “copy 
their pronunciation of the English language,” and he even travels to “a quarter of the town in 
which great numbers of this people reside, [to] study their complexion and countenance” (254). 
It is interesting that, after he performs his “research,” Caleb states that “[i]t is unnecessary to 
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describe the particulars of my new equipage. Suffice it to say, that one of my cares was to 
discolour my complexion, and give it the dun and sallow hue which is in most instances 
characteristic of the tribe to which I assumed to belong” (254-255, my italics). Here, 
Godwin/Caleb takes it as a given that his readers will know what a Jew’s “equipage” looks like. 
Considering that Caleb’s source on Jews consists of a robber and the occupants of a Jewish 
ghetto, it would likely be obvious to readers in the period that Caleb is disguising himself 
specifically as an Ashkenazi peddler. Todd Endelman’s Jews of Georgian England confirms this, 
as the author relates that “[t]he popular image of the Sephardi Jew [from the Iberian Peninsula] 
was an opulent stockbroker and that of the Ashkenazi Jew [from Germany and Eastern Europe] 
a ragged old-clothes man,” a stereotype that he attributes to the fact that there were far more 
Ashkenazi than Sephardi Jews in London in the eighteenth century, and thus, there were 
proportionally more poor Ashkenazi than there were poor Sephardi (171). Furthermore, 
because of their numbers and their characteristic occupation as hawkers, the lower-class 
Ashkenazi were more visible to native-born Englishpersons, and the (contestable) fact that most 
of the Jewish poor were Orthodox (189), likely made them more “legibly” Jewish.  
 If Godwin could assume that his audience would know what an English Ashkenazi Jew 
looked like, then it is likely that he could trust readers to form a mental image of an 
impoverished hawker, selling old clothes, cheap jewelry, or other knickknacks (180-81, 184). The 
“Jewish” Caleb embodies this stereotype to an extent; however, he becomes a somewhat 
different sort of hawker: a hawker of literature, albeit a type of literature that Garrett Sullivan 
characterizes as “‘wares’ churned out on demand and marketed by ‘speculators’” (324). Caleb 
claims: 
I was not without a conviction that experience and practice [in writing] must pave the 
way to excellent production. But, though of these I was utterly destitute, my 
propensities had always led me in this direction; and my early thirst of knowledge had 
conducted me to a more intimate acquaintance with books…[i]f my literary pretensions 
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were slight, the demand I intended to make upon them was not great. All I asked was a 
subsistence…[t]he reasons that principally determined my choice, were that this 
employment called upon me for the least preparation, and could, as I thought, be 
exercised with least observation. (257) 
 
Caleb’s perception of his literary talents and the options that they afford him is strikingly 
reminiscent of the Ashkenazi Jews’ reasons for engaging in street peddling. In the same way that 
Caleb is “utterly destitute” of “experience and practice,” most Jewish immigrants to London 
were “penniless and unskilled,” largely because they had scant opportunities to learn a craft in 
Germany
33
, from which the majority came. Caleb feels that he’s capable of eking out an 
existence as a writer primarily because of his “early thirst of knowledge” and “intimate 
acquaintance with books”; Jewish immigrants generally hawked because it was the only trade 
they or their families had known. Peddling was also attractive to newly-arrived Jews because it 
required very little start-up capital. Similarly, Caleb’s realization that “[t]he little money with 
which I had escaped from the blood hunters was almost wholly expended” and that “this 
employment called upon me for the least preparation” (256, 257) are other factors in his 
decision to write for a living.  
 Nevertheless, readings of Caleb’s Jewish disguise are complicated not only by his choice 
of subsistence but also, as with the Irish disguise, by the fact that he is not actually Jewish. His 
financial and motivational similarities to the historical Ashkenazi Jews are ultimately skin-deep, 
much like his contrived “discoloration.” Indeed, this disconnect between racial “trappings” and 
actual performance is noted by Caleb’s printer, who also happens to be Gines’s brother: “we 
none of us know what to make of the writer of these articles. He writes poetry and morality and 
history: I am a printer and corrector of the press, and may pretend without vanity to be a 
tolerably good judge of these matters: he writes them all to my mind extremely fine, and yet he 
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 This, and all other claims in this paragraph about Jewish immigrants come from Endelman, 179. 
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is no more than a Jew” (264). Though the last part of this passage is certainly the most 
provocative, the easily-overlooked first sentence is striking as a plaintive testament to Caleb’s 
status as an anomalous figure. Caleb may “peddle” commodities like a Jew, yet the fact that his 
productions are “poetry and morality and history” identify him as an individual who is more 
educated than the average “no more than a Jew” Ashkenazi, who, as a result of poverty, lack of 
opportunity, and the demands of the family business, would have had very little secular 
education (Endelman 187-189). For the printer, this is “as strange as if [Caleb’s productions] had 
been written by a Cherokee chieftain at the falls of the Missisippi [sic]” (264), a rhetorical move 
that effectively ushers Jews under the large tent of “foreign savages.” ‘What is one to make of 
such a person?’ the printer seems to ask; how can one categorize an individual who does not 
respect socially-constructed boundaries and expectations?  
The printer is not the only individual who notes Caleb’s shifting ethnic boundaries. At 
one point, a nosy old woman notices “Jewish” Caleb leaving an inn in Southwark during the early 
hours of the morning. When she asks the landlady and the inn staff about “the Jew who had 
slept there the night before” (262), no one knows to whom she is referring, since Caleb 
apparently adopted his disguise after checking in. Based on the time of day that the old woman 
saw him leaving, the landlady concludes that it must have been Caleb, yet she can offer no 
explanation for his Semitic appearance. What is of most interest in this segment is the language 
that Godwin employs: “It was very strange,” Caleb relates, “[t]hey compared notes respecting 
my appearance and dress. No two things could be more dissimilar. The Jew-Christian, upon any 
dearth of subjects of intelligence, repeatedly furnished matter for their discourse” (263, my 
italics). In addition to contributing generically to Caleb’s ethnic borderlessness, the apparent 
utter “dissimilarity” between his natural appearance and his contrived one, and the 
uncomfortable synthesis of him as “the Jew-Christian” could, especially when taken alongside 
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the printer’s incredulity, be read as another example of continental “Others” infiltrating 
England’s national borders. In this case, Caleb’s synthesized appearance and synchretistic 
performance can be understood as representing a fusion of native Englishman with naturalized 
Jew. Of course, for such a claim to have any meaning or relevance, one must first attempt to 
sketch the position of the eighteenth century’s Anglo-Jewry community.  
It is of course impossible to present a simple account of how Jews were viewed by 
native-born Englishpersons in the late eighteenth century, as holders of both anti-Semitic and 
(problematically) philo-Semitic attitudes had a variety of reasons for their beliefs. While some in 
the latter camp were merely sympathetic to the Jews’ history of maltreatment (Felsenstein 125), 
most others had more self-serving motives. Conversionists supported the presence of Jews in 
England because they believed it would facilitate the Jews’ conversion to Christianity (91), while 
millenarians subscribed to the very Blakean notion of an “imaginative synthesis of Jerusalem 
and Albion” (222). As early as the Commonwealth era, some economic opportunists eschewed 
religious questions entirely and recognized the financial and trade expansionist benefits of 
hosting Jews—especially the Sephardi, because of their connections to Spain and Portugal—in 
England (Endelman 17-18, Katz 123). However, in order to appreciate fully the relevance of 
philo-Semitic positions to our reading of Caleb Williams, it is necessary for us first to account for 
anti-Semitic views and how they construct the Jew as an invasive foreigner whose influence 
threatens to undermine the English polity. Indeed, despite a preponderance of (very 
Anglocentric) philo-Semitism, negative images of Jews still comprised the dominant discourse. 
David Katz, for example, comments that it was “the continued public perception of a 
disproportionate Jewish involvement in crime that helped form attitudes to the Jewish 
population of London during the revolutionary period” (316), while Frank Felsenstein refers to 
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“the widely held belief that rich and poor Jews illicitly conspire[d] to sustain one another at the 
expense of the indigenous English” (216).  
However, the most relevant anti-Semitic stereotype is that of the Jews as deserving 
vagabonds. Felsenstein cites the anonymously authored pamphlet Look Before You Leap, or, the 
Fate of the Jews (c. 1795), which states that “[t]he JEWS are held in utter and universal 
abomination, and are scattered up and down the earth like wandering vagabonds, for having 
disbelieved his Holy Word, for having crucified him, and denied his being the TRUE son of the 
LIVING GOD” (5-6). Similar, though somewhat less vitriolic, statements appear in the writings of 
messianist Henry Francis Offley, who in 1795, after making predictable “the Jews killed Christ” 
accusations, wrote “they were driven from society, and became vagabonds on the face of the 
earth” (xvii). Of even greater interest, Offley compares the diasporic nature of the Jewish people 
to the peddling profession, writing  
[c]ertainly the Jews almost ever since the destruction of their kingdom by Titus 
Vespasian, have been without a fix’d abode, and have been scattered all over the earth, 
neglecting the Lord their God…Even to England, if we confine ourselves alone, a Country 
professing the greatest humanity to strangers and foreigners—we see them wandering 
about the streets, particularly in the metropolis of London, in the most menial 
occupation, that of carrying a bag at their back, and crying old cloaths from door to 
door, the objects of universal ridicule and contempt. (8-9) 
 
“Such utterances,” according to Felsenstein, “reinforce the notion that the separation of the 
Jews is so ordained from above as a manifestation of heavenly displeasure and as a perpetual 
reminder of the truth of the Christian faith” (66). Indeed, the large influx of Jewish immigrants 
throughout the eighteenth century stirred up “pious” fears that a heavy concentration of Jews in 
the nation would contravene the will of a God who had intentionally scattered the descendants 
of “Christ’s executioners” across the face of the earth. Not surprisingly, this discourse was 
particularly popular in 1753, when the Commons was reviewing the proposed Jew Bill (68). A 
Modest Apology for the Citizens and Merchants of London, Who Petitioned the House of 
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Commons against Naturalizing the Jews (1753), for example, argued that if the Jews were to 
“become native free-born Englishmen they then cease to be Vagrants, and find such a Rest, as 
will frustrate, so far as Man is able, the Truth of God’s infallible Prophecies” (8).  
Underneath these sanctimonious rationalizations, however, run the familiar fears of a 
destabilized English national identity. Katz reads the Aliens Act of 1793—which subjected 
immigrants, many of whom were Jewish at this time, to close governmental scrutiny—as a 
challenge to the Anglo-Jewry’s loyalty. He writes that the Act “was but a symbol of the general 
feeling that revolution was a foreign import and as such its purveyors ought to be strictly 
watched” (285), a claim which implies that Jews were, at least to an extent, shuffled under the 
large categorical umbrella of continental foreigners. While the Aliens Act, openly anti-Semitic 
discourse, and the perpetuation of Jewish stereotypes were overt attempts at marginalization, it 
is interesting to note that so-called philo-Semites staved off fears of the English self somehow 
telescoping into a Jewish Other through the colonialist-inflected process of sentimental 
assimilation, the axes of which I have outlined in the introduction of this study. On the one hand 
there were the conversionists who pitied Israel’s plight but still felt called to “save” their 
Hebrew brethren through baptism. On the other hand, there were the millenarians’, whose 
desire to represent Britain as the New Jerusalem can be read as an attempt to claim the Chosen 
People’s legacy. Felsenstein describes this position in particular as “characteristically one-sided.” 
“English millenarianism,” he claims, “rarely, if ever, pauses to consider the Jews as Jews. Its 
palliation of traditional anti-Semitic attitudes seems often more a fortuitous byproduct than 
ideologically central to its program” (222). Hence, while blatantly anti-Semitic discourse situated 
the Jews as dangerous Others and vaguely implicated them as Jacobinically-inclined, so-called 
“philo-Semitic” discourse effectively borrowed a page from the imperialist playbook by 
desperately seeking to gentrify, Christianize, and claim the spiritual heritage of the influx of 
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Jewish immigrants. Such approaches to London Jews suggest then that the diaspora was 
understood as a potential threat to English national identity. 
In anticipation of those who might criticize these findings as speculative, I would like to 
relate briefly one particular historical moment that provocatively symptomatizes such fears. 
Most readers will probably be familiar with Lord George Gordon; yet while his role in the riots of 
1780 that bear his name has been well-documented, less attention has been paid to his 
conversion to Judaism in 1787 and his life afterwards. In the same year as his conversion, he was 
vigorously prosecuted at both Versailles and London for libel against Marie Antoinette. Katz 
editorializes that this was a slight offense in comparison to 1780’s riots (307), a claim which 
implies that Gordon’s prosecutors had ulterior motives; indeed, it was the ostensible opinion of 
his contemporary biographer, Robert Watson, that Gordon’s conversion was the real reason 
why the London court was so quick to prosecute him in the libel case (Watson 75). After being 
found guilty, Gordon fled to Holland, where his reputation as one who was “popular with the 
revolutionary elements” caused the Dutch to extradite him promptly back to England (Katz 307). 
While 1793’s Aliens Act seemed to assume that all foreigners were suspect since revolution was 
constructed as a “foreign import,” perhaps the “Judeo-fied” Gordon’s well-known pro-
revolutionary sentiments contributed especially to the Act’s implications that the Jews had 
Jacobin sympathies. Furthermore, Gordon’s ill-fated flight to Holland might have somewhat 
inspired Godwin, since Caleb twice attempts to flee to Holland and is frustrated in both 
attempts (270, 313). 
In any case, when Gordon was rearrested, both his religion and his performance of it 
became a topic of prurient conversation in the London periodicals and among the British 
glitterati. The Gentleman’s Magazine reported in 1787 on Gordon’s “lodg[ing] in one of the 
dirtiest houses in Dudley street, where the Jews chiefly inhabit” (qtd. in Katz 307), while the 
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London Chronicle speculated that Gordon’s beard was four inches long (558). More 
provocatively, Horace Walpole recounted how at one particular dinner party where Gordon was 
a subject of conversation, one of the guests commented on his “Mosaic beard,” and that “it was 
lucky when converts wore distinguishing marks by which they might be reconnoitred” (587-588, 
original italics). This remark is of particular significance to our current discussion, as it points to a 
fear of Jewish infiltration while at the same time, via the use of the conditional “when,” tacitly 
suggests the existence of a clandestine subculture of unreadable Englishpersons-turned-pseudo-
Jews, who need to be monitored, or “reconnoitred.” Furthermore, considering the period’s 
concerns that the aristocracy’s continentally-inflected mannerisms could and did trickle down to 
the middling classes, we can conclude that someone like Gordon would have been recognizable 
as a harbinger of broader social “decay.”  
Nevertheless, even though the presence of markers like Gordon’s “Mosaic beard” is 
desirable in that they make it easier for the majority to be aware of who is anomalous and who 
is not, this does not prevent these same markers from being perceived as marks of monstrosity. 
A reporter for the London Chronicle observed at Gordon’s trial that “[h]is Lordship made a very 
grotesque figure…he was wrapped up in a great coat, his hair lank as usual, his beard about 
three inches long, extending under his chin and throat, from ear to ear, and differing from the 
colour of his hair” (103, my italics). The reporter’s choice of the word “grotesque” is particularly 
striking here, as the Compact OED’s second definition of “grotesque” is “shockingly incongruous 
or inappropriate.” This “incongruity” not only invokes the uncanny nature of the anomalous 
figure, but is also a synonym for “dissimilarity,” the term that the gossip and the landlady 
applied to Caleb Williams’s contrasting physical appearances as he entered and left the inn in 
Southwark. Hence, it seems likely that Godwin is situating Caleb as such a figure not just 
because he disguises himself as a member of an ethnic group that is in and of itself 
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characterized as abject, but more importantly because he is, like Gordon, an Englishman 
performing a Jewish identity. 
On a final note, it is a fitting testament to Gordon’s uncategorizability that, after he died 
in Newgate Gaol, London’s Jews refused to inter him, and his body was instead buried quietly in 
the St. James cemetery at Hamptstead Road (Katz 310-311) 
Wandering Jew/Wandering Englishman: Caleb the Mythic 
Simply in terms of tropes, it is not difficult to develop a comparison of Caleb Williams to 
the stereotypical image of a “vagabond” Anglo-Jew. In addition to his “discoloration” and 
“hawking” profession, Caleb has been uprooted from his home and forced to wander without 
rest as punishment for offending a “deity”—in this case the “sublime,” seemingly “omniscient,” 
and “god-like” Falkland. Furthermore, Caleb’s repeated constructions of England as a 
foreignized land of which he is no longer a part, when read alongside the millenarians’ and 
others’ conflations of London with Zion, strengthens the comparison of Caleb to a Jew exiled 
from the Promised Land. However, tempting as it is to conclude that Godwin’s protagonist is 
being constructed exclusively within the framework of eighteenth-century English anti-Semitic 
stereotypes, it is perhaps more accurate—and certainly helps to mediate this critical leap—to 
suggest that Caleb has as much in common with the legendary Wandering Jew as he does with 
the historical Anglo-Jewry. I realize that highlighting such a distinction between “fact” and 
“fiction”—especially when the “fact” was commonly seen as a logical outgrowth of the 
“fiction”—can be problematic, and is likely to bother a few Marxist scholars. Sullivan engages 
this issue when he writes that the sensational halfpenny pamphlet the Most Wonderful and 
Surprising History, And Miraculous Adventures of Caleb Williams “is circulated and consumed 
not as a fiction, but as an anonymous statement of fact” (323). This is why I am less interested 
here in drawing distinctions than I am in simply providing as thorough a reading as possible. The 
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purpose of visiting the narrative of the Wandering Jew, then, is not to say that Caleb has more 
or less in common with him than he does with the Anglo-Jewry, but rather to illuminate how 
Caleb’s Jewish disguise is mediated by “fact,” “fiction,” and the uneasy fusion of the two. 
Briefly, the story of the Wandering Jew is a Christian legend in which a particular Jew 
struck, spat on, and/or in some other way insulted Christ while he was carrying the cross to the 
place of crucifixion. In response, Christ cursed the Jew to forever wander the earth, never to 
settle or die until the Second Coming. As he travels, the Jew preaches Christianity, cautions 
those he encounters against blasphemy, and refuses to accept financial relief even from the 
wealthy
34
. Interpretively, I agree with Felsenstein’s summation that the myth of the Wandering 
Jew:  
both asserts the values and beliefs of the Christian host group and at the same time 
preserves and perpetuates the alien or exo-cultural Otherness of the Jew. By constantly 
acknowledging the magnitude of his crime, the Jew affirms fundamental Christian 
verities, while also connoting the unhappy fate of those who fail or refuse to recognize 
what he now views as the true faith. (60-61) 
 
Furthermore, the Jew’s “zeal to proselytize” during his wanderings “is an essential canon of 
Christian rather than Jewish teaching,” while his intolerance for blasphemy and refusal to accept 
alms “suggest qualities that were popularly thought to be distinctly Christian and as distinctly 
un-Jewish.” But, Felsenstein quickly points out, “in his purgatorial state of wandering his 
inescapable Otherness as a Jew is perpetually reaffirmed” (61).  
While it is not inaccurate to state that the legend of the Wandering Jew—which existed 
as a European folktale even before the thirteenth century (Felsenstein 59)—was easily read in 
the period alongside the current and prior conditions of the historical Jews, period 
representations of the Wandering Jew differ from stereotypes of the Anglo-Jewry in two key 
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 I am paraphrasing and redacting an account of the legend that Felsenstein quotes from an undated—
though verified as eighteenth century—copy of the prose chapbook Reliques of Ancient Poetry, which 
exists in the Solomons Collection of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. 
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ways, and it is this pair of dissimilarities that invites the current comparison to Caleb Williams. 
First, the Wandering Jew was regarded as more sympathetic and respectable than real Jews 
partly because “his long gown and flowing beard” depicted him as “one who retains 
characteristics that are (at least vestigially) quasi-biblical and prophetic” whereas “the real Jew 
in his physical and spiritual impoverishment manifests for the Christian world the present fallen 
position of those who were once God’s chosen people” (79). This contrast, though certainly 
noted and common in the 1790s, was most wryly encapsulated in 1833, when Coleridge 
observed that “[t]he two images farthest removed from each other which I can comprehend 
under one term are, I think, Isaiah,—‘Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth!’—and Levi of 
Holywell Street—‘Old clothes!’—both of them Jews, you’ll observe’” (qtd. in Felsenstein 244-
245). Second, most versions of the legend dwell upon the Wandering Jew’s “remarkable facility 
with languages.” “Wherever he travels,” Felsenstein writes, “he is able to converse with ease in 
any tongue, learned or vernacular, a talent that may be understood as miraculous confirmation 
of the magnitude of his message.” In contrast, the Jewish peddler was typically represented as 
having only minimal knowledge of spoken English, preferring instead his “gibberish” Yiddish 
(79). Because eighteenth-century Englishpersons could and did dovetail the myth with the 
reality, and because of Caleb’s “legendary” status among the English polity and his “talent for 
mimicry,” I believe that to consider Caleb Williams within the milieu of Anglo-Jewry, one must 
also consider his kinship with the Wandering Jew. 
Like the legendary Semite, Caleb does in fact become somewhat of a problematic folk 
hero in the text. After his escape from the robber’s den, for example, he overhears bar patrons 
exchanging tall tales about one “Kit Williams.” One man describes “Kit” as “a devilish cunning 
fellow” known for “breaking prison no less than five times,” while a “buxom” barmaid relates 
how Kit “made his way through stone walls, as if they were so many cobwebs” (236, 237). This 
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same barmaid seems to harbor what could be described as a schoolgirl’s crush on “Kit,” as she 
dwells on his reported handsomeness and cleverness, and claims that she prays for his 
successful escape from his pursuers (237). Similarly, Caleb later encounters a hawker who is 
selling the aforementioned sensational pamphlet which the latter describes as  
the most wonderful history, and miraculous adventures of Caleb Williams…how he first 
robbed, and then brought false accusations against his master; as also of his attempting 
divers times to break out of prison, till at last he effected his escape in the most 
wonderful and uncredible [sic] manner; as also of his travelling the kingdom in various 
disguises, and the robberies he committed with a most desperate and daring gang of 
thieves. (268) 
 
When Caleb reads the pamphlet, he discovers that he “was equaled to the most notorious 
housebreaker in the art of penetrating through walls and doors, and to the most accomplished 
swindler in plausibleness, duplicity, and disguise” (269). Similar then to how an Englishperson 
can sympathize with the “Biblical-looking” Wandering Jew while simultaneously castigating real 
Jews, these narratives’ tendency to present a heavily mythologized account of Caleb Williams 
and his exploits produces both a kind of artificial sympathy and an “exo-cultural Otherness.” 
Essentially, these tales can cause a “star struck” barmaid and her ilk to see the largely fictitious 
“Kit” Williams as a lovable scoundrel, while the circulation of these narratives places the actual 
Caleb Williams in an oppressed position. The common people may get a prurient thrill out of 
consuming these yellow accounts, yet the real Caleb is forced to see “a million of men, in arms 
against me” (270), and his “whole species as ready, in one mode or other, to be made the 
instruments of the tyrant” (277).  Accepted as Caleb may be as a romantic figure, his narrative’s 
reliance on criminal episodes and defiance of the squirearchy still render him inexorably Other, 
the same way that the Wandering Jew’s sufferings can be pitied while his grievous act of 
blasphemy and essential borderlessness still label him as a deserving victim. Essentially, the 
Caleb Williams of popular imagination is as mythic and culturally fluent as the Wandering Jew, 
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yet the Caleb Williams who seeks shelter and human sympathy is suspect as a “thieving” 
peddler. 
 In sum, Godwin’s decision to disguise his protagonist specifically as an Irishman and a 
Jew strengthens the notion that Falkland’s (read “the aristocracy’s”) absorption of Italian culture 
threatens to destabilize English middle-class identity. By dressing Caleb up in these two specific 
ethnicities
35
, Godwin engages discourses of Otherness and cultural infiltration that were 
germane to the period in which he lived. The final denationalizing blow, however, comes closer 
to the end of the novel and is signaled by the loss of domestic possibility, and with it, sympathy. 
“It was this circumstance, more than all the rest, that gradually gorged my heart with 
abhorrence”: Loss of Domesticity, Loss of Sympathy 
 In Caleb Williams—as in the “real world”—circulating texts possess a lot of currency.  It 
was, as we have seen, Falkland’s handbill that forced Caleb to flee the robbers’ den, and it is 
Gines’s pamphlet that forces him to flee London, where he imagines “almost every house of the 
metropolis, would be induced [by the pamphlet] to look with a suspicious eye upon every 
stranger, especially every solitary stranger, that fell under their observation” (270). Indeed, 
Caleb’s paranoia is not entirely unfounded, as a mere two to three pages later he is betrayed by 
the elderly Mr. Spurrel, his last protector in London, who is eager to claim the promised reward 
of one hundred guineas (272-273). However, it is not until near the end of the novel, when 
Gines contrives for the damning pamphlet to end up in the hands of Caleb’s friend, the 
Welshwoman Laura, that Caleb’s “sympathy” finally decays. Before examining this moment 
though, it is essential that we first establish the domestic implications of Caleb’s sojourn in 
Wales. 
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 While Caleb does attempt a few other disguises—at one point he appears as “the son of a reputable 
farmer of the lower class,” (253), at another he appears “twisted and deformed” (267)—none of them are 
ethnically-inflected and are therefore beyond the scope of this study. 
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 While some of his motivations for residing in the countryside are simply expedient—he 
hopes to remain “hidden from the world” until Falkland’s death—his somewhat ulterior interest 
in pursuing a life of virtuous domesticity is unmistakable. Not only has Caleb at this point 
developed a “kind of disgust” for the “metropolis,” since he has “spent so many hours of 
artifice, sadness, and terror” in London, but also he believes that retirement to a rural setting 
will allow him the opportunity to “methodise and improve the experience which had been 
accumulated, cultivate the faculties I in any degree possessed, and employ the intervals of these 
occupations in simple industry and the intercourse of guileless, uneducated, kind-intentioned 
minds” (288). Essentially, he constructs the city as a site of artifice and the country as a place of 
virtuous industry, a move that anticipates Radcliffe’s presentation of Paris in The Mysteries of 
Udolpho as a realm of corruption, and the French countryside as an idyllic utopia.  
 And indeed, Caleb the laborer initially thrives in Wales. In addition to assisting the 
schoolmaster “who did not aspire to the sublime heights of science [Caleb] professed to 
communicate” (290), he begins working on “an etymological analysis of the English language” 
(294). Between these labors and the idyllic time that he spends with Laura, Caleb is “provided 
with sources both of industry and recreation, the more completely to divert [his] thoughts from 
the recollection of [his] past misfortunes” (295). His conduct and work ethic in this chapter 
naturally positions him as a good member of the bourgeoisie,
36
 and his longing to be a part of 
Laura’s family (292)—literally as well as figuratively, since at one point he imagines settling 
down with Laura’s eldest daughter (293)—only heightens his potential to win full membership in 
the middle class.  
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 For a good survey of eighteenth-century bourgeois values, consider the following studies: G.J. Barker-
Benfield’s The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992; Michael McKeon’s The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987; and Shawn Lisa Maurer’s Proposing Men: 
Dialectics of Gender and Class in the Eighteenth-Century English Periodical. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998.    
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 Thematically, Laura herself is an interesting, though generally overlooked, character. 
She is the daughter of “a Neapolitan nobleman” who was driven out of his country “upon 
suspicion of religious and political heresy,” and who, we are told, fled with Laura “like Prospero 
in the Tempest…to one of the most obscure and uncultivated regions of the world” (290) before 
eventually settling in Wales. Laura’s diasporic status is downplayed, however, by the fact that 
she was raised by a Welshman and his family since her own father (and, presumably, her 
unmentioned mother) died when she was an infant. As a result, her upbringing essentially 
precludes any acquirement of the “Italian” vices that plague Falkland. Though she successfully 
educates herself in areas that are “proper” for a young woman—she “taught herself to draw, to 
sing, and to understand the more polite European languages”—the fact that she “had no 
society, in this remote situation, but that of peasants” means that “she had no idea of honour or 
superiority to be derived from her acquisitions.” Rather, she “pursued [her education] from a 
secret taste, and as the sources of personal enjoyment” (291), instead of as “medals to hang 
upon the genealogical tree,” as is the case, according to Hester Thrale Piozzi, in Italy (50). This 
accounting of Laura’s character, along with the fact that Falkland “imbibed” his values from 
reading rather than having been born with them, solidifies the notion that faulty ideas of 
“honour or superiority” are acquired rather than innate. In addition to downplaying the racist 
overtones of Godwin’s reliance on Italian stereotypes, this move more importantly adds further 
support to the argument that Godwin is invoking ethnic stereotypes to criticize upper-class 
hegemony rather than to launch a wholesale attack on a particular culture. Though not without 
her flaws (as we will see momentarily), the ethnically Italian Laura is a more morally upright 
character than the discursively Italian Falkland. 
 Questions of ethnicity aside, the Laura episode performs two critical functions in the 
novel. First, as we have seen, Laura and her home present Caleb with a vision of and 
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opportunity for domestic bliss. More than that, it provides him with the chance to constitute 
himself independently, as a “normative” being whose identity is not contingent upon Falkland or 
his persecution. Second, the abrupt closing off of this possibility via Falkland’s agency drives 
home the point that aristocratic malfeasance threatens not only middle-class values, but also 
the foundations of English civilization. The reader is warned fairly early that Caleb will not be 
safe from Falkland’s vengeance in his rural retirement, since Laura recounts, to Caleb’s 
astonishment, that she is aware of Mr. Falkland, having read about him in her father’s letters. 
Her father, it seems, knew of Falkland’s encounter with Malvesi as well as other acts of 
“gallantry” the squire had performed in Italy, and as a result, spoke of Falkland “in the highest 
terms of panegyric.” Because of this, Laura connects the idea of Falkland with “the sentiments 
of unbounded esteem” (294). Therefore, it is not surprising that Caleb one day finds himself a 
pariah in the small community—we later discover that the townsfolk discovered who Caleb was 
because the damning pamphlet has made it into town. People suddenly begin to avoid him and 
Laura herself refuses him an audience at her home. When he catches his beloved “mother” by 
surprise in the fields, intent on delivering his side of the story, Laura lectures him that “[t]rue 
virtue shines by its own light, and needs no art to set it off” (299) and refuses to believe that 
Falkland could be anything other than “the most exalted of mortals.” Caleb, in contrast, is to her 
“a monster, and not a man” (300). In her analysis of the “power of narrative” in Caleb Williams, 
Walsh essentially places the blame for Laura’s actions on Falkland’s abuse of reputation, 
claiming that Laura “has formed her opinion of both men wholly on the basis of what she has 
heard about them, not what she has experienced” (32). And though it does not refer directly to 
the Laura episode, Horrocks’s reading of Caleb Williams refers to Falkland as a purveyor of 
Bakhtin’s “authoritative discourse,” which “demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it 
our own” (Bakhtin 342) (Horrocks 37). In light of this, and the fact that Laura “had been used to 
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regard every little relic of her father with a sort of religious veneration” (Godwin 294) one could 
claim that Falkland’s—or in this case, Laura’s father’s—“authoritative discourse” governs her 
opinion of the two men, which in turn supports the notion that the middle class is being “led” by 
the corrupt aristocracy. 
The significance of Falkland’s role in Caleb’s ostracization from the Welsh community 
can be more fully appreciated if we consider it in relation to George Haggerty’s claim that Caleb 
Williams, Mary Shelley’s The Last Man, and Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde are millennial texts that “all show the ways in which apocalyptic thinking places male-male 
desire at the fulcrum of cultural collapse” (128). Partially framing his analysis in Freud’s case 
study of Dr. Schreber,
37
 in which the subject conceived himself as being in a homoerotically-
charged relationship with a judging, all-powerful God, Haggerty writes that “Schreber’s 
abjection before God is an attempt to fix (or transfix) himself with an identity…the self is 
dissolved in the very attempt to fix identity. Identity itself becomes a kind of dissolution. It fails 
to serve any function but the measure of loss” (111, my italics). Along this axis, Haggerty claims 
Falkland is afraid that Caleb will “identify” him in relation to the “erotics” of his relationship with 
Tyrrel, a move that could destroy not only life and reputation, but also  
the entire system of heteronormative culture, of which he [Falkland] has pretended to 
be a part. In this sense, the trial heralds the cataclysmic end of history, not just because 
the class system is threatened and one of the dispossessed succeeds in overwhelming 
his ‘master,’ but also because the erotic privacy of a man of means is revealed to his 
own detriment. This threatens the fabric of culture more than anything else that 
transpires in volumes 2 and 3. (115) 
 
Though this discussion pays more attention to the erotics of the Falkland/Tyrrel dyad than it 
does the Falkland/Caleb one, and though it does not account for Falkland’s aggressive 
                                                 
37
 Haggerty notes that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has already claimed in Between Men that many Gothic 
novels’ “plots might be mapped almost point for point onto the case of Dr. Schreber: most saliently each is 
about one or more males who not only is persecuted by, but considers himself transparent to and often 
under the compulsion of, another male” (3). 
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intervention in Caleb’s domestic idyll in Wales, it provides a useful lens for our current inquiry. If 
we are to accept Haggerty’s conclusion that “male love, properly articulated and fully identified, 
can only mean the end of history,” possibly because “male love offers” an “escape from 
heteronormativity,” (128) then we can read Caleb’s forcible exclusion from domesticity as an 
example of a “perverse” aristocracy blocking the flourishing of heteronormative culture in favor 
of maintaining a homoerotic power struggle.
38
 As Caleb seeks to resolve his anomaly by 
“identifying” himself as one who is constituted heteronormatively and apart from Falkland, the 
squire’s “desire” for Caleb transfigures Caleb’s attempts at identification into a “kind of 
dissolution,” as Laura’s compassion for the fugitive, along with Caleb’s humanistic sympathy, 
evaporates under the compulsion of Falkland’s oppressive influence. As a result, the possibility 
of domestic settlement is blocked, and with it, the continued production of “civilization”— both 
in terms of heterosexual marriage and procreation, and in terms of “civilizing” sympathy. 
To support this reading further, one might consider in more depth the “queer” bond 
that exists between Caleb and Falkland. The Laura episode inspires Caleb to proclaim that man 
“holds, necessarily, indispensibly [sic], to his species. He is like those twin-births, that have two 
heads indeed, and four hands; but, if you attempt to detach them from each other, they are 
inevitably subjected to miserable and lingering destruction” (303). This passage is of particular 
interest because it concludes a paragraph in which Caleb is mourning his loss of participation in 
Laura’s family and “how completely [he] was cut off from the whole human species” (303), and 
therefore, can ostensibly be read as a simple claim about the necessity of human 
                                                 
38
 While I do not wish to get sidetracked with a long discussion about the homosocial dimensions of Caleb 
Williams, I will point out that Monika Fludernik relates how Robert J. Corber “argues that Godwin 
presented Falkland as a ‘sodomite’ in order to further incriminate the conservative camp (that is, the 
aristocracy is tyrannical and unnatural; their tyranny is as unnatural as their morality and sexual mores), 
and he reads this device as a lamentable aberration on the part of a liberal Godwin who—so he argues—
tried to curry favor with an unenlightened homophobic public” (858). For more information, see Corber’s 
“Representing the Unspeakable”: William Godwin and the Politics of Homophobia,” Journal of the History 
of Sexuality 1 (1990): 85-101. 
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companionship. However, it is more accurate to see this image as a comment on the 
Falkland/Caleb dyad, since the image of a “twin-birth,” with its “two heads and four hands” that 
cannot be safely “detached” invokes the monstrous, a term that cannot be applied to the 
Caleb/Laura dyad without considerable “reaching,” yet can easily be used as a descriptor for 
Caleb/Falkland. Furthermore, it foreshadows the novel’s conclusion, where Caleb’s attempts to 
“detach” himself from Falkland end in “miserable and lingering destruction” for both men.   
Essentially then, Caleb is held back from domestic fulfillment by his similarly anomalous 
oppressor, and “[i]t was this circumstance,” he informs the reader, “more than all the rest, that 
gradually gorged my heart with abhorrence of Mr. Falkland” (303) (read “destruction of 
sympathy”). The destruction of sympathy marks the destruction of civilization, and the 
destruction of civilization has already been symptomatized in the foreclosure of domesticity, 
which itself was caused by Laura’s “loss of sympathy” for Caleb. And finally, Caleb’s own loss of 
sympathy results in his prosecution of Falkland, which, as Haggerty noted and as we shall now 
explore, “threatens the fabric of culture.” 
“I have now no character that I wish to vindicate”: Abjectifying Sympathy 
  Finding that “the benevolence of [his] nature was in a great degree turned to gall” (317), 
Caleb finally decides to accuse his erstwhile patron in open court. This move is heavily in 
dialogue with the narrative of abjection, so it is necessary here to quote Kristeva at some length: 
When narrated identity is unbearable, when the boundary between subject and object 
is shaken, and when even the limit between inside and outside becomes uncertain, the 
narrative is what is challenged first.  If it continues nevertheless, its makeup changes; its 
linearity is shattered, it proceeds by flashes, enigmas, short cuts, incompletion, tangles, 
and cuts.  At a later stage, the unbearable identity of the narrator and of the 
surroundings that are supposed to sustain him can no longer be narrated but cries out 
or is descried with maximal stylistic intensity (language of violence, of obscenity, or of a 
rhetoric that relates the text to poetry). The narrative yields to a crying out theme that, 
when it tends to coincide with the incandescent states of a boundary-subjectivity that I 
have called abjection, is the crying-out theme of suffering-horror.  In other words, the 
theme of suffering-horror is the ultimate evidence of such states of abjection within a 
narrative representation. (141, original italics) 
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From the moment that he opened the trunk, up until the courtroom scene, Caleb’s identity has 
been “narrated” by Falkland, and the result of this “narration” is a series of “incompletion[s], 
[and] tangles,” as he is short circuited and foiled every time he attempts to settle into a stable 
situation. When Caleb finally decides he’s had enough, he “cries out” via his “obscene” decision 
to prosecute the respected Squire. 
However, when Falkland, who has “the appearance of a corpse” (318), arrives at the 
courthouse, Caleb’s sympathy comes rushing back, and he is overcome with guilt. Rather than 
impeaching Falkland’s character, he chooses to tell a version of events that, while “a plain and 
unadulterated tale,” still portrays Falkland and his virtues in the best possible light. The reason 
for this, according to Walsh, is that Caleb resists becoming like the “formal” justice system, 
which is immune to “the sensibility of the sufferer” (33), and Falkland, as a human being, “does 
not deserve the punishment and humiliation that the system metes out to guilty defendants” 
(35); in the famous words of Audre Lorde, one “can’t dismantle the master’s house with the 
master’s tools.” More relevant to our purposes, by focusing on Falkland’s good qualities, Caleb 
places the squire “in the same position as the honorable thief, Raymond, who because he has 
started along the road of crime, is never free of his past actions” (Walsh 35). Raymond, Walsh 
reminds us, tells Caleb that the justice system “seem[s] to have a brutal delight in confounding 
the demerits of offenders. It signifies not what is the character of the individual at the hour of 
trial. How changed, how spotless and how useful avails him nothing” (Godwin 227-228). This 
characterization, of course, could be just as easily applied to Caleb while in his “unsympathetic” 
state, yet he, unlike the justice system, is in fact affected by “the character of the individual at 
the hour of trial.” Still, by placing Falkland in the same position as the “honorable thief,” Caleb 
is, ironically, affirming Falkland’s status as an anomalous figure. 
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Be that as it may, Caleb’s decision to mitigate Falkland’s crimes can also be attributed to 
a more sinister cause. The squire’s weakness and self-effacing demeanor and Caleb’s guilty 
response sounds suspiciously like Garofalo’s reading of the “new aristocracy” and its tendency 
to enact “a vulnerable and beset manhood that allows them to assume the place of their 
victims,” thus preserving “the power of the law and inspir[ing] renewed love in modern times” 
(238). Indeed, Garofalo writes of the ending that Godwin “represents the split between law and 
obscene master as complicated by the discourse of sentimentality…[h]e offers a twist on the 
story of modern power in which the leader becomes not only split between his public and his 
disavowed function but must also suffer for it, must appear to be the victim of the system that 
sustains his power” (240). In this reading, Falkland essentially uses his “vulnerability” to “trick” 
Caleb into occupying a position where the former wins a moral victory and the latter is left “in 
abject self-disgust…transfixed by the object of his misery and at odds with its subject” (116). Of 
course, a potential problem with this approach is that Falkland does not appear to be 
empowered by Caleb’s “abject self-disgust”; he dies three days after the trial, and his accuser 
mournfully reports that Falkland’s death has been “accompanied with the foulest disgrace” 
(326). However, though Caleb may have ultimately ruined Falkland’s attempt to secure a legacy 
of virtue, one ought to note that Falkland’s performance of “a vulnerable and beset manhood” 
has placed Caleb in such a position of guilt that it completely destroys him; now that “the guilt 
of Falkland [has been] established,” Caleb is not liberated, but “truly miserable” (325). The 
squire’s prophecy that “[t]he memory [of Caleb’s attempts to expose him] shall survive me, 
when my existence is no more” (281) has been fulfilled; Caleb can neither forgive himself nor 
forget the consequences of his momentary “loss of benevolence.” 
The imperialist and marginalizing implications that emerge from the sentimental 
dynamics underlying this moment are complicated. Lynn Festa has written extensively on the 
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intersection of sentimentality and empire, essentially claiming that foreignness makes it difficult 
to create objects with which we can sympathize (4), yet the deployment of feeling “fashions the 
tropes that render relations with distant others unthinkable” (8). Sentimental texts, she claims, 
helped to localize the world by “giving shape and local habitation to the perpetrators, victims, 
and causal forces of empire” (2). However, she is quick to point out the difference between 
sympathy and sentimentality; the former implies an absorption of the subject into the object 
while the latter “is about both the encounter with the object…and the ability to disengage from 
the scene” (35). A feeling individual may have a sentimental reaction to a colonized Other, yet 
the feeling individual still has an anchoring place to which he can return, with identity intact. As 
a result, sentimentality can be read as a tool of the colonizer, a strategy of sublimation in which 
the feeling subject, threatened by abjection brought about by visceral contact with the deject, 
seeks to control the seemingly “non-assimilable” Other (Kristeva 11). In terms of the novel then, 
Caleb and Falkland can be understood as reacting sympathetically to each other in the 
courtroom scene.  
The mediating factor between the two men is, of course, Caleb’s testimony, as Falkland 
acknowledges that the narrative’s sincerity is what has overcome him: “I could have resisted any 
plan of malicious accusation you might have brought against me,” he remarks, “[b]ut I see that 
the artless and manly story you have told, has carried conviction to every hearer. All my 
prospects are concluded. All that I most ardently desired is for ever frustrated…I stand now 
completely detected” (324). As an “Italianated” Englishman who now lives only to guard his 
reputation (282), Falkland is incapable of countering Caleb’s plain speech, which, we recall, is an 
effective counterweight to the corrupt rhetoric of the public sphere (McCann 75). Honest, 
unadorned “English” speech overcomes any illusions of chivalric honor, and Falkland has no 
choice but to succumb to Caleb’s spontaneous rhetoric. Caleb, meanwhile, sympathizes with 
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Falkland’s visible suffering as we have seen, and as the two dejects embrace, Caleb absorbs 
Falkland’s “heroism” and “virtues,” while Falkland absorbs Caleb’s “infamy” (324). The result of 
this mutual exchange is death for Falkland and complete self-effacement for Caleb, who 
famously concludes his narrative by admitting that he has now “no character that I wish to 
vindicate” (326). The “sympathetic” switch that occurs between prosecutor and defendant acts 
as the final, resonating example of abjection’s disrespect of borders and what this disrespect 
produces. Caleb and Falkland, both subjects unto themselves and objects unto each other, 
exchange positions and—to an extent—identities, “‘I’ is expelled [and] the border has become 
an object. How can [one] be without border?” (Kristeva 4) Hence, by “murdering” Falkland, 
Caleb has essentially “murdered” himself. As Haggerty off-handedly proposes, Caleb’s loss of 
“character” can be read as “the result of a psychological impasse that makes identity a self-
contradiction” (116). 
 External to psychoanalysis, Caleb’s angry decision to prosecute Falkland is, once again, 
readable as a loss of sympathy and hence a loss of civilization. In this reading, the fact that he 
regains his sympathy is largely immaterial, as Falkland’s dirty laundry has already been aired, an 
exposure that in and of itself rocks the foundations of civilization. To learn that the eminent 
Squire is a murderer and a tyrant is, in the words of Collins, to “change all my ideas, and show 
me that there [is] no criterion by which vice might be prevented from being mistaken for virtue” 
(310). Falkland’s exposure as one who has been corrupted through and through by Italian vices 
destabilizes the validity of the patriarchy; Caleb recites the “moral” as a sort of monologue to 
the departed Falkland, mourning that “the poison of chivalry” and “low-minded envy…hurr[ied] 
thee into madness…[f]rom that moment thou only continuedst to live to the phantom of 
departed honour. From that moment thy benevolence was in a great part turned into rankling 
jealousy and inexorable precaution” (326). Of the ending, Garofalo writes that Caleb “never 
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perceives…that the humanitarian law of universal justice to which Falkland subscribes
39
 might 
actually be impotent”; he never “suspect[s] that the chivalric law has actually failed. By ignoring 
this failure, Caleb only safeguards the very power that Falkland has all along sought to protect 
and thus becomes a guardian of the very ideology he would dismantle” (240). However, this 
claim hinges on an assumption that Falkland’s chivalric values are not exposed to the public as 
faulty. I find this supposition to be problematic, as it glosses the fact that Falkland admits to 
committing murder and persecuting Caleb in open court and, subsequently, dies “accompanied 
with the foulest disgrace!” (326) Caleb’s final speech act, then, illustrates that the law is not 
“embodied in a terrifyingly powerful Falkland,” but rather that it is “a disembodied force that 
compels the master like a puppet” (Garofalo 240), a revelation which implies that it is 
continental influence which motivates a beloved country Squire to become “the obscene 
manipulator of lesser men’s fate” (Godwin 239). 
                                                 
39
 Garofalo claims that Falkland’s “law of chivalry…demands fidelity to universal justice” (238), yet she 
fails to cite any evidence, textual or otherwise, that “universal justice” has anything to do with Italianate 
chivalry. I cite this problematic portion of her reading simply to remain faithful to context. 
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CHAPTER II 
 PRODUCING SAMENESS ABROAD: FEELING, DOMESTICITY, AND THE SUBLIME IN THE NOVELS 
OF ANN RADCLIFFE 
Description itself is a political act. 
 -Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands 
The project of imperialism has always already historically refracted what might have been the 
absolute Other into a domesticated Other that consolidated the imperialist self. 
-Gayatri Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism”  
 No figure in the canon of late eighteenth-century Gothic literature is as controversially-
positioned for scholars as Ann Radcliffe. While the last chapter of this study has brought 
Godwin’s “radicalism” into question at points, it is more or less impossible to mistake the author 
of Political Justice as a conservative, or even a moderate. Radcliffe scholars, however, have been 
eager to claim her as a sort of proto-feminist while simultaneously being stymied by the primacy 
of bourgeois heterosexual love in her novels, a position best summarized by Robert Mayhew, 
who writes  
[i]t has been suggested that Radcliffe’s work has radical strains in its presentation of 
women and more generally in its portrayal of patterns of feminine sensibility…[yet] the 
limitations of her radicalism are discussed, her providential endings of marital bliss 
being as problematic today as they were to early nineteenth-century critics. She 
emerges from this criticism, as she did from trajectory-based generic criticism, as at best 
a liminal figure. (584) 
 
Because of her position as a popular writer who influenced more “literary” authors like Shelley 
and Austen, “liminal” is a good way to describe Radcliffe, but “anomalous” is perhaps the best 
way to describe her heroines. Though indisputably marginalized because of their gender and 
lack of financial mobility, the protagonists of The Romance of the Forest, The Mysteries of 
Udolpho, and The Italian are also highly Anglicized figures moving through a world that is 
occupied by monstrous, continental “Others.” Considering that these novels were written by a 
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British author living and working in a period when the imperial effort was highly visible, the 
latter position grants Adeline, Emily, and Ellena a considerable degree of “inherent” moral 
superiority, particularly where domestic matters are concerned. Hence, part of this chapter’s 
goal must be to unravel the questions of ethnic-based privilege and gender-based disadvantage 
that haunt these texts—with examples of both often appearing on the same page—and to 
consider how these questions play out along an imperialist axis.  
First, however, it is important for us to establish a more universal understanding of how 
Radcliffe’s work is situated in relation to colonialist discourse, and the extent to which its 
relative positioning differs from that of Caleb Williams. To do this, it is best to begin with a 
cursory consideration of how the texts’ antagonists operate because, though their ethnic 
anomalousness renders them somewhat similar to Falkland, the manner by which they oppress 
the novels’ protagonists is quite different, and it is through an examination of this difference 
that we can develop a better sense of the divergent form that nationalistic conflict and 
oppression takes in Radcliffe. In essence, while both Godwin and Radcliffe couch conflict in 
colonialist rhetoric, challenges to Caleb Williams’s ethnic character are brought up more often in 
public spheres, while Adeline, Emily, and Ellena encounter such challenges more often in 
domestic contexts. 
Much like the heroines, the monstrous “Others” of Radcliffe’s texts may be easily 
identified as such, yet their nationalities are not readily mappable, as they are simultaneously 
connected with England and southern Europe. While Montalt, Montoni, and Schedoni are 
ethnically French or Italian, these “Otherized” villains’ manners and Machiavellian personalities 
seem to be pulled from Elizabethan and Jacobean theatre (Agorni 30), thus connecting them 
with an English cultural heritage. Though a claim that these figures are Anglo-inflected 
Frenchmen or Italians, and therefore mirrors of the English-but-Italianated Falkland, would ring 
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simplistic, their hybridity nevertheless implies that they, like him, can be read as anomalous, 
foreignized threats to the British polity. However, where Falkland’s actions essentially 
deracinate Caleb Williams and in so doing call the guarantees of the Magna Carta into question, 
Radcliffe’s antagonists work to undermine female virtue and the ideals of domesticity. In 
essence, while Falkland’s oppressive acts directly assaulted national values since they were 
projected onto a man and his civil liberties, Radcliffe’s villains, with their persecution of 
women’s “private” virtue, are more circuitous in their undermining of Britain’s cultural values. 
Frances Chiu’s claim that Gothic fiction can be seen as a “large-scale political allegory…which 
renders the public sphere into a more comprehensible private and domestic one” (par. 13) 
provides evidence not just of the common critical perspective that private virtue is linked to 
national strength, but also indicates the Gothic’s involvement in this discourse. And even though 
she is writing on Clara Reeve’s The Old English Baron, Abby Coykendall’s claim that “for Reeve, 
family history is national history, and the traumas within one directly mime the traumas within 
the other” (462) similarly rings true on a larger historical register.  
Considering that both Caleb Williams and the works of Ann Radcliffe are concerned with 
foreignized threats to the polity, and both ultimately encode these threats in the rhetoric of 
empire, these differences may at first seem negligible. When considered in a finer context 
though, this divergence is quite significant in that it demonstrates how the discursive 
dimensions of British imperialism play out relative to English domesticity and middle-class 
femininity—realms of inquiry that are certainly connected to concerns about national identity, 
yet are also of course fruitful areas of scrutiny in their own right. Furthermore, the fact that 
Caleb Williams seems to “fail” at the task of preserving a distinctly English self, while Radcliffe’s 
heroines succeed, is a discrepancy worthy of further consideration.  
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The “easy” explanation for the latter incongruity lies simply in the realm of authorship: 
Godwin and Radcliffe are two different writers with largely divergent political sensibilities: the 
first writes to impugn the aristocracy’s suppression of the middle class’s “natural freedoms,” 
and the second writes to affirm the salience of domestic virtue. However, when this issue is 
viewed more closely on a textual/historical level, matters become far more complicated. To 
parse out this question, I propose that Caleb Williams does not have the same domestic support 
networks that Radcliffe’s protagonists have—even if in some cases all the heroines possess are 
“surrogate” parents and their resonant lessons. As a result he does not have access to the 
discourses of sensibility and sublimity that Adeline, Emily, and Ellena use to preserve their 
identities and negotiate their threatening environments. I maintain that the ability to harness 
these discourses proves to be crucial in Radcliffe’s work, and the fact that Caleb is incapable of 
utilizing them is what effectively condemns him to his final, denationalizing fate. 
 “A Vision of Herself [or Himself]”: What Caleb Lacks  
It would seem that the genesis of many of Caleb Williams’s problems lies in the way he 
is positioned in relation to his oppressor. Very little is known about Caleb’s parents other than 
that they were “peasants” who “had no portion to give [him] but an education free from the 
usual sources of depravity, and the inheritance long since lost by their unfortunate progeny! of 
an honest fame” (3). Although Caleb does refer to Collins as “my father” at one point in the text 
(309), the most significant role model/father figure in Caleb’s life is undoubtedly the anomalous, 
antagonizing Falkland, whose “virtues” Caleb breathlessly characterizes as “almost too sublime 
for human nature” (107).  
Radcliffe’s heroines, on the other hand, tend to possess not only some kind of “innate” 
awareness of English female virtue, but also an unproblematically “good” parent or parent-
figure whose guidance affirms their subscription to “proper” moral codes: Adeline is sheltered 
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by La Luc, who is a paradigm of benevolent patriarchy; Emily’s father St. Aubert teaches her how 
to avoid excessive sensibility while at the same time preserving a virtuous regard for others (85-
87); Ellena is raised by her affectionate and levelheaded aunt, Signora Bianchi, and is guided and 
sustained later in the text by her mother, Sr. Olivia, although neither party is aware of their 
kinship until the very end. Also unlike Caleb, Radcliffe’s heroines tend to recognize villains when 
they see them: Adeline quickly realizes upon observing Montalt and La Motte that something 
sinister is occurring between the two men (106); Emily admits to herself that she “had never 
liked Montoni” and that “from the usual expression of his countenance she had always shrunk” 
(168); and Ellena, upon first seeing Schedoni, notes that his “air and countenance were equally 
repulsive,” and that “there was something also terrific in the silent stalk of so gigantic a form; it 
announced both power and treachery” (256). Even upon learning (erroneously) that he is her 
father, Ellena is still suspicious, as we are told that Schedoni’s “eloquence…was not sufficient to 
justify an entire confidence in the assertion he had made, or to allow her to permit his caresses 
without trembling” (274). I would claim that the heroines’ are represented as such good judges 
of character because they have been cathected—partly because of their parents’ influence—
with a vast reservoir of sensibility, which grants them what Syndy Conger refers to as a 
“heightened consciousness…[a] capacity to penetrate beyond physical surfaces” (161, original 
italics). While this “heightened consciousness” certainly allows them to see past the villains’ 
oftentimes charming demeanors—in contrast to the bedazzled Caleb—it also, more 
provocatively, grants them an ability to essentially penetrate into and draw strength from the 
sublime.  
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Elsewhere
40
 I have highlighted this provocative dialectic between sensibility and 
sublimity within the context of the “female Gothic” by pairing Conger’s claim with Vijay Mishra’s 
contention that “one gains access to the sublime through self-contemplation, unrestrained by 
other demands or imperatives. In this narrative, ‘the sublime is simply the heightened 
consciousness of beholding oneself beholding the world’” (35, my italics). Furthermore, it is 
Kant’s sublimity which makes us “conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus also 
over nature without us (as exerting influence upon us)” (qtd. in Mishra 35, my italics). Hence, 
possessing a vast reservoir of sensibility grants one a “heightened consciousness,” while 
possessing a “heightened consciousness” makes one more attuned to the sublime. This, in turn, 
allows one to tap into one’s own inner strength and thus preserve an emphatic sense of self. 
This understanding of sublimity and its effects recalls Kant, whose formulation of the sublime 
experience imagines it as enabling the viewing subject to experience “an intense self-presence” 
and a “feeling of exaltation” (Ryan 265, 267). In the context of Radcliffe’s work (and elsewhere), 
an experience of the Kantian sublime is brought about by viewing majestic scenes of nature, 
whether it is the “Alpine steeps” (256) that cause Emily’s “mind [to recover] its strength” (257) 
in Udolpho, or the “grandeur” of “a landscape spread below” that makes Ellena realize in The 
Italian that “hither she could come, and her soul, refreshed by the views it afforded, would 
acquire strength to bear her, with equanimity, thro’ the persecutions that might await her” 
(106). The “Kantian” sublime, I have argued, can be metaphorically read in Radcliffe as a kind of 
“good father,” since the romantic, natural world that produces this type of sublimity clearly 
protects and, in a sense, “teaches” the heroines the fortitude they need to remain centered in 
the face of oppression. In addition to the textual evidence cited above, part of my conclusion is 
based on Eugenia Delamotte’s Perils of the Night (1990), in which she claims that the heroine is 
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protected from the villain by a “spiritual barrier” constituted by her “conscious worth” of her 
own virtue (32-33). This steadfast confidence, I contend in the article, comes from the Kantian 
sublime which, like a “good father,” provides his daughter with moral instruction and protects 
her virtue. More provocatively for our current purposes, Delamotte goes so far as to suggest 
that the heroine’s “conscious innocence” is what allows her to maintain “a vision of herself in an 
environment in which everything works to make her seem, even in her own eyes, other than 
what she is” (177). I highlight this statement because it evokes a conflict that is central to all of 
the texts we have engaged—namely, the protagonists’ constant efforts to resist their 
antagonists’ tireless attempts to ethnically and morally anomalize them despite their Anglo-
virtued conceptions of themselves. Put plainly, by helping the heroines’ to maintain their 
virtue—an important (if not the most important) locus of domestic, bourgeois identity in the 
novels—the Kantian “good father” sublime contributes invaluably to the preservation of its 
“daughters’” Anglo-inflected selfhood. 
One must keep in mind, however, that there were at least two dominant conceptions of 
sublimity occupying the British imagination in the 1790s. In contrast to Kant, Burke suggests that 
the sublime imposes upon the viewing subject a “sense of [her or his] own limitation” (Ryan 
266); this type of sublimity is most readily encoded in the seemingly all-powerful villains who 
persecute and imprison the seemingly powerless Adeline, Emily, and Ellena. Similarly, this type 
of sublimity seems to be an apt descriptor of the awe-inducingly “omniscient” Falkland, the sole 
significant father-figure in Caleb Williams’s world. Because Falkland—whose antagonizing 
influence ultimately turns Caleb’s “sympathy” to “gall”—is the only source of paternity and 
sublimity in this text, one could say that Caleb is simply not discursively equipped to effectively 
resist the corrupt patriarchy’s anomalizing influence in the same way that Radcliffe’s 
sentimental heroines are. Simply put, Caleb’s lack of a “benevolent” patriarch precludes his 
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access to sustainable sympathy, and since Falkland is the sole source of sublimity in the text, 
Caleb does not have a constructively (read: “Kantian”) sublime object upon which he can turn 
his sentimental, “heightened” gaze anyway. As a result, he does not have the self-preserving 
discursive mechanisms that Adeline, Emily, and Ellena have, and is therefore incapable of 
maintaining “a vision of [him]self in an environment in which everything works to make [him] 
seem, even in [his] own eyes, other than what [he] is” (Delamotte 177). 
Position(s) and Conflict: Heroines and Ethnic Anomaly 
Despite (and perhaps also because of) the discourses at their disposal, Radcliffe’s 
heroines occupy a problematic ethnic nexus within the texts. To ground their position in both 
discursive and historical terms, it is useful for us to turn to the scholarship of Felicity Nussbaum, 
who begins Torrid Zones by stating that “the invention of the ‘other’ woman of empire enabled 
the consolidation of the cult of domesticity in England and, at the same time, the association of 
the sexualized woman at home with the exotic or ‘savage’ non-European woman” (1). Here, 
Nussbaum is defining “women of empire” as colonized women—brown persons characterized as 
lascivious and alien, whose sensationalized existence creates a politically convenient—however 
inaccurate—analogue for the “sexualized woman at home,” thus bringing into relief the urgent 
necessity of a paradigm of domestic femininity to distinguish the “civilized” homeland from its 
“uncivilized” colonies.  However, Nussbaum also points to a broader definition of this term, 
claiming that it further 
encompasses European women in their complicity in the formation of empire and in 
their being scapegoated as the focus of luxury and commercial excess. The term 
[“women of empire”] unites women around the world in the eighteenth century in 
Europe and the colonies, because they share the threat of unregulated sexuality and the 
promise of maternity; what unites them in feminist theory is their mutual oppression. 
(2) 
 
Nussbaum’s terminology therefore provides a useful starting point for our consideration of 
Radcliffe’s heroines not only because it points to the conflict of ethnic privilege and gendered 
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disadvantage that is a hallmark of these characters, but also because Adeline, Emily, and Ellena 
can easily be understood as idealized daughters of the British bourgeoisie who act as a “stable” 
and “moral” counterpoint to the dark, “exotic” sexuality of both the villains and “foreign” 
women (i.e., Mme Cheron, Laurentini/Sr. Agnes, the Marchesa di Vivaldi, etc.).  Furthermore, 
Nussbaum’s elaboration that “European women are curiously considered to need protection 
from the sexually passionate indigenous men of the empire” (3), evokes Radcliffe’s heroines’ 
embattled relationships with sinister continental patriarchs. I ought to clarify then that my 
intent here is not to label Adeline, Emily, and Ellena as “women of empire”; nor is it to label 
them as other than “women of empire.” Rather, I invoke Nussbaum for the purpose of providing 
historical/theoretical context—I understand her reading of “women of empire” as indicative of 
female anomaly in the imperial eighteenth century. If British women are implicated in the 
colonial project as oppressors, and yet simultaneously recognized as victims of a white 
patriarchy—as colonized women of color clearly are—then this helps not only to ground my 
claims that Radcliffe’s heroines are “anomalous,” but also to clarify how easy it would have 
conceivably been for Radcliffe to create female characters who are ethnically French and Italian 
but who behave like bourgeois Englishwomen. 
Indeed, the heroines’ essential Englishness has certainly not escaped the attention of 
critics. Ronald Paulson says of The Mysteries of Udolpho that “[t]he deeply intuitive feelings of 
Emily are the quiet English virtues of the spectator of sublime overthrow across the channel” 
(279), and Ellen Moers muses that “[t]here is something very English about Mrs. Radcliffe’s doll 
heroines” (139). However, the only scholarship that I am aware of that has made a direct, 
sustained attempt to deconstruct this seeming disconnect between ethnicity and performance 
appears in critical literature specifically on The Italian. Diego Saglia’s “Looking at the Other: 
Cultural Difference and the Traveler’s Gaze in The Italian,” (1996) for example, makes the case 
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that Vivaldi and Ellena take over the roles of the English tourists who are visiting the Santa 
Maria del Pianto in the Prologue, while Schedoni stands in for the assassin that the same British 
tourists spot in the church. Provocatively, Saglia here labels Schedoni as “inherently foreign” and 
Vivaldi and Ellena as “apparently foreign” (18-19).  Similarly, Cannon Schmitt refers to Ellena as 
“an incarnation of Englishness” (855), comments that “[f]oreignness in The Italian is 
concentrated in the figure of Schedoni” (861), and refers to Ellena’s contradictory character 
traits as foregrounding Radcliffe’s tendency to shoehorn an Italian female character into an 
English mold (859).  
It is important, however, that I intervene with a caveat here. One of the primary goals of 
this chapter is to consider through a close reading the shifting ethnic positions of both the 
heroines and the villains. As we will see, the female protagonists’ virtue and subscription to an 
English bourgeois ethos is called into question at a few points in the respective texts; likewise, 
the “villains’” ostensible status as continental stereotypes is also destabilized at various 
moments as they experience—often, admittedly, fleeting—moments of guilt, uncertainty, and 
repentance. In essence, both parties exist on a shifting continuum, which itself is located at a 
discreet nexus of “English bourgeois” values and “continental Otherness”; the distinction 
between English heroine and foreign villain then is largely a question of which aspect of the 
character’s identity is emphasized at a given moment in the text. Obviously, by virtue of their 
behavior, the heroines are generally more on the “English bourgeois” side of the continuum 
while the villains are generally more on the other end for the same reason. Hence, as we will see 
in the analysis, it is ultimately impossible to label any character as “inherently British” or 
“inherently foreign,” despite Saglia’s tendency—in an otherwise excellent article—to do so. 
 In fairness to Saglia provocative work, I also ought to point out that he describes the 
Gothic as “a conflict between agents of similarity and figures of difference” (13), and he claims 
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of The Italian specifically that “Radcliffe’s romance testifies to a sustained effort in creating an 
imaginative geography of Italy and in pitting this realm of otherness against the travelling 
characters” (15). Essentially, I agree with Saglia’s claim here that Radcliffe’s fiction represents a 
“conflict” between (English) “similarity” and (continental) “difference,” and that the 
“imaginative geography” of the continent is the venue for this conflict; hence, Saglia’s 
scholarship undeniably provides an important frame for this chapter. However, Saglia also, I 
think, understates the complexities of the characters’ ethnicities and their performances of 
those ethnicities. Thus, part of my task must be to fill this gap and address some of the nuances 
that critics have—likely unintentionally—neglected.  
While Saglia’s and Schmitt’s work will ultimately play a considerable role in my own 
close reading of these texts, the larger critical narratives that frame this study offer far more 
provocative solutions to the overarching dilemma of Adeline’s, Emily’s, and Ellena’s ethnicities. 
To parse out the terms of this anomalousness along a historical axis, I claim that Radcliffe’s 
heroines are essentially living in a diaspora, a placement which identifies them with creolized 
dejects such as the Anglo-Indian Emma Roberts, whom I will discuss in more detail in the next 
section. When we consider Nussbaum’s claim that there is a political-discursive conflict between 
“women of empire” and English domestic femininity alongside my claim of the existence of an 
ethnic/behavioral divide in Radcliffe’s heroines, we can suggest that part of the protagonists’ 
struggle is the battle between their English manners and their foreign backgrounds—essentially 
Adeline, Emily, and Ellena’s performance identifies them with the cult of domesticity, yet their 
continental blood and (oftentimes familial) proximity to licentious, “Other” characters situates 
them in a position that is discursively similar (though certainly not identical) to the “Other,” 
narrowly-defined “woman of empire”—she whose “darkness” and inherent “foreignness” 
renders her, in the British popular imagination, the inverse of middle-class domestic values. Not 
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only does this particular tension ground the discussion in anomalous ethnicities, it is also in 
dialogue with my earlier point that the mere existence of the Gothic as such, with its wild 
settings and cast of noble chevaliers, fainting women, megalomaniacal barons, and scheming 
monks, reflects an absorption and embracement of colonialist discourse. 
Admittedly, the heroine’s internal conflict seems a bit one-sided, as Adeline, Emily, and 
Ellena never overtly deviate from the narrow path of virtue. However, their “true” “English” 
identities are nevertheless called into question at certain odd moments in the texts, and when 
such questions are raised, they are generally accompanied by threats of the heroines being 
somehow sexualized. By way of example, the possibility of “going native” is represented in The 
Italian when the reader is duped into believing that the malicious Italian monk Schedoni is 
Ellena’s father, thus creating the potential for a sort of moral miscegenation  (Schedoni is 
actually Ellena’s uncle through marriage—hence they share no blood tie). Similarly, in The 
Romance of the Forest, Adeline is led to believe that one of the Marquis de Montalt’s merciless 
henchmen is her father (we later discover that her father was actually murdered by the Marquis 
de Montalt, who is her uncle). More nuanced examples of the “going native” fear occur in The 
Mysteries of Udolpho, first when the possibility is obliquely raised that Emily is attracted to her 
villainous uncle-through-marriage Montoni, and second when she is briefly implicated in Sr. 
Agnes’s/Laurentini’s sexual guilt.
41
 Considering that both national and personal identities are at 
stake here (and not forgetting who the author is), the English subject must attempt to reverse 
this trajectory so that the continental Other is assimilated into the self rather than the reverse.  
Radcliffe’s heroines work to accomplish this via the deployment of discourses of domesticity and 
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sentimental assimilation, staving off threats to their virtue—and by proxy, their highly gendered 
ethnic identity—by behaving as “ideal” Englishwomen. To this end, Adeline strives to win the 
parental affection of the La Mottes despite their eventual cruelty; Emily respects the 
disingenuous Montonis as her aunt and uncle; and Ellena, despite her suspicions about 
Schedoni, accepts him as her father. Through these actions, I contend that the heroines are 
attempting to draw the villains (who are the chief signifiers of alterity) into the domestic 
economy—a move that is reminiscent of Richardson’s protagonists’ constant attempts to reform 
the rakes who persecute them. And, of course, Adeline, Emily, and Ellena do not rejoice in the 
villains’ falls, choosing to extend their seemingly endless supply of pity to their persecutors 
instead, a gesture of benevolence that cements their idealized middle-class English identities; 
essentially, they act as “ideal English daughters” in an attempt to reform their “less-than-ideal, 
continental fathers.” In this sense then, Radcliffe seems to be upholding the status quo as far as 
the role and rights of women are concerned. 
However, while I wish to hold onto my contention that Radcliffe’s characters can be 
read as metonymic figures whose existence points to the larger conflict of preserving an English 
identity in an age of empire and diaspora, I would also like to suggest that, by creating English 
characters who are nominally French and Italian, Radcliffe may have been attempting to 
promote the universal adoptability of English morals. In this reading, Radcliffe seems to be 
discursively invoking the missionary aspect of/justification for colonialism—if Hindus can be 
converted to Christianity, or former slave Olaudah Equiano can assimilate into London society, 
then surely the “misguided” members of “lesser” white European nations can adopt an 
“enlightened” value system. And since part of a middle-class Englishwoman’s role in this period 
is to be a paragon of virtue and an example for men, then Adeline’s, Emily’s, and Ellena’s 
unparalleled display of continence while under the oppression of lascivious foreign men (and, to 
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a lesser extent, women) offers the possibility of English domestic values infiltrating southern 
Europe through female intervention in the appropriately “private” sphere of domesticity. 
Indeed, if an expanding, interactive empire and Wollstonecraft’s call that all women enjoy (a 
Eurocentric form of) liberty has begun to render feminine ethnic difference disturbingly unclear 
for Radcliffe and her contemporaries, then why not take advantage of the relative confusion to 
promote the cult of domesticity as a universal standard? 
While these reformist possibilities are never fully realized, we still see them hinted at in 
all three of Radcliffe’s major novels. In some instances—most blatantly in The Romance of the 
Forest and The Mysteries of Udolpho—this dynamic plays out in Radcliffe’s deployment of two 
villains: one who is utterly “irredeemable” and another who is “somewhat redeemable.” In all 
three of the novels, however, the possibility of the villains’ moral reform is represented at 
various destabilizing moments. While Coral Ann Howells (fn 38) has observed instances where 
Radcliffe briefly and obliquely places her heroines in morally ambiguous situations, I contend 
that there are also moments where the villains are cast into notably anomalous positions: 
moments where their apparent status as “foreign Others” is compromised and they briefly and 
imperfectly perform or somehow resemble the “typical” performers of English middle-class 
morality. I claim that, through such moments, Radcliffe makes the case that non-English 
European women can embrace British domestic values,
42
 and then raises the possibility that 
these women, generally by example, can reform at least some non-English men. The fact that 
these men generally do not undergo a “perfect” or sustained reformation allows Radcliffe to 
keep one foot firmly planted in tradition—she seems to be claiming that the monstrous 
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foreigner does exist, and he is a real threat; however, redemption is still possible for some.  
Therefore, travel and engagement with continental vice serves a moral purpose, as it allows 
England to control and be a beacon to the rest of the world. 
“An Obsessive Theme of Female Imprisonment”:  
Captive Travelers (Re)producing the Home 
Before engaging in any sustained close reading, I feel that I ought to anticipate my critics 
and address the potential objection that applying notions of romantic tourism to the novels of 
Ann Radcliffe is erroneous on the grounds that the heroines of The Romance of the Forest, The 
Mysteries of Udolpho, and The Italian are certainly not “tourists” in the traditional sense.  
Adeline is forced to flee from an abusive father-figure only to enter into a furtive, surrogate 
family arrangement with the La Mottes; Emily is compelled to travel by her aunt and bandit 
uncle; and Ellena is kidnapped twice by Schedoni’s and the Marchesa di Vivaldi’s agents. All of 
this is true, but Sharon Harrow writes in Adventures in Domesticity: Gender and Colonial 
Adulteration in Eighteenth-Century British Literature (2004) that women commit the social 
offense of exposing their corporeality through physical movement and exertion (184).
43
  
Therefore, I would suggest that these unmarried, orphaned heroines need to be abducted or 
otherwise compelled to travel lest they violate laws of propriety by instigating movement on 
their own. Indeed, considering Adeline’s, Emily’s, and Ellena’s dread fear of deviating from 
delicacy, even when faced with potential ruin or death, it would be out of character for them to 
voluntarily undertake a journey in the first place. Furthermore, eighteenth-century travel writers 
and commentators traditionally characterized female travelers as somehow “exceptional” and 
capable of stunning feats. While this certainly marginalizes female accomplishment and 
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potential (Bassnet 228), it also takes pressure off of Radcliffe and her protagonists—if she is 
writing out of a tradition of “exceptional,” fortitudinous woman travelers—i.e., Helen Maria 
Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft, Emma Roberts, Lady Mary Wortley-Montague, Hester Piozzi, and 
Anna Falconbridge, to name a few—then there is room for her heroines to be “exceptional” 
while in difficult positions, and to act like British travelers when they are on the road, observing 
scenery and filtering it through English discourses. Essentially, the heroines’ abductions and 
imprisonments place them in difficult situations—similar to Anna Falconbridge, who was 
widowed while in Africa, or Emma Roberts, who occupied the British-India diaspora—yet it also 
affords them the opportunity to engage the discourses of travel and scenic proprietorship like 
Hester Piozzi or Lady Wortley-Montague. In a sense, Radcliffe is allowing her heroines to be both 
fortitudinous women and English tourists. In this way, she presents a remarkably 
representative—if unrealistic—portrait of female travelers and their positionality.   
 Nevertheless, the fact that these characters are compelled to travel still makes it 
difficult to claim uncritically that they are journeying in order to reform a tainted domestic 
space. I would certainly not go so far as to claim that the protagonists’ abductions are merely 
plot devices, ways for Radcliffe to maintain delicacy; to do so would fail to take into 
consideration all of the concerns that the novels are expressing about controlled bodies and 
patriarchy. However, it is interesting that the source of domestic corruption in Adeline’s, Emily’s, 
and Ellena’s lives is, in all cases, the violent intervention of the foreign—specifically, villains who 
are inevitably characterized as dark, passionate, and oppressive. Consider the fearsome 
“southern sublimity” of Montoni, as described by Emily: “[t]he fire and keenness of his eye, its 
proud exultation, its bold fierceness, its sullen watchfulness, as occasion, and even slight 
occasion, had called forth the latent soul, she had often observed with emotion; while from the 
usual expression of his countenance she had always shrunk” (157). Like northern European 
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travelers, who effaced threatening difference through “direct” (albeit filtered and preconceived) 
encounters with the foreign, Radcliffe’s heroines must confront the source of their domestic 
woes. 
   Of course, the juxtaposition of travel and domesticity in these novels has still deeper 
complications. Jane West, for example, expresses in The Advantages of Education (1793) that 
“domestic marriage is the temple of worship towards which all female adventurers must travel” 
(2). Although West represents one extreme, Mary Wollstonecraft herself claimed that 
“wherever [the female traveler] goes, a little fertile patch of household comfort grows beneath 
[her] feet” (105). One might also consider Nigel Leask’s claim in Curiosity and the Aesthetics of 
Travel Writing, 1770-1840 (2002) that “an associative ligature which mapped the exotic scene 
onto a nostalgic landscape of childhood and home…render[ed] it an especially approved idiom 
for women writers and artists” (176, my italics). This suggests that if Radcliffe is to preserve the 
delicacy of her abducted protagonists, then she must construct them in such a way that they 
narrate the exotic landscape and those who people it in terms of the domestic. Furthermore, 
Leask reads the travelogue of Emma Roberts as reflecting “an obsessive theme of female 
imprisonment.” Roberts herself characterizes Anglo-Indian women as “prisoners of home and 
hearth” whose only hopes for happiness can be found in marriage (222), much like the 
imprisoned Adeline, Emily, and Ellena, whose fortitude is rewarded with fairy tale marriages.  
While it is true that the home space is typically idealized from the start in Radcliffe’s novels, this 
is only true of a certain type of home—the rational, companionate domestic sphere that is 
represented in Ellena’s aunt Bianchi’s peaceful villa or Emily’s beloved La Vallee. Adeline enjoys 
this type of bliss with the La Motte’s in the abbey for a limited time, but Madame’s jealousy and 
Monsieur’s underhanded dealings with Montalt disrupt her happiness until she settles at 
Leloncourt in volume three. The Anglo-Indian homes that Roberts speaks of as prison-like are 
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more reminiscent of the “bad homes” that Radcliffe’s protagonists encounter in the form of 
crumbling castles or sinister abbeys. It is companionate marriage that whisks Adeline, Emily, and 
Ellena back to the “good” domestic space where they are no longer “[literal] prisoners of [the 
gothic] home and hearth,” thus strengthening the essential similarity between the situation of 
Radcliffe’s heroines and the ostensible situation of Roberts’s Anglo-Indian women. Finally, Leask 
makes a direct connection between the relief Roberts finds in the picturesque and the similar 
feelings that Radcliffe’s heroines experience when viewing the sublime, as both are uplifted by a 
landscape which has been stripped of its sociohistorical implications (224). These connections, I 
believe, are essential mediations between fiction and history, and underscore the importance of 
reading Radcliffe in terms of the postcolonial tropes and discourses I have been outlining. 
“Relations with Distant Others”: Sensibility and Empire 
As suggested in the introduction, it is not difficult to understand how discourses as 
universalizing as sensibility and sublimity could act as tools of imperialism. And in the realm of 
Gothic fiction, it is Ann Radcliffe’s work that deploys these discourses most clearly in the service 
of empire. I alluded in the last chapter to Lynn Festa’s claim that sentiment’s universalizing 
capability and ostensible transcendence of history makes it an ideal descriptor for empire (45). 
Because empire is at its core a tension between assimilation and othering, Festa suggests that 
foreignness makes it difficult to create objects with which we can sympathize; hence, as quoted 
earlier, feeling “fashions the tropes that render relations with distant others thinkable” (8) and 
sentimental texts localize the world “by giving shape and local habitation to the perpetrators, 
victims, and causal forces of empire” (2). These claims suggest that the mountain is being 
brought to Mohammed, so to speak, as sentiment brings the world to England and casts travel—
and by proxy, the native—as an extension of the British domestic. Furthermore, Festa defines 
the process of “going native” as identifying with others and thus adjusting one’s personal 
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identity (33-34), which of course is the reason why it is important for the English subject to 
construct her encounters with the foreign object along the axes of an English discourse.   
On a similarly broad scale, it is interesting to consider that Radcliffe’s novels appear to 
be structurally inflected with certain sentimental conventions of imperialist writing. In support 
of this, one would do well to consider Mary-Louise Pratt’s claim in Imperial Eyes that the 
discourse of sensibility started making its appearance in travel narratives as early as the 1760s, 
and that the deployment of sexualized sentimental tropes helped to mediate both imperial guilt 
and abolitionist thinking: “conjugal love” was represented “as an alternative to enslavement and 
colonial domination, or as newly legitimated versions of them” (86). While the notion of 
mutually-consenting conjugality seldom appears explicitly in Radcliffe’s texts—generally, the 
closest Radcliffe comes to addressing “normative” sexual desire is in the heroines’ and heroes’ 
inevitable marriages—Pratt’s findings are relevant to our purposes not only because they point 
to how sentiment operated as a tool of imperial domination in general, but also because they 
indicate that sensibility operates this way in Radcliffe to a greater extent than has perhaps been 
previously theorized. According to Pratt, the 1780s and ’90s saw sentimentality being 
consolidated as a “powerful mode for representing colonial relations and the imperial frontier.”  
If we are to accept her elaboration that “in both travel writing and imaginative literature the 
domestic subject of empire found itself enjoined to share new passions, to identify with 
expansion in a new way, through empathy with individual victim-heroes and heroines” (87), 
then we can claim that not only do Radcliffe’s “victim-heroines” deploy sensibility in a foreign 
context, but also their mere existence as “victim-heroines” for whom the “domestic subject of 
empire” is meant to feel sympathy suggests that the novels share a formulaic kinship with 
imperialist writing. By this I simply mean that Radcliffe’s rhetorical decision to center the action 
of the novels on the travails of continental “victim-heroines” who perform a recognizably British 
  127
domestic identity suggests that her novels are, in their most basic structure, invoking the 
traditions of travel writing and colonialist fiction that Pratt has outlined.  
 There are plenty of textual examples of the heroines’ sensibility, and there is certainly 
no shortage of scholarly articles dealing with this subject.
44
 Rather, however, than emphasize 
what has already been said about how Radcliffe critiques excessive sensibility, or how sensibility 
helps women to preserve their virtue, I want to focus on moments in these texts when the 
heroines’ feelings are deployed in the interests of moral reform, and when said feelings act as 
“tropes that render relations with distant others thinkable.” In other words, it is most important 
for our purposes to consider sections of the texts where the female protagonists use their 
sentimental capacities to narrow the distance between themselves and their “foreign” 
persecutors.  
As one considers these examples, one will likely notice that, in many cases, female 
contribution to moral reform often seems to occur “unconsciously” in the texts. Put plainly, 
Radcliffe’s heroines generally destabilize the villains’ characters and behaviors simply by virtue 
of their presence and “natural” behavior. This should not be particularly surprising, considering 
that eighteenth-century middle-class Englishwomen were typically expected to reform men’s 
manners via example.
45
 Furthermore, we might also recall Mary Poovey’s contention that 
“delicacy” was understood as an innate female virtue which, nevertheless, needed to be 
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constantly practiced and performed (15), or Yael Shapira’s similar comment that delicacy “is 
both a sensibility and a performance, or rather, it is a presumed sensibility whose existence 
must be constantly signaled by action” (457). Hence, as idealized tropes of English bourgeois 
femininity, I would suggest that Adeline, Emily, and Ellena are performing sensibility simply by 
“being themselves.” As a result, there is little need for them to actively “evangelize” in these 
texts.  
In The Romance of the Forest, for example, Adeline’s pathos alone is enough to charm 
the La Mottes from the very beginning when she is thrust under their protection in the midst of 
their flight from Monsieur’s creditors in Paris. “Notwithstanding his present agitation,” we are 
told that La Motte  
found it impossible to contemplate the beauty and distress of the object before him 
with indifference. Her youth, her apparent innocence—the artless energy of her manner 
forcibly assailed his heart…[e]very moment of farther observation heightened the 
surprise of La Motte, and interested him more warmly in her favor. Such elegance and 
apparent resignment, contrasted with the desolation of the house [at which she is 
forced into his care], and the savage manners of its inhabitants, seemed to him like a 
romance of imagination, rather than an occurrence of real life. He endeavored to 
comfort her, and his sense of compassion was too sincere to be misunderstood. (8, 9) 
 
Here we see Adeline as an “object” of “beauty and distress”—in two words, a sentimental 
object; and as a sentimental object, she is able to transform La Motte’s selfish concerns into 
“compassion.” Indeed, La Motte is a figure who is ripe for reform and reclamation; the text 
essentially constructs him as a virtuous man who has been corrupted by the “dissipations” of 
Parisian society. Even though “vice had not yet so entirely darkened his conscience, but that the 
blush of shame stained his cheek” (230), his mind is nevertheless “effeminated by vice” (228). 
Due to his desperate position and weak character, La Motte does eventually sell Adeline out to 
the Marquis de Montalt, who initially wants her for his harem. In the following chapters, Adeline 
escapes from the harem, is recaptured, and is sent back to the abbey under La Motte’s 
protection while Montalt recovers from a wound he received in a duel with Adeline’s lover 
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Theodore. Having recently discovered that Adeline is his niece, Montalt orders La Motte, under 
pain of exposure, to murder his surrogate daughter in her sleep so that the marquis can keep his 
own fortune and position secure. However, when La Motte beholds the sleeping Adeline, he is 
unable to act, for “when [La Motte] approached the bed he…heard [Adeline] sing in her sleep. 
As he listened he distinguished some notes of a melancholy little air which, in her happier days, 
she had often sung to him. The low and mournful accent in which she now uttered them 
expressed too well the tone of her mind” (253-254). Upon examining his intended victim, La 
Motte loses his resolve, as he beholds “her cheek yet wet with tears, resting upon her arm… 
[and] her innocent and lovely countenance, pale in grief” (254). The light from his lamp wakes 
her up, and her subsequent pleas for “pity and protection” convince him not only to abandon 
his design, but also to orchestrate her escape.  
Though Joseph Milicia, who wrote the preface to the 2004 Barnes & Noble edition of 
The Romance of the Forest, characterizes La Motte as “a warning against immoderation,” he also 
concedes that “it is impulsive ‘feeling’ (or human decency) that leads him finally to save 
Adeline’s life” (xiii). While this is true, one must keep in mind that Adeline’s unconscious actions 
are the primary impetus for La Motte’s flash of “impulsive feeling.” Adeline’s beginning to sing 
in her sleep a song of personal meaning to La Motte the instant the latter enters her room is 
clearly a sentimental contrivance, and the very constructedness of the scene brings sentiment’s 
domesticating potential into relief, as a poignard-wielding La Motte is delicately—yet 
unmistakably—reminded of his foster familial relationship to Adeline. In his decision to help her 
escape, La Motte effectively rejects the “foreign” Montalt—indeed, it is surprising that Radcliffe 
did not have him dramatically throwing down the “poignard” with which the marquis supplied 
him—in favor of filial duty. Hence, as a direct result of the pathos that Adeline exudes, not only 
is the “effeminate” La Motte finally able to perform an act of courageous virtue, but also, in 
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betraying the marquis, he sets himself up to be captured and tried, which itself paradoxically 
leads to his ultimate redemption.  
After he is found guilty of assaulting and robbing Montalt, Adeline intercedes with La 
Motte’s prosecutors for absolution, and as a result, he is spared the death penalty in favor of 
banishment. The text makes it clear that Adeline’s sentimental influence is the only reason why 
La Motte is shown leniency, as it is her “earnest supplication” and the king’s “consideration of 
the service [La Motte] had finally rendered her” that saves him from the death penalty, and her 
“noble generosity…silenced other prosecutions that were preparing against him, and bestowed 
on him a sum more than sufficient to support his family in a foreign country” (387). Moreover, 
not only do Adeline’s actions disentangle La Motte from his legal problems, but also they 
thoroughly reform his character:  
[t]his kindness operated so powerfully upon [La Motte’s] heart, which had been 
betrayed through weakness rather than natural depravity, and awakened so keen a 
remorse for the injuries he had once meditated against a benefactress so noble, that his 
former habits became odious to him, and his character gradually recovered the hue 
which it would probably always have worn had he never been exposed to the tempting 
dissipations of Paris. (387) 
 
As if to drive home the sincerity of La Motte’s return to virtue, the “foreign country” in which he 
chooses to settle is, ironically yet appropriately enough, England (388). Considering that “his 
character” has “recovered” its true “hue,” which was ruined by Parisian depravity, La Motte’s 
resolution to set out for England reads less like banishment and more like the return of the 
prodigal son; in this way, La Motte is essentially dismissed as a kind of “gone-native” figure who, 
through the intervention of the sentimental woman of empire, has managed to reclaim a 
birthright of virtue.   
 While La Motte is represented more or less as one who has strayed from the fold, 
Montalt is presented as a Gothic villain through-and-through, one of those whom Cannon 
Schmitt describes as “foreign villains [who are] anti-types, exempla of otherness” (855). In one 
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key moment, the marquis prefaces his request that La Motte murder Adeline with a 
denunciation of western civilization, impugning “the refined Europeans [who] boast a standard 
of honor, and a sublimity of virtue, which often leads them from pleasure to misery, and from 
nature to error,” and praising the “uninformed American [who] follows the impulse of his heart, 
and obeys the inspiration of wisdom” (241). He goes on to claim—in a vaguely Rousseauean 
tone—that  
[t]he Indian discovers his friend to be perfidious, and he kills him; the wild Asiatic does 
the same; the Turk, when ambition fires, or revenge provokes, gratifies his passion at 
the expense of life, and does not call it murder. Even the polished Italian, distracted by 
jealousy, or tempted by a strong circumstance of advantage, draws his stiletto, and 
accomplishes his purpose. It is the first proof of a superior mind to liberate itself from 
prejudices of country, or of education. (242) 
 
It is certainly telling in and of itself that Radcliffe, through Montalt, considers Italian “jealousy” 
alongside the perceived savagery of Middle and Far Eastern cultures. In terms of the novel and 
Montalt’s character though, this particular diatribe singles him out as one who is inimitably 
foreign; by implying that “savages” have “superior minds” and by scorning the “prejudices of 
country,” Montalt essentially positions himself outside of an “organized” moral and national 
establishment.  Furthermore, the fact that this speech is an attempt to groom La Motte to act as 
his personal assassin situates Montalt as a pernicious corruptor who is attempting to strip away 
the last vestiges of virtue from his morally porous protégé. Likewise, the fact that La Motte 
(rather unbelievably) does not comprehend the marquis’s murderous intent even when the 
latter speaks of the need to “annihilate” “a reptile [that] hurts us” or an “an animal of prey 
[that] threatens us” reinforces La Motte’s essential innocence and relative distance from vice. 
 Of course, the “foreign” aspects of Montalt’s character are problematized by the fact 
that he is also Adeline’s uncle. While the revelation of a blood tie between the Anglo-virtued 
heroine and the foreign vice-ridden villain raises the specter of moral miscegenation, Radcliffe 
dampens the shock of this connection by introducing (364) and just as quickly discrediting (374) 
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the far worse possibility of Adeline being the illegitimate daughter of Montalt and a nun, a 
misdirection she would later deploy to much greater and more protracted effect in The Italian. 
Also as in The Italian, Radcliffe mediates the heroine’s kinship to the villain by granting the latter 
a modicum of sympathy. Whereas in the later novel Schedoni’s villainous nature is somewhat 
tempered by his kind—albeit gruff and self-serving—treatment of Ellena after he erroneously 
concludes that she is his daughter, in The Romance of the Forest Montalt has a deathbed 
conversion in which he is “tortured with the remembrance of his crime” and, after swallowing 
poison, makes a full confession, reveals his niece’s birthright, and grants her “a considerable 
legacy” (387). While the text does not state that Adeline’s sensibility or virtuous example 
inspired her uncle, as it did La Motte, this is not particularly surprising, as it allows Radcliffe to 
keep Montalt anchored more or less on the far side of the villainous/virtuous spectrum while 
simultaneously making it less problematic for the heroine to be related to her antagonist.  
The Mysteries of Udolpho does not perform the same kind of familial “gymnastics” 
partly because Emily’s father is known from the beginning and partly because Montoni is not a 
blood relative of the St. Aubert family—hence, there is no need to soften his character to 
mediate the problematics of kinship with a virtuous heroine. As a result, it is easier to read 
Montoni as one who is irredeemably “foreign,” yet this does not mean that the text’s dynamics 
are any less complex. While Emily and Montoni comprise the plot’s main antagonistic dyad—
Yael Shapira describes their relationship as “charged” (464), and Kenneth Graham and Coral Ann 
Howells have both written on the subtle erotics of their interactions—and it is worthwhile to 
consider the Emily/Montoni conflict through the lens we have established, it is also fruitful to 
look at Emily’s relationship with Count Morano. There is no criticism of which I am aware that 
takes an in-depth look at this pairing and, if one reads Emily’s connection to Montoni alongside 
her connection to Morano in the same way that we read Adeline in relation to both La Motte 
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and Montalt, one can get a better, reinforced sense of how Radcliffe deploys different 
“degrees”—if that term can be used—of foreignness to explore the woman of empire’s 
domesticating potential.  
Morano is introduced as “a Venetian nobleman” (196) who develops an immediate, 
passionate interest in Emily, though her love for Valancourt and the fact that she “observed 
some traits in his [Morano’s] character that prejudiced her against whatever might otherwise be 
good in it” (202) causes her to reject his advances. Indeed, when Morano persists in his suit—
and is seconded by the avaricious Montoni, who hopes to profit from a marriage between the 
two—Emily is “astonished and highly disgusted at his perseverance” (204). Montoni’s continued 
insistence on the match causes “Emily’s dislike of Morano” to reach the point of “abhorrence,” 
since it makes her realize that “her opinion of [Morano] was of no consequence so long as his 
pretensions were sanctioned by Montoni,” a discovery that adds “indignation to the disgust 
which she had felt toward [Morano]” (211). Morano’s unquenchable passion, fiery temper, 
apparent disregard for the notion of companionate marriage, and status as a leisured nobleman 
establish his position as an Italian caricature in the text, and the “British” Emily’s “astonishment 
and disgust” at his passion, along with her “abhorrence” of Morano’s circumambulating her 
consent by attempting to win her hand through an appeal to Montoni’s greed, cements his 
status as such an “Other.” However, despite his many transgressions—including sneaking into 
Emily’s bedroom in Udolpho and attempting to persuade her to elope with him—Emily reaches 
out sentimentally to Morano after he falls wounded in a duel with Montoni.  
When the latter orders Morano to leave the castle immediately, despite his critical 
state, the narrator relates how Emily “came forward into the corridor, and pleaded a cause of 
common humanity with the feelings of the warmest benevolence, when she entreated Montoni 
to allow Morano the assistance in the castle which his situation required” (281). Despite the fact 
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that Montoni seems to possess “a monster’s cruelty” (282), Emily, we are told, is “superior to 
Montoni’s menaces, giving water to Morano, and directing the attendants to bind up his 
wound” (282). As she gazes upon the wounded Count, her “countenance [is] strongly expressive 
of solicitude” (282), and, nervous as her admirer’s presence makes her, “the fainting languor of 
his countenance again awakened her pity and overcame her terror” (283). It is important to 
note that in this scene Emily is called away from Morano by an angry Montoni, yet, despite her 
“impatien[ce] to be gone,” she lingers with the wounded Count, repeatedly reassuring him of 
her forgiveness and “sincere wishes” for his recovery and “general welfare,” though stopping 
short of saying that she loves him, despite his desire to hear her do so (283). It is only when 
called by Montoni a second time that Emily leaves Morano’s side. If sentiment in the context of 
empire “is about both the encounter with the object [whether that object be an individual, a 
site, or a cultural practice]…and the ability to disengage from the scene” (Festa 35), then Emily’s 
simultaneous pity for and detachment from the thoroughly Italian Morano effectively renders 
her a “sentimental figure of empire”: she deploys enough sympathy to secure her virtuousness, 
yet stops short of identifying with the abject Count. 
This reading of Emily’s character is borne out by what occurs after she responds to 
Montoni’s summons. When the latter insinuates that Emily remained in the wounded Morano’s 
presence out of a “more than common interest” in the Count, Emily rather wittily remarks, “I 
fear, sir, it was more than common interest that detained me…for of late I have been inclined to 
think that of compassion is an uncommon one. But how could I, could you, sir, witness Count 
Morano’s deplorable condition, and not wish to relieve it?” (284, original italics) Through this 
statement, Emily deflects Montoni’s scandalous implication while at the same time placing 
herself in a position of superior moral authority (interestingly, by turning his own diction and 
syntax against him). Indeed, for her, it is impossible not to perform a compassionate act when 
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faced with suffering, and by chastising Montoni’s lack of sentiment, Emily seems to be 
attempting to introduce a possibility of moral reform. Indeed, the fact that her sensibility made 
her “superior to Montoni’s menaces” when Morano was suffering implies that she is well-suited 
to this task—it seems then, that in the romantic imagination, the woman of empire’s moral 
power overcomes the foreign villain’s hegemonic authority.  
Montoni is apparently aware of these implications, as he sneeringly responds “before 
you undertake to regulate the morals of other persons, you should learn and practise the virtues 
which are indispensable to a woman—sincerity, uniformity of conduct, and obedience” (285). 
Considering the power that a woman of empire wields in these texts, it should not be surprising 
that Montoni’s attempt at deflection is ineffective. Though Emily is initially shocked and hurt by 
this rebuke, since she understands herself to be “finely sensible not only of what is just in morals 
but of whatever is beautiful in the female character,” her mortification is brief, as “in the next 
moment her heart swelled with the consciousness of having deserved praise instead of censure, 
and she was proudly silent.” What’s more, Montoni is unaware of his failure, because he “was a 
stranger to the luxury of conscious worth, and therefore did not foresee the energy of that 
sentiment which now repelled his satire” (285).  
Nevertheless, Emily’s moral position is still briefly compromised in this exchange. Before 
issuing the rebuke discussed in the above paragraph, Montoni suggests that Emily’s “female 
caprice” is to blame for Morano’s surprise appearance at Udolpho. Believing that Morano’s fall 
from Montoni’s esteem caused Emily to develop a belated interest in the Count, Montoni goes 
so far as to imply that Emily contrived for Morano to be in her bedroom that evening. The 
reader of course knows this to be untrue, and Emily is predictably shocked at such an indelicate 
insinuation, yet the sexual undercurrents of this moment, when read alongside Emily’s 
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sentimental outreach to Morano and sensibility’s historical position as a coded substitute for 
sexuality, raise some interesting interpretive possibilities.  
Sensibility’s connection to sexuality is perhaps best articulated in George Haggerty’s 
Men in Love (1999) where he writes that, in sensibility 
the body becomes an agent of sexual response in its very emotional organization. For 
the man or, in a very different way, the woman of feeling a sigh, a tear, the touch of a 
pulse, or the distribution of a charitable coin [or, in Emily’s case, a cup of water] can 
carry with it an unmistakably erotic charge, and each of them becomes, in various 
circumstances, the carefully articulated substitute for sexual activity. (82) 
 
The critical tradition that Haggerty highlights casts Emily’s act of mercy in an erotic shade. If one 
reads this alongside Montoni’s scandalous implication and Emily and Morano’s failed erotic 
history, the resulting constellation of factors articulates what might otherwise be unthinkable in 
a Radcliffe novel—namely, that Emily is a sexualized being and that the foreign, aristocratic 
Morano possesses an erotic valence for her. Nevertheless, such a possibility is ultimately dashed 
by Emily’s relative coolness in this scene: she is no weeping Yorick, rapturously feeling the pulse 
of a lovely young Parisian. Rather, while her sentimental response to Morano’s suffering may 
necessarily invoke an erotic tradition, her “impatien[ce] to be gone” and refusal to indulge in 
more than “common humanity” short-circuits any sexual implications, thus providing yet 
another example of Radcliffe’s tendency to introduce in her work that which is taboo, only to 
pull back from the thematic precipice at the last minute. Indeed, in this light, Montoni’s 
subsequent accusations can be seen as Radcliffe acknowledging sensibility’s more prurient 
implications, while Emily’s cool response to Morano and indignant reaction to Montoni allows 
Radcliffe to actively deflate the erotic potential of an act that is ultimately meant only to 
demonstrate Emily’s comparable moral authority. Essentially, Emily arms herself with the tools 
of sensibility so that she can practice female virtue by responding to Morano’s distress, and so 
that she can, like a good “domestic subject of empire”—by this I mean one who is establishing 
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and promoting English domestic values in a “foreign” space—introduce the possibility of moral 
reformation in her response to Montoni’s insinuations.  
 Nevertheless, Emily does not seem to be quite as successful as Adeline at “converting 
manners.” Shortly after Morano’s rencounter with Montoni, we are told that “[t]he professions 
of repentance, which Morano had made to Emily, under the anguish of his wound, was sincere 
at the moment he offered them; but he had mistaken the subject of his sorrow, for, while he 
thought he was condemning the cruelty of his late design, he was lamenting only the state of 
suffering, to which it had reduced him” (371). While this passage sets up Morano’s next failed 
attempt to carry off Emily and seems to foreclose any possibility of his undergoing a reformation 
as far-reaching and permanent as La Motte’s, it is nevertheless interesting that this nullification 
comes nearly 100 pages after Morano’s “repentance,” and in a brief, expository passage at that. 
Essentially, for a decent period of time, Morano’s character is destabilized, which is more than 
can be said for Montoni, who is never granted a sympathetic moment. The fact that these two 
characters occupy two very different spheres of villainy is borne out by the different manners in 
which they exit the text: Montoni is captured by the authorities—who are assisted by a tip from 
the vengeful Morano (541)—and eventually dies in prison “in a doubtful and mysterious 
manner,” most likely from poison (588), whereas Morano, for his role in Montoni’s capture, is 
cleared of the false charges that Montoni earlier leveled against him (541).  
While it would be fallacious to read, one-for-one, Montoni for Montalt and Morano for 
La Motte, it is also impossible to ignore the similar dynamics. Like Montalt, Montoni must be 
removed from the world of the text in order for any happy ending to take place, as it is 
Montoni’s death that essentially returns Emily control of her estates in the same way that 
Montalt’s demise brought Adeline’s legacy to light. Furthermore, both La Motte and Morano 
face some degree of chastisement for their crimes in that both are imprisoned for a space, yet 
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both are ultimately set free, La Motte to live a life of virtue, and Morano to an uncertain future, 
since the text never returns to him or clarifies his ultimate fate.  Essentially, by creating two 
legibly non-English villains, one who is more or less an embodiment of evil and one who is 
capable of being moved—albeit temporarily—by feeling, Radcliffe seems to be suggesting that 
women, via sentiment, can potentially “reform” the foreign space, yet it is an uphill battle, 
fraught with those who would challenge and call into question female virtue. Regardless of her 
success or failure at this sort of domestic evangelism, however, the woman of empire can 
always rest secure in the fact that the path of English virtue is unassailable, that “though the 
vicious can sometimes pour affliction upon the good, their power is transient and their 
punishment certain; and that innocence, though oppressed by injustice, shall, supported by 
patience, finally triumph over misfortune!” (696) 
 Such is also the case at the conclusion of The Italian, though before Ellena and Vivaldi 
can have their happy ending, the machinations of Schedoni and his hired ruffian, Spalatro, must 
first be overcome.
46
 Diego Saglia has commented on how The Italian seems to particularly 
exemplify the apparent binarism of foreign villain/domestic heroine, stating that “[t]he semantic 
network of darkness woven around Schedoni’s figure, his dark cowl, his obscure origins, his 
‘habitual gloom’ (p. 35) ascribe him to the specific domain of Italian and sublime difference” 
(18), and that “[o]n the one hand, the agents of sameness [Ellena and Vivaldi] work towards 
unity and stability emblematized in romantic love and the family nucleus it eventually brings 
about. On the other hand, Italianness questions this stability and tends to disrupt it in the name 
of a different order of things based on superstition, arbitrary power, lawlessness, or murder” 
                                                 
46
 While it is true that the Marchesa di Vivaldi plays a significant antagonistic role in The Italian—more so 
than Mme Cheron in The Mysteries of Udolpho and definitely more so than Mme La Motte in The 
Romance of the Forest—the dynamics between the heroine and her female persecutors are generally not the 
same as those between the heroine and the male villain. An in-depth consideration of these “villainesses” 
would be beyond the scope of this study. 
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(31-32). The latter claim is particularly relevant to our current discussion, as it acknowledges not 
only the struggle between “the foreign” and “the domestic,” but also foreignness’s tendency in 
these texts to be represented as a disruptor of domestic values. However, as we have seen, this 
kind of disruption moves two ways: the French and Italian villains may destabilize English virtue, 
but English virtue, as embodied in the heroines, also seeks to reform and order the “chaos” of a 
foreign-inflected criminality. Along a similar line, Schmitt maintains that “one function of 
[national] displacement in The Italian is the intensification of a binarism between English and 
foreign already at work in the domestic settings of sentimental fiction” (863); reading Schmitt’s 
claim in light of Saglia’s findings and our present discussion then, reaffirms that Gothic novels 
like The Italian are grounded in the domestically-virtued tradition of the sentimental novel and 
are thus subject to the familiar trope of female sentiment and continence as a near-miraculous 
reformative tool. Hence, The Italian, generally recognized as Radcliffe’s most “mature” work, 
can also be understood as providing a particularly exemplary case of sensibility being encoded 
as a domesticating, difference-effacing discourse. 
Like Adeline and La Motte in The Romance of the Forest, Ellena and Schedoni perform 
an interesting “dance” of sentiment, though this exchange is far more protracted. In the same 
way that La Motte was ordered by Montalt to murder Ellena, and was foiled by emotions 
brought about by Adeline’s aura of innocence, Schedoni has planned Ellena’s murder at the 
behest of the Marchesa di Vivaldi, and he too is stopped, in his first attempt on the beach, by an 
alien sense of compassion: 
[h]e, who had hitherto been insensible to every tender feeling, who, governed by 
ambition and resentment, had contributed, by his artful instigations, to fix the baleful 
resolution of the Marchesa di Vivaldi, and who was come to execute her purpose, — 
even he could not look upon the innocent, the wretched Ellena, without yielding to the 
momentary weakness, as he termed it, of compassion. (259) 
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What is striking about Schedoni’s hesitation is the fact that he is “especially representative” of a 
Gothic Italy (Schmitt 861); because of his inherent “insensibility” and the fact that he previously 
murdered his brother and attempted to murder his sister-in-law/unwilling wife, Schedoni’s 
hesitation is more surprising than that of the simpering La Motte. As an image of pathos, Ellena 
effectively displaces the monk’s “savagery” and replaces it with an utterly unfamiliar sense of 
benevolence which so confounds her oppressor that “the emotions of his mind were violent and 
contradictory…[h]e considered the character of his mind with astonishment, for circumstances 
had drawn forth traits, of which, till now, he had no suspicion” (261). It is interesting, however, 
that upon reflection, Schedoni realizes that his emotional weakness seems to dissipate when he 
is not in Ellena’s presence—he notes that his pity “was transient, [and] it disappeared almost 
with the object that had awakened it” (264)—a recognition which suggests that the woman of 
empire is effectually being constructed here as the conscience of the foreign assassin.  
Indeed, even Schedoni’s hired ruffian, Spalatro, refuses to murder Ellena, and it is left 
ambiguous as to “[w]hether the innocence and beauty of Ellena had softened his heart, or that 
his conscience did torture him for his past deeds” (267). While the language of this passage 
represents Ellena’s “innocence and beauty” and Spalatro’s “conscience,” as two different forces, 
it is nevertheless telling that Ellena seems to be the first “contract” that Spalatro has ever 
refused—much to Schedoni’s incredulity (266-267). Interestingly, Spalatro’s attack of conscience 
is externalized through an appearance of a bloody specter which represents his former 
assassinations and which only he can see, as he hysterically relates to a shaken but unbelieving 
Schedoni: “‘[i]t came before my eyes in a moment, and shewed itself distinctly and 
outspread…[a]nd then it beckoned – yes, it beckoned me, with that blood-stained finger! and 
glided away down the passage, still beckoning—till it was lost in the darkness’” (269). While it is 
true that Spalatro is a “rustic” and thus it is not surprising that he should be carried away by 
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imagination, the fact remains that this kind of hysteria is generally reserved for “good” but 
bumpkinish servants like Peter in Romance, Annette and Dorotheé in Udolpho, or Paolo in The 
Italian, and of course for the Gothic heroine herself—though in the case of The Italian Vivaldi is 
much more susceptible to superstitious flights of fancy than Ellena. Yet Spalatro is no loquacious 
domestic or swooning sensitive; in fact, Ellena, upon first seeing him, cathects him with what 
might be a shade of foreign sublimity, as the very sight of Spalatro causes her to “shrink” from 
his “terrific wildness” and she notes that “[s]he had never before seen villainy and suffering so 
strongly pictured on the same face, and she observed him with a degree of thrilling curiosity, 
which for a moment excluded from her mind all consciousness of the evils to be apprehended 
from him” (244). Even after Schedoni attempts to murder her—a key moment that we will 
consider in more depth momentarily—and Ellena finds the monk’s discarded dagger in her 
room, she briefly considers the possibility that the Confessor had come to kill her, but quickly 
dismisses the thought, choosing to believe that “Spalatro alone had meditated her destruction” 
(281), and as all three characters leave the ruined beach mansion, Ellena places her trust in 
Schedoni—albeit cautiously—while continuing to fear Spalatro, of whom “she thought ‘assassin’ 
was written in each line of [his face]” (289).  
Hence, Spalatro cannot be categorized as a “mere” rustic; though his class background 
enables and mediates his “slip” into hysterical spectralization, he is still a villain and a valid 
object of fear for Ellena, which makes this moment of “supernatural” guilt all the more odd. 
Considering the chronology of this scene—Spalatro refuses to commit the murder, Schedoni 
reminds him of his bloody, unrepentant past, Spalatro morosely alludes to “[t]he bloody hand 
[which] is always before me,” the narrator raises the “Ellena’s beauty and innocence or 
Spalatro’s conscience” question, and two pages later, the “ghosts” appear (266-267, 269)—I 
would read this scene as a case of Ellena’s “innocence and beauty” stimulating Spalatro’s 
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heretofore easily suppressed conscience. Nevertheless, this is far from being a “complete” 
reform—Spalatro is, after all, an Italian whose predominant characteristics are his “terrific 
wildness” and the fact that he has first “villain,” and then “assassin” “engraved in every line of 
his face” (244, 289). Though he is unwilling to kill Ellena with his own hand, it turns out that 
Spalatro’s “conscience, or his pity, was of a very peculiar kind however; for, though he refused 
to execute the deed himself, he consented to wait…while Schedoni accomplished it, and 
afterward to assist in carrying the body to the shore,” a decision which Schedoni disgustedly 
terms “a compromise between conscience and guilt, worthy of a demon” (267). Hence, we are 
presented with another example of the woman of empire’s ability to promote reform and 
morality, juxtaposed with the “fact” that most foreign “villains” are ultimately irredeemable. 
Spalatro’s villainous personality can be destabilized, but it cannot be effaced. 
While we are considering Spalatro, it is also interesting to note that this interplay in his 
character is revisited near the end of the text. Schedoni’s vengeful former accomplice, Nicola di 
Zampari, seeks to expose the Confessor to the Inquisition, and, as evidence, he calls upon a 
priest in Rome who heard the last confession of the recently-deceased Spalatro, who, it turns 
out, was the very bravo Schedoni had hired to dispose of his brother the Count di Bruno many 
years prior. Spalatro’s motives for making a Catholic confession, it turns out, are a bit muddled: 
The account which Spalatro had given of his motive for this journey to the priest was, 
that, having lately [and erroneously, through Schedoni’s contrivance] understood 
Schedoni to be resident at Rome, he had followed him thither, with an intention of 
relieving his conscience by an acknowledgment of his own crimes, and a disclosure of 
Schedoni’s. This, however, was not exactly the fact. The design of Spalatro was to extort 
money from the guilty Confessor. (418) 
 
Complicating matters further is the fact that, upon reaching Rome and discovering that Schedoni 
had misled him, a wounded and feverish Spalatro ultimately “unburdened his conscience by a 
full confession of his guilt” before dying (419). As with Montalt in The Romance of the Forest, 
Spalatro’s deathbed confession turns out to be an important piece of the denouement, as it 
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provides sufficient evidence to impugn Schedoni for the murder of his brother and the near-
murder of his wife. More thematically, Spalatro’s confession allows him to be essentially 
“redeemed” at the end, though his initial, treacherous motives for pursuing Schedoni to Rome 
simultaneously problematizes this “redemption” and keeps Spalatro’s Italianness at the 
forefront. 
 As for Schedoni himself, his attempt to murder Ellena is similar to La Motte’s attempt on 
Adeline’s life, since he is enfeebled by his intended victim’s show of innocence:  
While Schedoni gazed for a moment upon her innocent countenance, a faint smile stole 
over it…[h]e searched for the dagger, and it was some time before his trembling hand 
could disengage it from the folds of his garment…[h]is agitation and repugnance to 
strike encreased with every moment of delay, and, as often as he prepared to plunge 
the poniard in her bosom, a shuddering horror restrained him. (271) 
 
As those who are familiar with the novel know, Schedoni is ultimately stopped when he espies a 
miniature of himself as a young man around Ellena’s neck, and the two come to the false 
conclusion that he is her long-lost father (Schedoni is actually Ellena’s uncle) (272-274). Upon 
discovering this, Schedoni presses a still somewhat doubtful Ellena “to his bosom” and cries 
tears of “remorse and grief” (274). As in the episode with Adeline and La Motte then, the 
heroine’s innocence essentially transforms a murderous impulse into a paternalistic embrace, 
since it is unlikely that Schedoni would have noticed the portrait if he had not delayed his strike; 
hence, what is meant to be a scene of violence becomes instead a scene of familial reunion. 
Because at this moment in the text Schedoni is confounded with Ellena’s deceased father—
whom he in fact murdered— we can understand this scene as an example of what Schmitt 
refers to as “[t]he simultaneous presence of intransigent otherness and domestic sameness in 
The Italian” (855). Here, villain and victim, murderous uncle and virtuous father are, at least for 
the next one hundred and fifty or so pages, collapsed into one figure.   
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Schedoni’s character undergoes still greater destabilization when, soon after this 
encounter, he finds that Ellena’s “innocent looks [and] her affectionate thanks, inflicted an 
anguish, which was scarcely endurable” (287). While this negative reaction to emotional 
honesty can and should be read as evidence of Schedoni’s essential “Otherness,” it should also 
be noted that such an experience of guilt reinforces Ellena’s status as the monk’s “conscience”; 
his shell has been penetrated and his initial positioning as a bloodthirsty, Machiavellian 
stereotype has been destabilized by Ellena’s indirect intervention: the scheming plotter who 
earlier termed “compassion” a “weakness” is experiencing guilt. The extent of Schedoni’s 
internal torment is further hinted at in his uncharacteristic reaction to the “Virginia” tragedy 
being enacted—albeit ineptly—by a crowd of rustics in a village where the party stops for rest 
and refreshment. In this mise en abîme, Schedoni and Ellena’s peasant guide dramatically points 
out the “villain” who has “murdered his own daughter” in the play. When Schedoni hears “these 
terrible words,” his “indignation” is “done away by other emotions,” as he witnesses the actors 
perform “the moment when [Virginia] was dying in the arms of her father, who was holding up 
the poniard with which he had stabbed her.” We are told that “[t]he feelings of Schedoni, at this 
instant, inflicted a punishment almost worthy of the crime he had meditated” (318). Schedoni is 
“[s]tung to the heart” by this performance, and his attempts to leave precipitately upset the 
peasant guide, who “almost for the first time in his life…was suffering under the strange delights 
of artificial grief” (319).  
Noted Gothic scholar Robert Miles, who edited the Penguin edition of The Italian (2004), 
comments in the endnotes on this reference to “the strange delights of artificial grief,” claiming 
that “[this] phrase reflects mainstream eighteenth-century aesthetic theory on the paradoxical 
character and benefits of tragic drama.” He goes on to cite John and Anna Laetitia Aikin (later 
Barbauld), who claimed that  
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[t]he painful sensation immediately arising from a scene of misery, is so much softened 
and alleviated by the reflex sense of self-approbation on attending virtuous sympathy, 
that we find…a very exquisite and refined pleasure remaining, which makes us desirous 
of again being witnesses to such scenes, instead of flying from them with disgust and 
horror (Miscellaneous Pieces, p.120). (488)  
 
While it is the peasant guide who is described as experiencing this particular “delight,” the 
above historicization is still very much applicable to the emotionally-struck Schedoni, and, with 
the Aikins’ words in mind, I would also remind readers of the intrinsic link between sensibility 
and spectacle. Schedoni’s being “stung to the heart” by a theatrical performance invokes a 
tradition of feeling men—Lovelace’s feigned emotional response to Venice Preserved and 
Clarissa Harlowe’s subsequent reassessment of his character comes to mind. However, Schedoni 
is most certainly not experiencing a “virtuous sympathy” here; rather, his reaction is more 
reminiscent of Claudius’s in Hamlet, and thus his behavior can be understood as reflecting his 
anomalous position: he reacts emotionally to and identifies with visual representations unlike a 
“typical” Gothic villain such as Montoni, yet the feeling he experiences is that of guilt rather 
than pathos. Hence, his status as an “Other” is simultaneously maintained and disrupted by a 
dramatic representation of his attempted murder of Ellena. 
Furthermore, a similar “confounding” incident takes place much later in the text.  When 
Schedoni is brought before the Inquisition, the narrator comments provocatively on his 
unreadable character, stating that it “certainly required something more than human firmness 
to support unmoved the severe scrutiny, and the yet severer suspicions, to which he stood 
exposed. Whether, however, it was the fortitude of conscious innocence, or the hardihood of 
atrocious vice, that protected the Confessor, he certainly did not betray any emotion” (392, my 
italics). As one might expect, the deployment of the term “conscious innocence” is what makes 
this moment particularly noteworthy. As discussed earlier, “conscious innocence” is a trait that 
Radcliffe’s heroines typically possess: we have already, for example, discussed Emily’s sense of 
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“conscious worth” and “proud silence” in the face of Montoni’s unjust rebukes (285). In The 
Italian we see Ellena practicing this trait most readily when the tyrannical abbess of San Stefano 
accuses her of attempting to marry above her station, an insinuation which causes Ellena to feel 
“the sting of offended honour…till the pride of conscious worth gradually reviv[ed] her courage 
and fortif[ied] her patience” (80). As mentioned earlier, this “conscious innocence” is essentially 
a type of “spiritual barrier” (to borrow Delamotte’s term) which protects the heroine’s ego from 
the villain’s unjust accusations.
47
 Naturally, the reader is aware of the fact that, in Schedoni’s 
case, the accusations being leveled are just, and it is “the hardihood of atrocious vice” rather 
than “the fortitude of conscious innocence” which renders him unreadable, in the same way 
that a seasoned reader of Radcliffe (or even the Gothic generally) would likely be suspicious, 
along with Ellena, of Schedoni’s claims to paternity (especially with such a large revelation 
coming comparatively early in the novel). While I wouldn’t say that Schedoni’s demeanor in this 
scene and the way it is characterized in the text necessarily has anything to do with Ellena or her 
actions directly, it is still undeniable that this kind of statement is disorienting since it 
momentarily identifies Schedoni with Ellena—if the fortitude of the “righteous” and the 
fortitude of the hardened sinner are confoundable in their outward representation, then the 
gap between heroine and villain is necessarily narrowed. As if to signify and acknowledge this 
confusion, we are told that Vivaldi “could not judge whether the pride which occasioned 
[Schedoni’s] silence, was that of innocence or of remorse” (403). Therefore, as in the case of his 
“sentimental” reaction to the story of Virginia, Schedoni here performs a “queer”—perhaps 
even uncanny—version of English virtue and delicacy; similar to Spalatro and his decision to 
eschew taking part in Ellena’s murder but willingness to assist with disposing of the body, the 
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 I discuss this in much more depth, and with specific examples, in “Sublime Patriarchs and the Problems 
of the New Middle Class.” 
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vague possibility that Schedoni’s character is anything other than an Italian stereotype is briefly 
raised and just as quickly dismissed. 
Stereotypical representations notwithstanding, Schedoni’s death, like Spalatro’s and 
Montalt’s, features repentance and the revealing of information that is necessary to guarantee 
the heroine’s and hero’s happiness. Surrounded by Zampari, Vivaldi, Vivaldi’s father the 
Marchese, and various officers of the Inquisition, the dying Confessor, who, like Montalt, has 
poisoned himself, calls upon Zampari “to do justice in this instance, and to acknowledge, before 
these witnesses, that Ellena Rosalba is innocent of every circumstance of misconduct, which you 
have formerly related to the Marchese di Vivaldi!’” (452) Schedoni, who has nothing left to lose, 
apparently decides to reveal all simply out of desire to make things right, as he explains “fallen 
though I am, I have still been desirous of counteracting, as far as remains for me, the evil I have 
occasioned” (453). He reveals that Ellena is of noble blood (452) and therefore “worthy” of the 
Marchese di Vivaldi’s approval, and it is “[i]n consequence of the dying confession of Schedoni, 
[that] an order was sent from the holy office for the release of Vivaldi” (467) from the dungeons 
of the Inquisition. Hence, Schedoni is somewhat vindicated at the end of the text. Though his 
essentially “monstrous” character cannot be permitted to remain in a landscape over which 
Ellena is now “in every respect, the queen” (476), it would seem that his dealings with the 
heroine and the hero and his discovered kinship with the former have shaken his conscience 
enough to inspire him to make amends. 
In light of these various examples and what they have revealed about the character of 
Radcliffe’s villains, it is interesting to consider what Pam Perkins has written about Radcliffe and 
Italy. Though she is not discussing sensibility per se, Perkins has read the travel writings of John 
Moore against Radcliffe’s Italian Gothic fiction, and concluded that  
[w]hat she [Radcliffe] is doing is simultaneously employing and inverting the tendency of 
travel writers to make the strange familiar – whether they do so by representing the 
  148
foreign as being subsumed and mastered by the traveller’s [sic] gaze, as many recent 
critics have argued was a characteristic technique of eighteenth century travel writers, 
or, more subtly, by repeating details about a foreign culture in such a way that this 
supposed revelation of the exotic fits in comfortably with an established British literary 
discourse. Travel writing about Italy thus serves not merely as a source of picturesque 
descriptions of landscape for a Gothic novelist such as Radcliffe, but also, more 
importantly, as a cultural discourse that she can manipulate to unsettle her readers. (41) 
 
This statement accounts in many ways for the odd, destabilizing moments that we have been 
considering. Villains like Schedoni and Spalatro are certainly “strange,” yet their problematic, 
pseudo-implication in sensibility at times and a more generalized English morality at others, 
renders them uncannily familiar. However, where Perkins reads this simply as a technique of 
horror writing—and I certainly do not think that there is anything inaccurate about this 
assessment—I would once again claim that these instances can also be understood as moments 
in the texts where the Gothic heroine either through direct intervention (as with Emily and in 
some cases Adeline) or simply by virtue of her “sentimental” nature (as with Ellena and, again, in 
some cases with Adeline), destabilizes Gothic villains whose stereotypically continental manners 
are textually emphasized, and introduces the possibility of moral reform—albeit a moral reform 
which is either never fully realized or realized so late in the text that it does not require the 
reader to perform any substantive cognitive labor to refit the villain into a more complex moral 
framework. 
Transport and Ravishment: Adeline, Ellena, and the Sublime 
The extent of Radcliffe’s discursive proximity to empire should not come as much of a 
surprise considering her textual reliance on the sublime. Sublimity and landscape aesthetics in 
general, of course, have a long and storied relationship to the imperial project. Although she is 
not engaging the sublime exactly, Pratt’s notes on “promontory description” provide an 
interesting entry point for our consideration of landscape’s role in imperialism. Along these 
lines, she claims that European “discovery” is inherently ironic, since generally European 
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explorers hired natives to guide them to “discoveries” such as Lake Tanganyika in Central Africa 
(202). In order to characterize such a moment as significant and “heroic,” European travel 
writers engaged in “promontory descriptions,” in which the speaker deploys a “monarch-of-all-I-
survey” type of discourse (201).
48
 Most significant for our purposes is Pratt’s understanding of 
“promontory descriptions” as “a gesture of converting local knowledges (discourses) into 
European national and continental knowledges associated with European forms and relations of 
power” (202). Though at this point in her study Pratt is specifically engaging narratives from the 
mid to late nineteenth century, this claim is still relevant to our area of inquiry, not only because 
Pratt notes that the “promontory description” is “very common in Romantic and Victorian 
writing of all kinds” (202) (one would suppose that “Romantic writing” includes 1790s Gothic 
fiction) but also because it is in dialogue with David Spurr’s concept of “appropriation,” in which 
the colonizer executes his “desire to recreate, in these unconquered territories or in these 
unsubdued hearts and minds, one’s own image, and to reunite the pieces of a cultural identity 
divided from itself” (42). Indeed, as “creolized” dejects whose sense of self is constantly being 
threatened by a foreignized patriarchy, Adeline, Emily, and Ellena “appropriate” the 
overwhelming continental landscapes surrounding them by utilizing the discourse of the 
sublime, thus claiming kinship with the foreign by drawing it under the aegis of a common 
western aesthetic register, and thus “reuniting the pieces” of their “divided cultural identities.”  
Pratt’s caveat that the “monarch-of-all-I-survey scene” is a “masculine heroic discourse 
of discovery” which “is not readily available to women” (213) ought not to concern us too much 
since Adeline, Emily, and Ellena are not engaging in “promontory description” per se; they are 
engaging in the discourse of the sublime. While the former is similar to the latter in the sense 
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 For a primary example one could consider Richard Burton’s Lake Regions of Central Africa (1860).  
Pratt cites a key passage in Imperial Eyes, 201-2. Patrick Brantlinger’s also references Burton’s text as one 
that “make[s] use of Gothic tropes” (157) in “Imperial Gothic.” Teaching the Gothic. Ed. Anna Powell and  
Andrew Smith. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 153-67. 
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that in both cases the viewing subject is (re)constructing the landscape along the axes of a 
Eurocentric discourse, one must bear in mind that in “promontory description” the viewing 
subject’s proprietorship over the scene is explicit, while in the discourse of the sublime, the 
viewing subject constructs herself as one who is subjected and humbled by the spectacle; her 
proprietorship exists solely on a subtextual level of appropriation. 
More specifically, in terms of the intersection of the sublime with colonialist speech 
acts, Dekker suggests that there’s a “ravishing sublimity associated in Radcliffe’s fiction with 
southern Europe, Burke, feudal institutions and buildings, and a transporting sublimity 
associated with the North, Shakespeare, natural scenery, and the spirit of liberty: the former 
permitting little more than passive receptivity, the latter awakening the mind to presences 
beyond the merely seen” (109). While I do not contest Dekker’s reading—the “feudal” southern 
European villains and their crumbling domiciles certainly do permit “little more than passive 
receptivity” while the “natural scenery” does inspire the mind to “presences beyond the merely 
seen”—it is interesting that Radcliffe’s heroines, though traveling in southern Europe and facing 
its allegedly “ravishing” sublimity, engage in landscape description that undeniably reflects the 
“transporting” sublimity associated with the north. However, one must also keep in mind that 
“transport”—that is, “such attributes of the sublime as an exalting sense of imaginative 
expansion and empowerment”—is not limited to an encounter with the “northern” sublime; 
such feelings can also be drawn from “the other (Burkean) end of the emotional scale, a strange 
mingling of awe, terror, and delight” (8). The fact that this is possible suggests that, by applying 
such an “aesthetic appreciation of [the landscape’s] merits,” Radcliffe’s heroines labor to make 
sense of the foreign landscape through the deployment of an aesthetic discourse; this implies an 
attempt to tame that which is frightening and un-English with familiar language and standards 
of virtue and self-reliance. 
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By way of example, there is an interesting moment in The Romance of the Forest where 
Peter, the predictably loquacious servant, extols the virtues of his homeland Savoy’s location 
amongst the Alps in counterpoint to the hills of France. He exclaims  
the hills there are very well for French hills, but they are not to be named on the same 
day with ours.’ Adeline [the narrative continues], lost in admiration of the astonishing 
and tremendous scenery around her, assented very warmly to the truth of Peter’s 
assertion, which encouraged him to expatiate more largely upon the advantages of his 
country; its disadvantages he totally forgot; and though he gave away his last sous to 
the children of the peasantry that run barefooted by the side of the horse, he spoke of 
nothing but the happiness and content of the inhabitants. (264) 
 
Savoy, which since 1720 had been associated with the Kingdom of Sardinia, was being occupied 
by French Revolutionary forces at the time of Radcliffe’s writing. As a nation simultaneously 
associated with Italy and revolutionary France, it is not surprising that Radcliffe should draw the 
reader’s attention to the region’s poverty—indeed, her referring to “barefooted peasant 
children” reminds one of France’s critics’ tendency to dwell on the image of an impoverished 
rural peasantry clad in wooden shoes.  
However, Radcliffe is also quick to point out that Leloncourt, Peter’s hometown, over 
which the benevolent pastor La Luc presides, “was an exception to the general character of the 
country, and to the usual effects of an arbitrary government; it was flourishing, healthy, and 
happy; and these advantages it chiefly owed to the activity and attention of the benevolent 
clergyman whose cure it was” (264). During Adeline and Peter’s journey, there is an interesting 
shift in Adeline’s emotional state before and after she sees Leloncourt, a shift which supports a 
reading of the sublime-in-landscape as an Anglifying tool. As the journey wanes on, the grandeur 
of Savoy’s Alpine landscape begins to take an emotional toll on the fatigued Adeline; we are told 
that  
[h]er spirits, thus weakened, the gloomy grandeur of the scenes which had so lately 
awakened emotions of delightful sublimity, now awed her into terror; she trembled at 
the sound of the torrents rolling among the cliffs and thundering in the vale below, and 
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shrunk from the view of the precipices, which sometimes overhung the road, and at 
others appeared beneath it. (265) 
 
However, upon approaching Leloncourt, which rests “at the foot of the Savoy Alps,” the traveler 
is once again rejuvenated by the sight of the sublime, as the sunset above the town and the 
surrounding, mountainous landscape “drew from Adeline, languid as she was, an exclamation of 
rapture” (265). Here, we see a landscape with Franco-Italian associations becoming an object of 
“Burkean” terror,
49
 until the appearance of a township—a township which is led and managed 
by an Anglified divine—in the midst of this foreignness stabilizes the heroine’s emotional state, 
a move which suggests that it is the sublime’s association with British aesthetic discourse more 
than anything else which gives it its fortifying valence.  
 In The Italian, there are other, perhaps more subtle, interesting juxtapositions of “good” 
and “bad” sublimity. Anyone who has studied Radcliffe is familiar with the two “big” sublime 
moments in the text—the first being when Ellena discovers the convent of San Stefano’s turret 
room, which overlooks a majestic panorama of mountains, and the second being when Ellena, 
Vivaldi, and the servant Paolo observe and comment on a particular vista as they are fleeing 
from the convent. The former moment will be considered in more depth later on, while the 
latter’s connection to travel and English identity has already been expostulated by Pam Perkins. 
Readers of The Italian will of course recall that the scene in question depicts the three travelers 
looking upon Lake Celano, with Vivaldi noting the sublime mountains that surround it, Ellena 
pointing out the beautiful banks and plains, and Paolo essentially “missing the point” by 
comparing this scene to a vaguely similar one in the travelers’ native Naples (185-186). Perkins 
reads this moment as an example of the “English” Ellena and Vivaldi’s mastery of national 
aesthetic discourse as opposed to Paolo’s rustic provincialism, claiming that 
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 It is interesting that Emily and Ellena never have similar negative reactions to Italian landscapes in 
Udolpho and The Italian. Most likely, this is merely an example of Radcliffe honing her craft over the 
course of several novels. 
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Ellena – and to a lesser extent Vivaldi – are more ‘English’ than Italian in their reactions 
and in the ways that they are characterised, at least in part because, like a reader 
sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate the careful intertexualising of the novel and the 
literature of the Grand Tour, they know how to turn their own country into a tourist 
site. They know the beauty spots worth observing, and they know the proper language 
in which to appreciate them, a point emphasised by the supposedly comic inarticulacy 
and local pride of the servants. (41) 
 
However, there is another, earlier sublime moment which, while perhaps not 
particularly notable in its own right, raises some interesting associations when considered in 
textual and historical context. This moment occurs while Ellena is being forcibly transported to 
San Stefano by Schedoni’s and the Marchesa di Vivaldi’s bravos. Despite her terror and 
uncertainty, the mountain scenery that the carriage passes through grants her 
temporary, though feeble, relief…till, her spirits being gradually revived and elevated by 
the grandeur of the images around her, she said to herself ‘If I am condemned to 
misery, surely I could endure it with more fortitude in scenes like these, than amidst the 
tamer landscapes of Nature! Here, the objects seen [sic] to impart somewhat of their 
own force, their own sublimity to the soul. It is scarcely possible to yield to the pressure 
of misfortune while we walk, as with the Deity, amidst his most stupendous works!’ (75) 
 
To appreciate fully the significance of this moment, one must bear in mind that Ellena’s 
engagement in sublime, pseudo-religious discourse follows her realization, upon looking out the 
window of the carriage, that she has entered unfamiliar territory, as there is “no object that 
could direct her conjecture concerning where she was” (74).  Interestingly, despite her troubles, 
Ellena seems to express the sentiments of the explorer, as she notes the “scanty vegetation, 
such as stunted pinasters, dwarf-oak and holly which gave dark touches to the many-coloured 
cliffs, and sometimes stretched in shadowy masses to the deep vallies [sic], that, winding into 
obscurity, seemed to invite curiosity to explore the scenes beyond” (74-75, my italics).  While I 
would not go so far as to say that Ellena is some kind of explorer, the deployment of such a 
description evokes a tradition of colonial exploration.  
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Along these lines, it is also interesting that the embattled Ellena takes the time to note 
and identify the various examples of vegetation—in addition to the “stunted pinasters, dwarf-
oak and holly,” she also spots “thickets of Indian-fig, pomegranate, and oleander” (75); not long 
afterward, she is obliged to walk a path “coolly overshadowed by thickets of almond-trees, figs, 
broad-leaved myrtle, and ever-green rose bushes, intermingled with the strawberry tree, 
beautiful in fruit and blossoms, the yellow jasmine, the delightful acacia mimosa, and a variety 
of other fragrant plants,” a path that “would have charmed almost any other eye than Ellena’s 
whose spirit was wrapt in care” (76-77).  
This cataloguing of trees and flora is of course reminiscent of that most benign of travel 
narrative stock figures, the herborizer—he whom Pratt describes as “armed with nothing more 
than a collector’s bag, a notebook, and some specimen bottles, desiring nothing more than a 
few peaceful hours alone with the bugs and flowers” (27). Of course, Radcliffe’s great herborizer 
is St. Aubert in Udolpho, whose status as such helps to cement his discursive position as an 
English scenic tourist. Because the herborizer is typically—if not always—gendered male, I 
would certainly not try to claim that Ellena is an herborizer (the absence of “specimen bottles” 
and such in her inventory also makes such a reading untenable), but it is certainly noteworthy 
that herborizing was a popular gentlemanly hobby that grew out of the latter half of the 
eighteenth century’s preoccupation with natural history, which itself “conceived of the world as 
a chaos out of which the scientist produced an order” (30, original italics). In Ellena’s case, I 
would say that her tendency to recognize such a wide breadth of plants and trees helps to 
identify her, rather subtly, with a broader tradition of exploration. The fact that she is a woman 
and that she is being carried through these landscapes by force ensures that the reader remains 
focused on the Gothic plot and the heroine’s requisite helplessness, yet her effortless naming of 
the surrounding vegetation simultaneously positions Ellena as one who possesses a degree of 
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agency over her surroundings—she is actively “producing order” in the midst of her chaotic 
predicament. Furthermore, the fact that she is in the midst of a sublime vista during this 
moment also helps to mediate problems of gender since, as Yaeger has pointed out, “the 
sublime is also the genre of permitted trespass – a genre in which figures of women can seize 
the grand roles formerly allotted to figures of men” (199). 
However, a mere two pages later, Ellena spies the immense convent of San Stefano, and 
this time her encounter with sublimity is far less emboldening: 
Partial features of the vast edifice she was approaching, appeared now and then 
between the trees; the tall west window of the cathedral with the spires that 
overtopped it; the narrow pointed roofs of the cloisters; angles of the insurmountable 
walls, which fenced the garden from the precipices below, and the dark portal leading 
into the chief court, each of these, seen at intervals beneath the bloom of cypress and 
spreading cedar, seemed as if menacing the unhappy Ellena with hints of future 
suffering. (77) 
 
It is easy to overlook, in the effusiveness of the above passage, the fact that the dark convent is 
seen only sporadically; it appears and disappears “between the trees,” flitting like a specter. 
Ellena’s inability to see San Stefano clearly is typically Radcliffean, as Radcliffe generally deploys 
the sublime—particularly the “Burkean” variety—amidst scenes of obscurity (Conger 131, 
Mishra 234). Furthermore, the trees which hide San Stefano from Ellena’s view are cypresses 
and cedars, both of which are typically associated with the Mediterranean, and neither of which 
is indigenous to England, a move which brings into relief San Stefano’s status as a highly 
foreignized environment. While this observation may seem like a stretch at first, it is compelling 
to consider this moment in relation to Ellena’s viewing of the same landscape from San 
Stefano’s turret.  
This itself is one of the most significant instances of sublimity in The Italian because it 
invokes, more clearly than any other sublime moment in the text, the heroine’s “soul 
expansion.” The fact that this key moment is brought about by a more controlled encounter 
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with a sublime scene that has heretofore been textually associated with Ellena’s kidnapping is 
also intriguing. After discovering that the kindly Sr. Olivia—who she later discovers is actually 
her mother—has left the door to her “cell” open, Ellena wanders into the turret room as she 
seeks a means of escape; upon looking out the window: 
[t]he consciousness of her prison was lost, while her eyes ranged over the wide and 
freely-sublime scene without…Ellena, with a dreadful pleasure, looked down [the cliffs], 
shagged as they were with larch, and frequently darkened by lines of gigantic pine 
bending along the rocky ledges, till her eyes rested on the thick chestnut woods that 
extended over their winding base, and which, softening to the plains, seemed to form a 
gradation between the variegated cultivation there, and the awful wildness of the rocks 
above. Round these extensive plains were tumbled the mountains, of various shape and 
attitude, which Ellena had admired on her approach to San Stefano; some shaded with 
forests of olive and almond trees, but the greater part abandoned to the flocks, which, 
in summer, feed on their aromatic herbage…[t]he accumulation of overtopping points, 
which the mountains of this dark perspective exhibited, presented an image of grandeur 
superior to any thing she had seen while within the pass itself. (105, 106) 
 
Here, Ellena beholds the same scene that she observed from her carriage, except this time she 
views it from a “promontory” and thus sees it within the context of the larger countryside. In 
this particular controlled situation, she is able to more fully derive a sense of agency from her 
surroundings, and this sense of agency takes the form of devotional reflection, as Ellena feels 
that she is able to look “beyond the awful veil which obscures the features of the Deity” and 
thus is able to scorn “the boasted power of man, when the fall of a single cliff from these 
mountains would with ease destroy thousands of his race assembled on the plains below,” and 
take heart in the fact that “man, the giant who now held her in captivity, would shrink to the 
diminutiveness of a fairy” (106-107). Diego Saglia has made an observation similar to mine, 
noting that Ellena’s trip to San Stefano is rife with danger and uncertainty, yet when she views 
the same scenery from the turret room, “Ellena obviously occupies a position of self-assurance, 
and her eyes dominate the sublime spectacle so that she can organize it through description 
and, above all, inform it with the appropriate religious meanings. These allegories are in fact a 
cultural reading of the landscape enabling Ellena Rosalba to position herself in it” (21).  
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In the context of Saglia’s claims and our current discussion, I would read this moment in 
counterpoint to Ellena’s viewing of the convent; in the latter she is cowed by the “the narrow 
pointed roofs of the cloisters; [the] angles of the insurmountable walls, which fenced the garden 
from the precipices below, and the dark portal leading into the chief court,” while in the current 
scene she feels that she is seeing the face of God in “the awful wildness of the rocks [and] [t]he 
accumulation of overtopping points.” In typical Gothic—but especially Radcliffean—fashion, the 
irony is that God does not dwell in the convent or the church, but in the land surrounding these 
buildings; indeed, Radcliffe makes the point that the cliffs “rose, in nearly-perpendicular lines, to 
the walls of the monastery, which they supported” (106, my italics) a statement that is 
reinforced by Ellena’s subsequent fantasy of tumbling cliffs easily destroying an army. Hence, we 
can understand this moment as a case of the Gothic heroine recontextualizing her terrifyingly 
foreign surroundings: not only is the land she was forcibly carried through reconfigured in the 
language of sublime self-empowerment when viewed from the convent’s “promontory,” but 
also the convent itself is characterized as “prophaned” (100) and “menacing” (77), God Himself 
only present in a surrounding countryside that the Gothic heroine has actively cathected with 
the sentiments of sublimity. 
The Mysteries of Udolpho is a bit of an anomaly in that there are no particularly 
noteworthy examples of the sublime mediating an encounter with the foreign—or at least none 
that are similar in tone and deployment to the ones we have just considered in The Romance of 
the Forest and The Italian—other than the moment when Emily confronts Montoni over his 
callous behavior towards the wounded Morano. As mentioned earlier, Eugenia Delamotte has 
read this scene as an example of the heroine deploying a “spiritual barrier,” produced by her 
sense of her own virtue, which protects her ego from the villain, who would like nothing more 
than to rob her of her sense of selfhood (32-33, 175). Building off of Delamotte’s claim, I have 
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argued in “Sublime Patriarchs and the Problems of the New Middle Class” that this spiritual 
barrier is in dialogue with the Kantian sublime partly because Kantian sublimity makes us 
“conscious of our superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature without us (as 
exerting influence upon us)” (qtd. in Mishra 35) and partly because when Emily stands up to 
Montoni, her “sacred pride swells against the pressure of injustice, and almost to glory” (381). 
Of greater interest for our purposes though is the fact that many of the sublime moments in 
Udolpho are connected to notions of domesticity, as Emily frequently pines for the absent 
Valancourt while looking upon the Apennine scenery surrounding the castle Udolpho. This 
should not come as much of a surprise, considering that Emily spends roughly the first quarter 
of the novel traveling through and observing the Pyrenees with Valancourt and St. Aubert. 
Indeed, sublimity’s ability to produce domestic subjects is a key part of my reading because it 
helps to clarify how Radcliffe’s texts exemplify the “colonization” of private space.  
Sublimity Producing the Private Sphere  
So far our discussion on the sublime’s intersection with domesticity has been largely 
focused on “the domestic” in terms of nationhood rather than so-called “private spheres.” Along 
these lines, I realize that discourse on the sublime may at first seem out of place in a critical 
work that is preoccupied with notions of the home. Admittedly, the sublime is typically 
associated more with the individual while the beautiful is connected to the family—Anne 
Mellor, for example, states that Henry Clerval’s “valuing the picturesque and the beautiful above 
the sublime…affirms an aesthetic grounded on the family and the community rather than on the 
individual” (138). However, one can also consider Madame de Stael’s Corrine (1807), a novel 
that Dekker describes as “a study in companionable tourism” (223). The titular heroine gushes 
her belief that people “become dearer to each other when they share admiration for 
monuments whose true greatness speaks to the soul!” (qtd. in Dekker 30) The whole notion of 
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“companionable tourism,” the popular Romantic belief that travel with a companion had “the 
potential of at once stimulating perception and deepening friendship” (30) suggests that viewing 
sublime landscapes with a beloved partner deepens the relationship between both parties, thus 
strengthening ties of kinship and performing labor in service of the home front. For an example 
that’s perhaps more immediately relevant to Radcliffe’s agenda, one can consider the words of 
Lady Anne Percival in Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda (1801): “[a] woman who has an opportunity of 
seeing her lover in private society, in domestic life, has infinite advantages; for if she has any 
sense, and he has any sincerity, the real character of both may be developed” (qtd. in McCann 
186, my italics). While they may not always be in the domestic space per se while having these 
“moments,” Radcliffe’s lovers are certainly in “private society” while viewing the sublime since 
generally their only companions other than each other are benevolent family members (La Luc 
and Claire in The Romance of the Forest, St. Aubert in Udolpho, and Signora Bianchi in The 
Italian) or loquacious but loveable and loyal servants (Peter in Romance and Paolo in The 
Italian), and it is their “sense and sincerity” before the sublime that allows them to develop their 
“real characters” in each other’s company, thus laying the foundations for a domestic future 
based on love and mutual respect. While it is true that the heroine also interacts with landscape 
while in exclusively bad company—Emily’s trip to Udolpho, for example—it is in these moments 
that she reflects on the sublime’s ability to strengthen her. Sublimity plays a different role in this 
context, as the beloved is not present and the heroine’s needs are different.  However, in all 
cases where the hero and the heroine are together, evil characters are not immediately present, 
and the surrounding landscape acts as a bonding force.  
This is relevant to our discussion on empire primarily because it illustrates an 
intersection between Radcliffe’s heroines’ domesticating “missions” and Spurr’s concepts of 
appropriation and insubstantialization, which I highlighted in the introduction of this study. To 
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review briefly, appropriation represents the colonizers’ “desire to recreate, in these 
unconquered territories or in these unsubdued hearts and minds, one’s own image, and to 
reunite the pieces of a cultural identity divided from itself” (Spurr 42), while insubstantialization 
casts the “Other” world as “an immaterial counterpart to the dissolving consciousness of the 
subject” (142). To clarify, appropriation essentially co-opts the foreign landscape—and the 
indigenous people who inhabit it—and imposes the traveler’s/colonizer’s own contexts and 
desires onto the scene. Insubstantialization is similar in that it dehistoricizes a landscape or 
region and reconstructs it as a kind of set piece against which the Westerner’s inner drama can 
play out. Specifically in the case of Radcliffe, we witness her female and male protagonists 
“appropriating” continental mountainscapes by framing them in a version of sublime discourse 
that is meant to heighten the experience of a “companionable tourism” that will inevitably have 
its end in bourgeois “companionate marriage.” And since these characters are, as we have 
established, eighteenth-century middle class folk traveling through a romanticized and 
unrealistic past, we can also understand that the scenes they are viewing have been 
insubstantialized, taken out of historical context and deployed solely to serve the interests and 
passions of their anachronistic viewers. Finally, the fact that these interests and passions run 
towards moral reform, marriage, and bourgeois domesticity indicates that the protagonists’ 
shared viewing of the sublime is intended as a device to produce an English model of the private 
sphere in the midst of foreign landscape, thus echoing my broader reading of these texts. 
Examples of how Radcliffe reflects these notions, albeit in different forms, can be found 
in all three of the works under consideration. In Udolpho, when Emily and Valancourt view the 
sublime while traveling through the Pyrenees, we are told that “the grandeur and sublimity of 
the scenes, amidst which they had first met, had fascinated [Emily’s] fancy, and had 
imperceptibility contributed to render Valancourt more interesting by seeming to communicate 
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to him somewhat of their own character” (89, my italics). Radcliffe further clarifies the link 
between sublimity, her beloveds, and domesticity by adding St. Aubert to the Emily-Valancourt-
sublime trifecta, as the benevolent patriarch comes to realize that, despite having traveled an 
arduous path,  
[t]he wonderful sublimity and variety of the prospects repaid him for all this; and the 
enthusiasm with which they were viewed by his young companions, heightened his own, 
and awakened a remembrance of all the delightful emotions of his early days, when the 
sublime charms of nature were first unveiled to him. He found great pleasure in 
conversing with Valancourt, and in listening to his ingenious remarks: the fire and 
simplicity of his manners seemed to render him a characteristic figure in the scenes 
around them; and St. Aubert discovered in his sentiments the justness and the dignity of 
an elevated mind unbiased by intercourse with the world…he [Valancourt] believed well 
of all mankind; and this gave him [St. Aubert] the reflected image of his own heart.  (53, 
my italics) 
 
This passage effectively positions St. Aubert as a sort of older version of Valancourt, while 
Valancourt himself is essentially transfigured into an extension of the landscape. I have claimed 
in “Sublime Patriarchs and the Problems of the New Middle Class,” that Radcliffe’s heroes are 
not empowered by the sublime—as a benevolent yet penetrative and authoritative father-
figure, the sublime in nature is something that the hero cannot engage in the same way that the 
heroine-as-daughter can. Rather, the hero can only characterize the sublime as something that 
must be surmounted—as Vivaldi does when he describes Monte-Corno as “a ruffian, huge, 
scared [sic], threatening, and horrid!” (185) and marks how a particular mountain range’s 
“broken summits…exhibit the portraiture of towers and castles, and embattled ramparts, which 
appear designed to guard them against enemies, that may come by the clouds” (189)
50
—or as 
something that must be somehow claimed or identified with.  
Because of his essential connection to the landscape as established in the last indented 
quotation, Valancourt is clearly “taking over the (real and surrogate) father’s place in Emily’s 
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 The colonial implications here are obvious, especially when Vivaldi’s militaristic depiction of natural 
scenery is considered alongside Pratt’s “promontory descriptions.” 
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world” (Bondhus).  In this way, I argue, Valancourt works towards securing himself a place in the 
“fraternal patriarchy,”
51
 confirming Shaun Lisa Maurer’s observation that “the ideal husband [is] 
an extension of the ideal father” in eighteenth-century middle-class thought (117). St. Aubert’s 
silent approbation of Emily and Valancourt’s budding romance further validates Maurer’s 
contention, as the kindly patriarch notes “[t]hey appeared like two lovers who had never 
strayed beyond these their native mountains; whose situation had secluded them from the 
frivolities of common life; whose ideas were simple and grand, like the landscapes among which 
they moved; and who knew no other happiness than in the union of pure and affectionate 
hearts” (54). Furthermore, shortly after St. Aubert dies, Emily and Valancourt reencounter each 
other and discuss “the scenes they had passed along the Pyrenean Alps.” St. Aubert’s spirit is 
strongly felt here, as “[t]his subject recalled forcibly to Emily the idea of her father, whose image 
appeared in every landscape which Valancourt particularized, whose remarks dwelt upon her 
memory, and whose enthusiasm still glowed in her heart” (114-115). Therefore, the sublime—
the sensation of which is generated by an encounter with continental mountains—is figured as 
productive and supportive of domestic values and the perpetuation of companionate, bourgeois 
lineage, a claim that receives its final confirmation from Emily’s tendency, more than any other 
Radcliffe heroine—except perhaps Adeline—to link spectatorship of the sublime with her 
beloved throughout the novel. At one point the text reads: “with what emotions of sublimity, 
softened by tenderness, did [Emily] meet Valancourt in thought, at the customary hour of sun-
set, when, wandering among the Alps, she watched the glorious orb sink amid their summits” 
(163). At another, Emily observes “the wild summits of the Pyrenees, and her fancy immediately 
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of Gender and Class in the Eighteenth-Century English Periodical. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998. 179, 197. 
  163
painted the green pastures of Gascony at their feet. Her heart pointed to her peaceful home—to 
the neighborhood where Valancourt was—where St. Aubert had been” (130).  
The Romance of the Forest is somewhat similar to Udolpho in terms of this particular 
dynamic. However, perhaps because it is the earliest of the three novels, it is also markedly 
atypical in its treatment of the heroine-hero-sublime scene triad because all of Adeline’s 
encounters with the sublime occur while Theodore is absent in body—though such scenery does 
seem to encourage her to “retrace all the conduct of her beloved Theodore, and endeavor to 
recollect his exact countenance, his air, and manner” (285).  Nevertheless, the sublime’s 
relationship to domestic unity is still present in Romance, most notably when Adeline, La Luc, his 
sentimental daughter Clara, and their servant Peter picnic among some castle ruins in the Alps. 
In this scene, Adeline makes typical observations on the “stupendous mountains” and the 
“gloomy grandeur of these woods” (290) while La Luc makes the familiar connection between 
sublime nature and its “Great Author” (291). The romantic Clara, however, is the one who 
highlights a link between sublimity and familial complacence, exclaiming “how delightful would 
it be to pass one’s life beneath these shades with the friends who are dear to one”; in response 
to Clara’s effusion, we are told that Adeline “sighed deeply to the image of felicity, and of 
Theodore, which it recalled, and turned away to conceal her tears” (290). Hence, though her 
beloved is not physically present at the scene, Adeline still situates him at the crux of 
domesticity and sublimity. 
As for The Italian, there is a voyeuristic episode near the beginning in which Vivaldi 
watches Ellena at her balcony while he is under the sublime enchantment of Mount Vesuvius 
and the distant chant of a funereal procession. We are told that  
[t]he solemnity of the scene accorded with the temper of his mind, and he listened in 
deep attention for the returning sounds, which broke upon the ear like distant thunder 
muttering imperfectly from the clouds. The pauses of silence, that succeeded each 
groan of the mountain, when expectation listened for the rising sound, affected the 
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imagination of Vivaldi at this time with particular awe, and, rapt in thought, he 
continued to gaze upon the sublime and shadowy outline of the shores, and on the sea, 
just discovered beneath the twilight of a cloudless sky. (15) 
 
While this scene climaxes with a “beautiful” rather than “sublime” appearance from Ellena—
who looks like “a Grecian nymph” surrounded by “clematis” (16)—it is amidst this sublimity that 
Vivaldi breathlessly listens to Ellena “sigh, and then, with a sweetness peculiar to her accent, 
pronounce his name” (17), an action that assures him of her regard. Considering Ellena’s 
delicacy, her refusal to obey “the dictates of her heart” when it is not practical to do so (210), 
and Vivaldi’s frequent bouts of uncertainty as to whether or not Ellena truly loves him (160, 176-
9, 212-13), small, private moments such as these reassure the reader (and Vivaldi) of 
companionate marriage’s eventual, inevitable triumph. Along these lines, this same “pavilion” 
where Vivaldi “had overheard that short but interesting soliloquy, which assured him of 
[Ellena’s] regard” is also the site where Signora Bianchi, sitting with the two lovers, later sighs 
“‘this sun so glorious, which lights up all the various colouring of these shores, and the glow of 
those majestic mountains; alas! I feel that it will not long shine for me – my eyes must soon 
close upon the prospect for ever,” a realization that impels her to urge Ellena and Vivaldi’s swift 
wedding (47). 
Ultimately then, since their various adventures and travails eventually lead to the 
ultimate end of companionate marriage and domestic bliss, and since in Radcliffe “recollected 
‘ideal scenes’…supply fortitude during trials and help the individual remain faithful to her true 
self and loved ones in foreign and self-alienating circumstances” (Dekker 115, my italics), I would 
argue that the sublime, at least as far as Radcliffe is concerned, actively promotes the individual 
as a potentially domestic subject, and this promotion of domesticity echoes and enables the 
heroine’s reformative interactions with the continental Other. 
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Empire Mediating Conservative and Progressive Projects  
 Thus far I have been focusing primarily on the heroines’ “norming” potential, their 
status as moral reformers amidst the “turpitude” of southern Europe. It is impossible to cast 
these characters in this position without implying a certain level of condemnation, and indeed, 
the cultural labor that these women perform is quite deserving of criticism since it perpetuates 
an illusion of British moral primacy. However, we must also bear in mind that these characters 
are clearly victims of patriarchal oppression, and it is perhaps as a result of this oppression that 
they attempt to reform female roles in the domestic arrangement.  As we just established, an 
encounter with the sublime promotes individual development, yet in Radcliffe, this “evolution” 
is mediated by the heroines’ position in relation to domesticity. Perhaps the best way to phrase 
it is that the sublime promotes the individual as a domestic subject, yet the individual has freely 
chosen to become such a subject.  
It is interesting that in Radcliffe’s literary world, the protagonists shape and define 
themselves as domestic subjects while they are traveling or occupying a “foreign” space that 
exists external to the safe bourgeois home (malicious convents, the Marquis de Montalt’s ruined 
abbey, the castle Udolpho, etc.). This seems to defy Angela Keane’s claim in Women Writers and 
the English Nation in the 1790s (2005) that women who travel and define themselves outside of 
the home are erased from the heterosexual family structure and even femininity itself (3). It 
similarly problematizes, Susan Bassnett’s statement that “travel for some women, it seems, may 
have offered a means of redefining themselves, assuming a different persona and becoming 
someone who didn’t exist at home” (234). I would like to suggest that, by allowing female travel 
to produce a progressive female domesticity, Radcliffe is challenging the dominant discourses of 
the time on women and travel—her heroines are certainly not unsexed, as Keane claims, and 
they do not “assume a different persona” as Bassnett suggests. Adeline, Emily, and Ellena all 
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retain their “idealized” state throughout their adventures, excepting, of course, Howells’s 
“eccentric moments” where “new possibilities are raised in the text.” As I have established in 
this chapter, these women are traveling because the home has been disrupted and tainted by 
the violent intervention of the continental “Other”—they travel to reproduce the domestic on 
terms that remain loyal to middle-class English values, but that also allow women more agency. 
In terms of imperialist discourse, we have already seen how perception of the sublime in 
Radcliffe is filtered through, and perhaps even allowed by, the viewer’s developed notions of 
sensibility—heroines, heroes, and their beloved family members react positively to the sublime, 
while unfeeling “evil” characters are never transported by their surroundings.  What is 
interesting about this is that the sensibility of Radcliffe’s protagonists is reminiscent of the 
sensibility of Mary Wollstonecraft, who redefined the doctrine by casting “delicacy, chastity, and 
modesty” as tools by which women could gain “equality, self-respect, and independence” rather 
than as a patriarchal tool in which women are passive receptors of moral codification (Jones 
106). Essentially, while sensibility in Radcliffe does act conservatively as a tool by which the 
heroines attempt to draw the villains into the “established” domestic economy—a colonialist 
move—the values it implies also allow the heroines to practice the virtues of the patriarchy 
while at the same time using those virtues to produce themselves as individuals—a move that is 
reminiscent of Godwin’s English liberty. The fact that perception of the sublime is filtered 
through the discourse of sensibility suggests then that Radcliffe’s female protagonists are, by 
extension, situated as individuals in relation to the sublime and what it imparts. Thus, the 
heroine’s inevitable marriage can be understood as a joyous act of free will—domesticity is 
freely and happily chosen.  Therefore, even though domesticity may “quell women’s expression 
of both the erotic and the political” (Nussbaum 24), it simultaneously exists as an enterprise that 
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women deployed on their own and in the name of their own social interests (Armstrong and 
Brown).   
In light of Nussbaum’s and Armstrong and Brown’s findings, it is tempting to conclude 
that Radcliffe’s approach to domesticity is more radical than conservative.
52
 Other critics seem 
to imply this, though perhaps not using the language that I have.  Andrew McCann writes:  
in Ann Radcliffe’s novels, heterosexual love is the basis of a relationship between two 
equal parties such that, in the private space of the hearth, husband and wife come 
together simply as human beings unmarked by the hierarchical structures that, 
elsewhere in these novels, typify a world of Gothic intrigue and exploitation. The family, 
in other words, becomes the site of a subjectivity and a form of communal solidarity 
outside of and unmediated by relationships of ownership and exchange (86, my italics).  
 
Liberalizing as this may seem, the woman’s role is still one of sequestration, as even Jacobins in 
the 1790s quarantined woman in the domestic space so that she and her inescapable sexuality 
wouldn’t interfere with the business of radical politics (148). However, this is mediated by the 
fact that, if women are indeed socialized to see themselves as “objects before the male libido,” 
then marriage is “not a moment of alienation, but of fond recognition of self-confirmation” 
(153). Domesticity can therefore be understood as a hegemonic space which is also, 
paradoxically, a space that is fervently sought after by women as some sort of telos on their 
quests for identity formation.  
 The implication remains, however, that English values are somehow universal—why else 
would the protagonists be able to project these values so successfully onto foreign landscapes?  
Why else would virtue, as it is understood in the context of the eighteenth-century, English, 
middle-class subject, be upheld by all of the “good” characters, regardless of their textual 
ethnicities?  Why else would the heroines be “idealized” in these terms?  This moral 
universalism, along with Radcliffe’s tendency to define virtue along anti-Jacobin lines 
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(“fulfillment of one’s familial duties, gendered responsibilities, and social duties” [Armstrong 3-
4]) precludes any revolutionary claims that Radcliffe is a radical writer. Besides, if she were 
overtly propagating a more Godwinian agenda, her work would likely have been castigated by 
anti-Jacobin critics.
53
 Interestingly, in their review of The Italian, the Anti-Jacobin Review wrote 
the following of the servant Paolo’s character: “allowing that human nature is nearly the same in 
all countries, we should still contend, that Paulo is more of an Englishman than an Italian” (501).  
This statement not only encapsulates conservative attitudes towards “human nature” and, by 
extension, “universal morality,” but also illustrates Radcliffe’s complicity in this discourse, and 
her critics’ awareness of that complicity. However, the Review’s literary critic also takes issue 
with Radcliffe’s writing style, stating that “the wilderness, the mysterious horror of many 
situations and events in Mrs. R. are rather German than English” (27). This vaguely disapproving 
comment is likely meant to imply that Radcliffe’s work uncomfortably engages a foreign 
sensibility. Interestingly, Keane ascribes the Review’s troubles with Radcliffe’s work to the fact 
that “her fictions are centred around female protagonists who move through landscape and 
who exceed the commonplace representational reduction of women to property, and indeed 
become proprietors” (19). Hence, while Radcliffe shies away from promoting what period 
commentators might have identified as a “radical” agenda, she still presents a more progressive 
representation of women, casting them as subjects rather than objects. 
Like her characters then, Radcliffe’s politics, as expressed in the novels, are not easily 
mappable. To situate Radcliffe more historically, I again point out Agorni’s reading of Hester 
Piozzi who, she claims, creates an “imagined community of learned Italian women [which 
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and many persons will read it with great pleasure and satisfaction” (169).  See the Critical Review xxii 
(June 1798), 166-9. 
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allows] British women writers to find a legitimate entry into forbidden territories in this 
historical period” (130). Essentially, in her letters, Piozzi draws an Italy that resembles an ideal 
British society that also accommodates women more wholly (141). In a more direct connection 
to the texts, Keane maintains that Radcliffe creates female characters who occupy the same 
strata as property-owning men (19). While I find Keane’s assessment to be erring heavily on the 
side of optimism, there is no denying that Radcliffe performs labor similar to Piozzi’s by 
imagining new possibilities for women not only in the domestic, but also in the public space—
Adeline goes to court to testify and secure justice at the end of The Romance of the Forest; the 
embattled Emily not only claims ownership of her inherited property at the end of Udolpho, but 
also sensibly manages it by liquidating her unnecessary real estate assets; and though Ellena 
never really has an opportunity to play a role in the “public space,” she still participates in what 
Brenda Tooley refers to as a “feminotopia” that allows for “limited [female] autonomy” at the 
convent of the Santa della Pieta in The Italian. While it is true that Ellena does not end up 
settling at the Santa della Pieta, the prospect of her taking up permanent residence with the 
nuns is raised as a viable possibility should her situation with Vivaldi’s family not improve (350-
351). Furthermore, her long-lost mother Sr. Olivia eventually comes to reside there, thus 
strengthening the domestic implications of a convent which has already been described as being 
“like a large family, of which the lady abbess was the mother” (348). And although Ellena does 
end up marrying Vivaldi, they settle in a house that is close to the Santa della Pieta (474). Again, 
I cite this aspect of Radcliffe’s writing to make the point that her approach to domesticity, while 
“conservative” in some ways, still falls on the “radical” side of the political spectrum in other 
ways, as not only does she propagate marriage based on mutual respect rather than social 
control (as delineated above), but also because she creates a more active role for women in 
both the domestic and economic spheres.  
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I have devoted so much of this chapter to deconstructing Radcliffe’s approach to 
domesticity because I believe it is key to understanding how she and her work are situated in 
relation to travel and empire. Radcliffe is almost certainly complicit in the creation of a “moral 
empire” in which middle-class values can and should be universalized—a feat she accomplishes 
through her particularized deployment of the sublime and, to an extent, sensibility and 
domesticity. And yet, one must still keep in mind that the sublime experience is “individualized.” 
Female sensibility and virtue are more about achieving independence than adhering to 
repressive social codes, and a somewhat reconfigured domesticity not only grants women more 
marital equality but also allows them a rather impressive level of control in the spheres of 
property and economics. This suggests to me that Radcliffe’s heroines are in fact traveling not 
only to efface difference but also to reshape and better understand how they are positioned in 
relation to domesticity. Dekker makes an interesting claim along these lines in The Fictions of 
Romantic Tourism, stating that “then, as now, changes of scene and company promised the 
possibility of a corresponding transformation of self, temporarily making the tourist ‘feel like a 
new person’” (46). Radcliffe it would seem is taking this dynamic a step further—her heroines, 
as we have established, are not “tourists” in the literal sense; their journeys are compulsory and 
life-changing, and therefore the “transformation of self” which they undergo is much more far-
reaching. What is key here is Dekker’s inherent claim that travel and displacement force the 
individual to resee herself, which is essentially what Radcliffe’s heroines are doing when they 
contest the bounds of domestic femininity while living in diasporic exile; indeed, Dekker later 
sums up his argument by stating that “Romantic tourists often seem to value the foreign not for 
its own sake but because it offers far less resistance to imaginative reshaping than the known 
and familiar would” (52). Therefore, I would suggest that Radcliffe’s heroines need to be 
somewhat foreignized (nominally French or Italian) and need to be traveling through these 
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“exotic” sites in order for them to entertain the possibility of social reform; as with Piozzi’s 
“imagined community of learned Italian women,” it is somehow politically safer, and perhaps 
even easier, to reinvent the self while abroad, both literally and figuratively. 
Travel’s progressive implications can also be noted if one reads Adeline, Emily, and 
Ellena as women who are leaving behind the home and “trying on” different domestic 
configurations. Adeline lives with the La Mottes—a kind of surrogate nuclear family—in the 
abbey St. Clair before being abducted to what is essentially Montalt’s harem, and then escaping 
to the ideal sentimental community of Leloncourt. Emily lives in a variety of houses, most 
notably the threatening Udolpho and the benevolent Chateau de Villefort; and Ellena 
experiences negative convent life at San Stefano, decayed domestic horror at Schedoni’s beach 
mansion, and a community of sentimental sisterhood at Santa della Pieta. In all cases the 
heroines attempt to make the best of the situation, practicing sentimental virtue and English 
delicacy in locations where such behavior often isn’t necessary, or even appropriate (Napier 
107). As I’ve established, this can be read as a key example of the heroine as romantic 
traveler/colonizer, overcoming threatening alterity by practicing the very values that are 
supposedly under attack at home (and in her own foreignized body) by this same alterity and 
thus proving the British moral system’s continuing validity. These attacks come in the form of 
the destruction of the parents or parental figures, their places being usurped by the foreign 
villains, and the physical home itself sometimes even being threatened, as when Emily’s 
avaricious relatives the Quesnels plot to acquire La Vallee and change the sentimental 
homestead into a fashionable resort for themselves. However, this dynamic can also be read as 
the heroine’s attempt to assess different domestic structures. Her adventures behind her, the 
Radcliffean protagonist closes out her narrative by settling into a domesticity that eschews the 
patriarchy of the castle or convent life and, while internalizing the liberal lessons of Adeline’s 
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Leloncourt, Emily’s La Vallee and Chateau de Villefort, and Ellena’s Santa della Pieta, is still 
grounded in an institutionalized, heterosexual contract. Rather than the self telescoping into the 
Other, the Other is appropriated into the self. In the words of Angela Keane, Radcliffe’s heroines 
are the “ideal citizens of public-minded private spheres. Enlightened, reflective and sustained by 
property, they establish familial structures based on mutual love and communal responsibility” 
(19).   
Ultimately then, we can understand Radcliffe’s nominally southern European heroines 
as diasporic figures whose primary conflict is to situate themselves in relation to domesticity 
while at the same time staving off the danger of becoming nativized and anomalous. Similar to 
Caleb Williams, they run the risk of becoming uncivilized as a result of constant persecution at 
the hands of foreign, abject Others: the foreign patriarchs who, like Falkland, occupy an 
uncertain and terrifying space between Italian and English cultural heritages. Since it is these 
villains who have disrupted the heroines’ domestic space—whether through murder or the 
manipulation of complicated processes of inheritance and patriarchal law—the heroines are 
forced to travel with them into the dangerous “torrid zones,” where they risk either losing their 
civilized identities or dying, while at the same time exploring different domestic configurations.  
However, by deploying the discourses of sensibility, sublimity, and domestication that literal, 
“real world” colonialism plays a part in enabling, and then applying them to (fictional) travel, 
Radcliffe’s protagonists discursively reform their surroundings and, in so doing, preserve their 
identities as separate from those of their foreignized persecutors, eliminate threats of anomaly, 
and reaffirm middle-class domestic values—albeit in a more progressive, individualized, proto-
feminist way. Their ability to see their persecutors as Other anticipates Victor Frankenstein’s 
approach to the Monster (as we will see), yet they avoid his grim fate by deploying a sensibility 
that recognizes the villains’ humanity and invites them to reform their lives and join the 
  173
heroines in the domestic economy. Therefore, Adeline, Emily, and Ellena release the perfect 
measure of sentiment—they acknowledge their persecutors’ as having the potential to become 
“civilized,” yet they do not engage in the self-effacing sympathy that destroys Caleb Williams 
when he confronts Falkland in court. Radcliffe then, by erasing literal Englishness and setting up 
a discursive formulation of the diaspora, is able to discourse with both “the English subject and 
the colonial specter” (Harrow 17) in such a way that walks the line between the extremes of 
Caleb Williams and Frankenstein. 
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CHAPTER III  
(NOT) PRODUCING THE SELF IN THE OTHER: THE FAILURE TO EFFACE DIFFERENCE IN 
FRANKENSTEIN 
 A little over twenty-five years after Frankenstein’s initial publication, Mary Shelley’s 
two-volume Rambles in Germany and Italy (1844) appeared. In the Italian part of her travel 
narrative, Shelley expresses her support for the Carbonari and writes, with a somewhat 
uncritical sense of nationalism, that English citizens "ought to sympathise in [the Italians'] 
struggles; for the aspiration for free institutions all over the world has its source in England" 
(qtd. in Bennett 114). At another point, her assessment of the Italian people sounds 
uncomfortably similar to George Cooper’s assessment of the Irish as “barbaric” individuals who 
nevertheless are “fitted by nature…for the highest attainments in moral or intellectual 
excellence” (194), as she writes that  
[n]o one can talk to them [the Italians] without perceiving latent, under ignorance and 
superstition, great natural abilities, and that heartfelt piety which springs (as our higher 
virtues do,) from the imagination which warms and colours their faith. Poor people! 
how I long for a fairy wand which would make them proprietors of the earth which they 
till, but most not reap. How sad a thing is human society: yet ... it warms my heart when 
I find the individuals that compose a population, poor, humble, ignorant, misguided, yet 
endowed with some of the brightest gifts of our nature, and bearing in their faces the 
stamp of intelligence and feeling. (qtd. in Nitchie 41) 
 
While the first of the above passages from the Rambles displays an Anglocentric attitude 
characteristic of many of the writers and commentators I have been addressing in this study, it 
is key to note that, in the words of Esther Schor, Shelley is generally “urg[ing] the English to 
‘sympathise’ with, not pity, the Italians,” and, in so doing, “she is urging a new and 
unaccustomed regard for them as peers” (246). And though the second of the above passages 
adopts a patronizing tone, one ought to note that Shelley, unlike Cooper, does not compare the 
European Other to aboriginal “savages,” nor does she seem to be calling for English intervention 
in Italy, instead expressing a wish that the Italians themselves become “proprietors of the earth 
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which they till.” Indeed, for Shelley, the solution to Italy’s political problems, its clashes with 
papal and Austrian hegemony, lies not in “subjugation” or “revolution” but rather in “peaceful 
mediation” (qtd. in Bennett 114). Furthermore, Shelley seems to have recognized, largely 
through her alliances with the Carbonari, that Italian poverty and “superstition” is the result of 
imperialism and abused power rather than being somehow intrinsic to ethnic character. This 
situates her as one who possessed and promoted a more generous understanding of European 
Otherness, a position informed more by direct contact with the people and less by the crutch of 
stereotypes and received “wisdom.”  
Shelley’s approach to tourism can similarly be seen as “more generous” in the sense 
that she channels the politics of her famous mother and represents travel as a sentimental 
process through which one comes to recognize—rather than impose or deny—the self in the 
Other (Schor 241). While it is true that her opinions on travel and its ethics did not appear in 
print until well after Frankenstein was published, it is likely that she had formed many of them 
much earlier, having, for example, read Mary Wollstonecraft’s Letters with Percy while on their 
elopement journey which took place between 1814 and 1816 (237)—a journey which she and 
her husband would in fact chronicle in 1817’s History of a Six Weeks’ Tour through a part of 
France, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland; with Letters Descriptive of a Sail Round the Lake of 
Geneva and of the Glaciers of Chamouni. Furthermore, as my reading of Frankenstein will 
demonstrate, it is Victor’s initial desire to produce an inherently subjugated Creature, and his 
later desire to destroy rather than sympathize with it, that are attacked most emphatically in the 
novel.  
To provide further evidence of Shelley’s “liberalism” in matters of imperialism and 
Otherness, I refer to Jessica Richard’s claim that “[t]he details Shelley gives us of Walton’s 
behavior as the captain of a polar expedition make it clear that her use of the Arctic frame 
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narrative was meant to critique [John] Barrow’s [of the Royal Admiralty] romance of polar 
exploration” (305). Since it is commonly understood that Robert Walton’s voyage to the sublime 
Arctic acts as an effective mirror of Victor’s own overreaching, Shelley’s criticism of 
Barrow/Walton implicates this natural philosopher’s pseudo-imperialistic actions as well; 
referring to Walton’s misguided hope that the northernmost point of the world is a spring-like 
paradise (28), Richard concludes her essay by stating that “Walton’s polar quest shows us the 
risks of a hubristic ethic of exploration, whether poetic or scientific, that irresponsibly creates 
‘regions of beauty and delight’ out of a world that is stark and cold” (308). While I feel that 
Richard is being a bit too pessimistic in her implication that Shelley viewed early nineteenth-
century Europe as “a world that is stark and cold”—such an attitude is more characteristic of her 
Things As They Are father—I think the heart of the matter is that Shelley is critical of imposition, 
specifically the imposition of hubristic desires and the personal ego onto the Other, whether 
that Other be a sublime landscape or a marginalized individual. Along these lines, Andrew Griffin 
has suggested that the Monster’s promise of self-immolation in the Arctic would be “a bitter 
parody of both Walton’s and Frankenstein’s dream of the fire in ice, underscoring the sorrow 
and fatality in that dream” (69). Following this reading, one could argue Shelley is trying to 
communicate that aggressively attempting to map one’s own desires onto an Other—rather 
than respectfully recognizing the kinship that one shares with that Other—ends not in a sublime 
discovery of “a new species of many happy and excellent natures” or “a country of eternal 
light,” but in death, effacement, and “the agony of the torturing flames” (189). 
Shelley’s apparent sympathy for her hyperphysical “hideous progeny” and her critical 
take on Victor’s and Walton’s arrogance in the face of sublime nature also has, as we will see, 
implications for how aesthetics are situated in the text. The role of aesthetics raises some 
difficult questions, and many critics have made speculations about Shelley’s position on 
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sublimity and beauty;
54
 three particular readings stand out as key building blocks in my own 
discussion. Ann Mellor, for one, casts Frankenstein as an example of “Mary Shelley’s criticism of 
the unfettered Romantic imagination and its celebration of the sublime,” suggesting that the 
novel represents “an affirmation of the beautiful over the sublime” because “the sublime 
appeals to the instinct of self-preservation and rouses feelings of terror that result in a desire for 
power, domination, and continuing control” while the beautiful “appeals to the instinct of self-
procreation and rouses sensations of erotic and affectional love” (104). For Mellor, Shelley is 
positing that sublimity emphasizes unknowability, and it is only through an understanding of 
“the unknowable as lovable,” that one can “prevent the creation of monsters…capable of 
destroying all human civilization” (104). More recently, however, Nancy Fredricks has offered a 
provocative challenge to Mellor’s claims, arguing that “the aesthetics of the beautiful works to 
enslave women and secure their dependence on men as objects of exchange under patriarchal 
domination” (178). Furthermore, Fredricks also asserts that beauty as a discourse is “responsible 
for the monster’s abandonment and abusive treatment, fueling his bitterness and murderous 
rage,” while the sublime provides a space in which “the marginalized can be heard” (178). 
Complicating matters further is Elizabeth Bohls, who suggests that Shelley’s “critical deployment 
of aesthetics reveals it to be an imperial discourse—one of the languages of high culture, 
seemingly far removed from the practical tasks of empire, but actually helping produce imperial 
subjects to carry out those tasks” (25).  
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Irreconcilable as these positions may appear to be, I propose that they can in fact be 
synthesized, and that such a synthesis produces some intriguing results. I believe, for example, 
that Bohls is correct to claim that aesthetics as a whole can be constructed, by default, as an 
imperializing discourse, yet Fredricks is also correct to state that, in Frankenstein, the beautiful 
marginalizes while sublimity grants a voice to the marginalized Monster. I can also agree—albeit 
conditionally—with Mellor’s contention that Shelley critiques the “unfettered Romantic 
imagination” through her deployment of the sublime; however, I feel that Shelley’s critique of 
sublimity has less to do with the Monster’s ability to inspire awe and terror—as Mellor does—
and more to do with Shelley’s representation of Victor’s hubris. Specifically, I argue that, while 
beauty does work to marginalize the Creature, it is unable to accomplish anything more than a 
temporary exclusion. Though “society’s valorization of the beautiful” (Fredricks 178) in the text 
keeps the Monster out of the private sphere for a time, the fact that he responds to his 
alienation by violently destroying the Frankenstein household suggests that the beautiful has 
failed in its ostensible purpose of preserving existing power structures. Similarly, the Monster’s 
intrusion on Victor’s attempts to find succor amongst the sublime vistas of the Alps, and the 
inevitable failure of Walton’s Arctic voyage,
55
 suggests that the sublime does not succeed as an 
epic, masculine “system” which “human beings construct out of the elemental chaos of nature” 
in order to impose “a phenomenological order on an unknown noumenon” (Mellor 103). In 
essence, the sublime cannot operate successfully as an imperializing discourse in the text largely 
because the “subaltern” Creature’s very nature is sublime. Thus, I argue that Frankenstein 
represents a failure of aesthetics—like Mellor I acknowledge Shelley’s critical position on the 
sublime, yet I believe that the focus of Shelley’s criticism is on the sublime’s use as an 
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appropriating discourse rather than as a force of soul-shrinking terror; like Fredricks I recognize 
that Frankenstein criticizes the beautiful and uses the sublime to grant a voice to the 
marginalized, yet I also, like Bohls, consider the sublime’s role within a larger colonialist 
tradition. Unlike Bohls, however, I link the sublime and its failure as an imperialist discourse with 
the implosion of domesticity and sentiment. 
Hence, while other critics have certainly performed focused readings of the novel in 
terms of the sublime, the sentimental,
56
 and the domestic
57
—and these readings help to frame 
and situate my own—the purpose of this chapter is to account for how all of these discursive 
threads intersect in Frankenstein and are in turn mapped upon the rhetorical landscape of 
empire. In other words, while the novel has been read in terms of empire, sentiment, sublimity, 
and domesticity, and some critics have identified an overlap between some of these discourses, 
I wish to juxtapose all of these concepts in an effort to present a reading of Frankenstein which 
demonstrates how the languages of morality, aesthetics, and domesticity operate jointly to 
enable and justify the marginalization of the Other. Furthermore, I wish to illustrate how 
Shelley, in contrast to Godwin and Radcliffe, suggests that an encounter with Otherness can 
reveal for the European subject failures that are inherent in moral, aesthetic, and domestic 
discourses. Specifically, I accomplish this in several ways. For one, I posit that Elizabeth Lavenza 
and the Monster are similarly positioned as uncanny racial figures, and that this helps to 
indicate how uncomfortably close the domestic subject and the colonial subaltern are situated 
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in relation to each other, and how this placement is mediated through the assignment of 
aesthetic value. I also spend a considerable amount of time examining the De Lacey family 
episode, with particular attention paid to how Safie’s reception and education reveals the 
various complications associated with the question of Otherness in the novel. Finally, I develop 
my earlier-stated contentions on the role of aesthetic discourse in the novel.  
Like the other primary texts that this study has engaged, Frankenstein is of course not 
explicitly a “novel about empire”; rather it is a novel which heavily deploys imperialist discourses 
and features a foreignized subaltern—in this case, the Monster—as a central character. Indeed, 
it is certainly not difficult to read The Monster as a discursively colonized individual. Srinivas 
Aravamudan, for example, describes the Tropicopolitan as a “colonial subject” who is both 
“object of representation and agent of resistance” (4, original italics). Although the Creature has 
no direct ties to the tropics, he is certainly comparable to the “colonial subject” in that he is 
both an “object of representation and [an] agent of resistance.” More specifically, as a 
representative of “death, incest, and illicit sexual desire” (Hill-Miller 64) in addition to 
foreignness—Patrick Brantlinger cites the Creature’s straight black hair and yellow complexion 
as indicating “perhaps a tint of racial darkness or Orientalism” (156)—the Creature can be 
understood as representing the colonial uncanny, in which the subject is different from the 
European spectator, yet still embodies European “racial, psychological, and sexual anxieties” 
(Smith and Hughes 3). This in turn provides an interesting lens for looking at the Creature’s 
status as an anomalous figure: not only does he occupy the borderland between human/not 
human, creator/created, master/slave, autonomous subject/contingent object, but also he 
problematizes clear distinctions between colonizer and colonized—as a representative of the 
“colonial uncanny,” he is “birthed” by a privileged, European man and is constituted and 
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understood by and through the lens of Eurocentric discourse, yet, by virtue of his appearance 
and “unnatural” conception, he is still, emphatically and inexorably, “Other.” 
Indeed, partly because of the novel’s cultural stature and partly because of its 
preoccupation with enterprise and alterity, critics have been eager to interpret Frankenstein 
through racial and colonial lenses. The most well-known treatment is of course Gayatri Spivak’s 
oft-anthologized “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism” (1986), in which she 
concludes “Shelley’s point is that social engineering should not be based on pure, theoretical, or 
natural-scientific reason alone, which is her implicit critique of the utilitarian vision of an 
engineered [read “colonized”] society” (848).
58
 Considering that about a third of Frankenstein is 
narrated in the (eloquent) voice of a sympathetic non-European Other, it does not require much 
mediation to read this novel as more critical than Godwin’s
59
 or Radcliffe’s of empire and its 
machinery; as a result, it can also be said that Shelley, as the author of Frankenstein, displays a 
far greater awareness of the political baggage and shortcomings associated with the adjacent 
discourses of domesticity, sublimity, and sensibility. 
Different as Shelley’s novel is in terms of its approach to morality, aesthetics, and 
domesticity, I would also add that sympathy plays, to a certain extent, a similar role in 
Frankenstein as it did in Caleb Williams—specifically, it is understood as “the essential civilizing 
ingredient” (Hill-Miller 70), and because the Creature is consistently denied any share in this 
“civilizing” discourse, he, like Caleb, is permanently relegated to an anomalous position. 
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Furthermore, Jeffrey Cass suggests that “[t]he Monster embodies the myopic self-interest and 
greed of Frankenstein as colonizer, someone whose ‘lack of domestic affections’ spurs him on to 
greater acquisition, to greater power” (37), a reading which not only conflates the colonizer and 
the overreaching scientist and impugns them both as creators of monstrosity, but also identifies 
the root cause of Victor’s transgression as his “lack of domestic affections.” It can therefore be 
said that both father and daughter are writing about the loss of civilization, and locating the loss 
of civilization within the loss of sympathy, which itself has strong ties to the domestic. The 
importance difference, however, is that Godwin characterizes this loss as a function of the 
continentalized aristocracy’s (read: the “Other’s”) denial of domestic stability to the English 
subject, while Shelley, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, characterizes this loss as a function 
of the insular European subject’s denial of domesticity to the monstrous Other.  
It is fair to say then that, particularly in the case of Frankenstein, the discursive threads 
we are considering—empire, sympathy, and the sublime—are inflected by and refracted 
through the home sphere; hence, our first priority must be to come to an understanding of what 
domesticity means in this novel.  
Sameness and Difference in the Frankenstein Household 
We have seen how “stable” middle-class domesticity is represented as a site of liberal, 
Eurocentric civilization in Caleb Williams—the loss of the domestic is the “circumstance more 
than all the rest, that gradually gorged [Caleb’s] heart with abhorrence of Mr. Falkland” (303, my 
italics)—and is dramatically idealized in Radcliffe. Shelley’s narrative, however, “views 
domesticity as an aspect of human alienation rather than its solution,” largely because the cult 
of domesticity is founded upon hierarchical relationships and a sense of insularity that views 
outside or “foreign” influences with suspicion and disdain (Komisaruk 410-411). Like her father, 
Mary Shelley recognizes the damaged nature of this hierarchical system; unlike her father, she 
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locates the source of this damage within the inherent structure of the bourgeois home, rather 
than within an exocultural force that has aggressively corrupted a pristinely-imagined 
homestead. Along these lines, Thomas Dutoit has written that the novel’s “real monster” is “the 
domestic scene and its discourse on virtue, happiness, and affection”—a discourse which he 
refers to as a “fiction” (867)—and Sarah Goodwin maintains that the Creature “gives 
expression” to “repressed violence in the home” (100,101). Citing both of these critics in her 
reading, Johanna Smith identifies the Creature as “Victor’s murderous ‘spirit’” who “reveals the 
dark side of the Frankenstein family’s oppressive domesticity” (321). Taking matters a step 
further, Elizabeth Bohls claims that 
[t]he Frankensteins’ aesthetic community is dysfunctional in more ways than one. It 
represses women and promotes colonialism, even genocide. Western civilization, 
viewed from the inside, has not got its parts put together quite right. This suspicion is 
confirmed when we see this disproportion reflected from the outside—blown up in the 
monstrous mirror that is Frankenstein’s creature. (28-29) 
 
However, just what is so “oppressive” about the Frankenstein home? Vis a vis 
domesticity, one of the central assumptions of this study has been that the English (or Anglified) 
subject is compelled to travel by a sense of dissatisfaction with the domestic space which she or 
he inhabits, and that the ensuing journey can be read as an attempt to reform the tainted 
sphere via an exploration of alternate homes. Caleb Williams flees Falkland’s estate and 
wanders Britain because the imposition of continentally-inflected aristocratic hegemony has 
demolished the security of the home, and while on his journey, he seeks a dwelling more 
congenial to bourgeois values—first in the “honorable” robbers’ den and later in Laura’s Welsh 
community. In Radcliffe’s novels, Adeline’s, Emily’s, and Ellena’s homes are disrupted by violent, 
continental patriarchs, yet their journeys expose them to a variety of different domestic 
structures and always terminate in the claiming of a companionate, bourgeois homestead that 
simultaneously acknowledges a greater measure of autonomy for women. In the case of 
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Frankenstein, however, Victor’s relationship to domesticity is rather curious. Prior to his 
attending medical school at Ingolstadt and “birthing” the Creature, there appears to be no real 
split with the home sphere as such. Indeed, the darkness in the Frankenstein family is largely 
subtextual; however, it is this unsavory subtext which, according to Debra Best, pushes Victor to 
produce the Creature.  
In “The Monster in the Family: A Reconsideration of Frankenstein’s Domestic 
Relationships” (1999), Best maintains that the impetus behind Victor’s mad quest is his Walton-
like desire for “a clear and steady relationship which will provide a sense of stability, certainty, 
and self-identity” (373), something he lacks in his “multivalent” family which, “[r]ather than 
creating a complex network of bonds to pull [itself] together” produces “confusion concerning 
one’s proper role in the family while also leading one towards social loss and familial taboos, 
such as incest and gender transgression” (370). Essentially, Best reads Victor’s domestic 
relationships as perplexingly multifarious—in Elizabeth Lavenza “cousin, sister, mother, and 
wife” are “juxtaposed…so that the elements of incest become apparent,” while Justine Moritz 
plays “the roles of sister and mother [which] conflict with that of servant” (367); and Victor 
himself fulfills traditionally “feminine” roles when he cares for the sick William and helps to 
educate his younger brothers (368).  
Where Best essentially reads the dysfunctions of the Frankenstein family along 
gendered and psychoanalytic axes, Adam Komisaruk takes a more overtly political stance, 
maintaining that “[n]umerous characters in Frankenstein show hostility toward members of 
their own families, let alone toward the national, sexual or racial ‘other’ whom Victor’s creature 
epitomizes. These characters,” he continues, “also tend to be the strongest embracers of 
capitalist individualism, especially by way of the tortured commercial triangles involving Britain, 
France, and the East” (411), a statement which, when read in light of Ann Mellor’s contention 
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that “while celebrating the egalitarian bourgeois family, Mary Shelley acknowledges that it has 
never existed” (217), provides strong evidence that in Frankenstein the initial trouble has less to 
do with “the foreign” and more to do with the systemic problems of the bourgeois home and its 
subtle connections to the imperial effort. In support of this connection, I return to Komisaruk, 
who cites Elizabeth Lavenza’s status as “[a]n instrument for perpetuating a privileged European 
stock [who] is commodified from the first” (418), a status which is established when Caroline 
Frankenstein characterizes her as “a pretty present for my Victor” (44). Similarly, Caroline 
herself can be understood as a “picture of male condescension” (Komisaruk 419) since we are 
told that Alphonse Frankenstein “strove to shelter her, as a fair exotic is sheltered by the 
gardener” (42).  
Komisaruk’s reading, then, points to a provocative metaphoric link between domesticity 
and imperial enterprise; I would elaborate on this link by suggesting that one of the most 
intriguing textual connections between domesticity and empire comes comparatively early in 
the novel. As Victor prepares to build the Creature, he feverishly relates that 
[n]o one can conceive the variety of feelings which bore me onwards, like a hurricane, in 
the first enthusiasm of success. Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I 
should first break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world. A new species 
would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe 
their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I 
should deserve theirs. (58)   
 
Here, Victor’s frenzy is partly written in the language of travel and colonization and partly in the 
language of domesticity. Breaking through “bounds” and enlightening a “dark world” is 
reminiscent of an attempt to bring Enlightenment ideals to a space that dwells in darkness—
both the darkness of “unsophisticated,” aboriginal practices and the darkness of skin—while 
Victor’s subsequent indulgence in a fantasy of benevolent patriarchy creates an interesting 
bridge between the discourses of empire and the discourses of the home, as it ties him 
rhetorically to both the “benign” colonizer and the bourgeois father.  
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On a side note, it can be argued that Victor’s sentiments and the subtle connection that 
he makes between domestic affection and imperial enterprise are drawn, in part, from his 
encounters with the larger scientific community. His mentor M. Waldman, for example, lectures 
to a roomful of students at Ingolstadt, claiming that modern-day natural philosophers 
“penetrate into the recesses of nature, and show how she works in her hiding places. They 
ascend into the heavens…[t]hey have acquired new and almost unlimited powers; they can 
command the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake, and even mock the invisible world 
with its own shadows” (53). After hearing Waldman’s hubristic speech, Victor seeks him out and 
fashions the elder scholar as a sort of father-figure. By virtue of his indulgence and support, 
Waldman becomes a “true friend” to Frankenstein, one who “smoothed for me the path of 
knowledge, and made the most abstruse enquiries clear and facile to my apprehension” (55). In 
this way, Waldman’s primary job in the text becomes to act as a benevolent patriarch who 
simultaneously raises the imperialist dimensions of scientific enquiry. Indeed, his rhetoric almost 
seems to normalize Victor’s quest; if the post-Enlightenment scientist can and should “penetrate 
into the recesses of nature” in order to cultivate “new and almost unlimited powers” over it, 
then who is to say that those powers should not include the ability to bestow life? Waldman’s 
directives suggest then that Victor, while admittedly taking matters to an extreme, is 
nevertheless acting in the spirit of his peers. And Waldman’s patriarchal position complicates 
matters further by subtly reinforcing the link between domestic affection and scientific/imperial 
enterprise which Victor initially observed in his own family. 
To situate this connection between domesticity and empire in relation to the other texts 
we have been considering, I would say that where Radcliffe’s heroines seek to reaffirm the 
values of the homeland in a world that has been shattered by the confusion and syncretism of 
empire—a confusion and syncretism that operates on a microscale in the “foreignized 
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homeland” of Caleb Williams—Victor actively sets out to reshape the world in his own image. 
Ironically, his creation of an anomalous being helps to reinforce the boundary-less world that, in 
other forms, Caleb and Radcliffe’s heroines find so threatening. In other words, Victor 
Frankenstein is not motivated to “break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world” 
by the malignant intrusion of the foreign into the domestic space. Rather, domesticity 
engenders imperialism in that it represents European intervention as an unquestionably 
benevolent enterprise—Alphonse Frankenstein comes “like a protecting spirit” (41) to his future 
wife, the “fair exotic” Caroline Beaufort, while Caroline herself “rescues” the Italian—though 
emphatically white—Elizabeth from an impoverished foster family composed of “dark-eyed, 
hardy little vagrants” (43) when the Frankenstein family is vacationing in Italy. Furthermore, this 
cycle of “rescuing” seems to undergird the entire structure of the Frankenstein household, 
which is characterized by what Smith calls an “emotional quid pro quo.” She suggests that  
[a]mong the Frankensteins, a gift requires gratitude and so produces a sense of 
obligation, a debt that can be discharged only by endless repetitions of this 
pattern…[Victor] owes gratitude for the life [his parents] have given him and for their 
care, and this obligation forms the cord that, no matter how silken, confines him within 
the family. Hence he repeats this pattern when he contemplates creating a new species. 
(319, 320) 
 
In this reading, Victor’s desire for praise from “a new species” is simply a desire to replicate the 
example his parents have provided. All three cases—Alphonse’s “rescue” of Caroline, Caroline’s 
adoption of Elizabeth, and Victor’s creation of the Monster—are essentially the same in that 
each is a problematically beneficent act, each involves a privileged individual taking up a 
disadvantaged “exotic,” and each is an inherently domestic act—marriage, adoption, and 
“birth,” respectively. 
 The two explanations for Victor’s actions which we have identified—one, that he creates 
the Monster out of a desire for a “clear and steady relationship” which will resolve his position, 
and two, that he is emulating his parents—have both been well-argued and are certainly not 
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mutually exclusive. I have drawn upon the first argument to establish the dysfunctional nature 
of the Frankenstein household and to clarify that this dysfunction stems from the anomalous 
positioning of the family’s members. I have drawn upon the second as a way to begin building a 
bridge between the discourses of home and empire. That being said, I would now like to 
elaborate further on these discursive connections by considering how the Creature and 
Elizabeth Lavenza—who are seldom, if ever, thought of in relation to each other in the critical 
scholarship—represent an intriguing fusion of these two discourses. In so doing, I hope to 
cement the domestic/colonial link which is a centerpiece of the novel while simultaneously 
taking steps towards defining the role of the anomalous in the text.  
 As mentioned above, Elizabeth’s Caucasian features are emphasized when she is first 
introduced in the narrative, a rhetorical move that has not escaped the attention of Komisaruk, 
who refers to “Victor’s insistent figures of whiteness in describing her” (417). Indeed, Victor 
dwells on the details of Elizabeth’s figure in admiring depth, noting that “[h]er hair was the 
brightest living gold…her brow was clear and ample, her blue eyes cloudless, and her lips and 
the moulding of her face so expressive of sensibility and sweetness, that none could behold her 
without looking on her as of a distinct species, a being heaven-sent, and bearing a celestial 
stamp in her features” (43). What is particularly odd about this passage is that a figure of such 
emphatic whiteness should be exotified as a “distinct species.” This characterization, combined 
with Elizabeth’s incongruous appearance amongst the “dark-eyed, hardy little vagrants,” sets 
her up from the very beginning as an anomalous subject. Throughout the text, Elizabeth 
develops paradoxically as both a figure of familiarity and a figure of Otherness: she is white, yet 
she is so white that she seems to be of “a distinct species”; she fills all of her feminine domestic 
roles as “cousin, sister, mother, and wife” impeccably, yet by occupying all of these different 
positions—often simultaneously—she raises the specter of incest. 
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Furthermore, as the most uncategorizable member of the Frankenstein family, Elizabeth 
seems to have more in common with the Creature than a casual reading might suggest. Indeed, 
these two individuals become psychically linked for Victor on multiple occasions. Immediately 
after creating the Monster, for example, Victor dreams of kissing Elizabeth only to find her dead 
in his arms, and the Creature’s famous threat “I shall be with you on your wedding-night” (146) 
causes him to spend his first night with his new bride obsessively patrolling the house rather 
than consummating the marriage (167). Most relevant to our purposes however, is the curious 
resemblance between Victor’s description of Elizabeth’s initial appearance and his description of 
the newly-created Monster. As with Elizabeth, Victor focuses on skin color, hair, eyes, and lips:  
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was 
of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances 
only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the 
same colour as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his shriveled complexion 
and straight black lips. (60)  
 
The reference to the Creature’s “pearly” teeth is what sets this description structurally apart 
from the description of Elizabeth. If teeth are being used to incorporate whiteness into a 
description—as they clearly are here—then there is no need to describe Elizabeth’s teeth 
because the rest of her features do enough to connote her fairness. However, the “pearly 
whiteness” of the Creature’s teeth has a different effect—it serves to heighten the 
grotesqueness of the rest of his features. I would therefore suggest that the striking image of 
white teeth framed by “straight black lips,” along with the fact that the Creature’s other facial 
features gruesomely mirror Victor’s description of the almost-too-white Elizabeth, strengthens 
the case that the Monster is a representative of the colonial uncanny. The white teeth/black 
mouth dichotomy represents an uncomfortable synthesis, a variation on Rudyard Kipling’s 
Anglicized Indians, “a kind of child of Frankenstein, both ‘Ours’ and irremediably Other, a 
grotesque parody of civilized humanity” (Spurr 85). Meanwhile, the part-by-part descriptions of 
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Elizabeth’s and the Creature’s faces present a correlation between a “heaven-sent” (43) figure 
of domesticity and a “demoniacal” (61) figure of colonial Otherness. Under this rubric, 
Elizabeth’s characterization as a “distinct species” of a “celestial” (61) nature places her at the 
corresponding extreme to Victor’s “wretched devil” (93).  
Though it is useful to an extent to think of Elizabeth and the Creature as representing 
two opposing forces, Elizabeth’s multivalent, anomalous position within the Frankenstein 
household (and the text) makes it impossible to read her merely as an angelic foil to/mirror 
image of the Creature. Similarly, the Creature’s ardent desire for a mate, whom he believes will 
cause his “virtues” to “arise” and whose companionship will allow him to “become linked to the 
chain of existence and events” (130), precludes any reading which positions him exclusively as a 
hellish enemy of the domestic establishment. Rather, it is more accurate to say that the 
similarities between Elizabeth and the Creature represent the inseparability of the domestic 
subject and the colonial subaltern: both are uncanny figures who represent an anomalous fusion 
of “sameness” and “difference,” both in terms of physical appearance and in terms of social 
position (or desired social position, in the case of the Monster). 
Having established this, it is now necessary for us to move to a fuller discussion of how 
these two forces interact with each other. To do so we must move ahead in the novel and 
consider the Monster’s stake in domesticity, as it is his intrusion into the De Lacey and 
Frankenstein families and his desire for a mate which provide the clearest examples of the 
uneasy overlap of “sameness” and “Otherness.”  
The Other(s) in the House 
 Victor Frankenstein’s greatest sin is commonly identified as his failure to take paternal 
responsibility for his creation. In the text, the Creature himself makes this charge when 
requesting a mate, demanding of Victor to “[d]o your duty towards me, and I will do mine 
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towards you and the rest of mankind” (93). Given the language in which it is framed, I am 
confident in reading the Creature’s request for a female companion as an echo of the 
“emotional quid pro quo” (Smith 319) of favors, debts, and gratitude which characterizes the 
Frankenstein household. Not only does this mirroring further blur the boundaries between the 
Frankensteins’ domestic situation and the world of colonial Otherness that the Monster 
represents, but also it makes Victor realize “[f]or the first time…what the duties of a creator 
towards his creature were” (95). While Victor replicates the cycle of favors and gratitude that 
characterizes his family when he creates the Monster (Smith 319), what he apparently does not 
anticipate is that the Creature’s gratitude is not automatic; it is contingent upon Victor’s 
willingness to act the part of the benevolent father. Indeed, the Creature seems to be willing to 
give Victor the gratitude that he seeks, telling his maker at one point, “I will be even mild and 
docile to my natural lord and king, if thou wilt also perform thy part, the which thou owest me” 
(93), and at another, “Oh! my creator, make me happy; let me feel gratitude towards you for 
one benefit!” (129) The (re)production of domesticity then, is the price that must be paid in 
order to secure happiness for the creation and peace for the creator. 
As readers of the text know, Victor reluctantly agrees to do the Creature’s bidding, only 
to renege at the last minute, tearing up the completed but not yet animated female in full view 
of his enraged progeny. Victor’s actions here problematize Sharon Harrow’s claim In Adventures 
in Domesticity: Gender and Colonial Adulteration in Eighteenth-Century British Literature (2004) 
that Frankenstein is a typical “Enlightenment traveler who voyages away from home and 
domesticates difference in exotic lands” (205). Although Victor does indeed “voyage away from 
home”—literally in his trips to Ingolstadt, the Orkney Islands, and the Arctic, and figuratively in 
his creation of the Monster—and although he certainly fantasizes about “domesticat[ing] 
difference in exotic lands” when he imagines himself as the beloved father of “a new species,” 
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his inability to recognize the Creature as human—referring to him only as “a daemon,” “a fiend,” 
“a monster,” and “a devil”—and his destruction of the female being strongly suggests that he 
resists the idea of “domesticating difference.”
60
 Because to “domesticate difference” is to 
produce a “grotesque parody of civilized humanity” (Spurr 85), this is not particularly surprising. 
Consider the Monster’s vision of domestic life with his mate in “the vast wilds of South 
America”: “[w]e shall make our bed of dried leaves; the sun will shine on us as on man, and will 
ripen our food. The picture I present to you is peaceful and human” (129). The fact that this 
picture is “human,” I argue, is actually why it is so detestable to Victor. To grant the Creature a 
wife is to recognize his humanity; to recognize the Creature’s humanity is to recognize himself in 
his creation; and in light of the uneasy similarities between the Frankensteins’ domestic 
situation and the colonial uncanny as described in the previous section, to acknowledge the 
Creature’s domestic affections is to acknowledge the monstrosity latent in the Frankenstein 
household. 
For his part, the Creature argues his case passionately, claiming that “[i]f I have no ties 
and no affections, hatred and vice must be my portion; the love of another will destroy the 
cause of my crimes, and I shall become a thing, of whose existence every one will be ignorant. 
My vices are the children of a forced solitude that I abhor; and my virtues will necessarily arise 
when I live in communion with an equal” (130). This argument reveals that the Monster has 
bought into the Enlightenment myth that domesticity is a cure for vice, a concept he seems to 
have imbibed from his viewing of the De Lacey family. Indeed, the Creature seems to recognize 
the ability of familial affections to promote virtue, as he is “moved…sensibly” when he sees the 
impoverished Felix and Agatha going hungry so that their blind father can eat (102) and, despite 
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 While Victor does encounter difference on his literal journeys—he comments on the “squalid poverty” of 
his temporary neighbors on the Orkney Islands, for example (143)—he does not give these or any of the 
other native peoples he encounters much thought, his mind being constantly preoccupied with the Creature 
and his demands. 
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the earlier cruelty he received from the villagers and the knowledge of hegemony that he gained 
from overhearing Felix read Volney’s Ruins of Empire, he still at this point “look[s] upon crime as 
a distant evil,” claiming that “benevolence and generosity were ever present before me [in the 
De Lacey cottage], inciting within me a desire to become an actor in the busy scene where so 
many admirable qualities were called forth and displayed” (114-15). This construction of the De 
Lacey family as a domestic oasis is not surprising; Debra Best comments that “[a]lthough French 
in origin and living in Germany, the De Laceys represent the typical but idealized family 
demographics for nineteenth-century England,” and Johanna Smith notes the De Laceys’ 
“interactive domestic style” and the family’s “conventionally middle-class separate-spheres 
arrangement,” with Felix working outside and Agatha performing indoor chores (323). As figures 
of middle-class sentiment then, the De Laceys initially appear as an “idealized” and “stable” 
family unit (371), one which the Monster longs to join. And in a way, he does become a member 
of the family, as he “assist[s] their labours” by gathering wood and depositing it at the door 
(102), and he clearly forms a strong emotional attachment to his “friends” and “protectors” 
(110). Furthermore, the fact that the Monster’s “hovel” is “situated against the back of the [De 
Lacey’s] cottage” (99) and he is able to observe them through “a small and almost imperceptible 
chink, through which the eye could just penetrate” (100) suggests that he is, quite literally, 
occupying the margins of the domestic space.  
While it does not require much textual support to claim that the Creature “learns 
domesticity” from the De Laceys, it is far more compelling to consider what the Creature learns 
about empire, foreignness, and his own position relative to these discourses from his viewing of 
the cottagers. In other words, the most relevant question at the moment would be how are 
empire and its subalterns triangulated through the domestic space in Frankenstein? One of the 
Creature’s most significant discoveries, I argue, is that there are degrees of difference, and that 
  194
some Others are “capable” of being accepted and drawn into the domestic economy while 
those like himself are not. Naturally, it is the arrival of Felix’s beloved Safie, the “sweet Arabian” 
(107), that precipitates these new lessons. From the start, the Monster recognizes Safie’s 
otherness, as the first things he observes about her are that she is “covered with a thick black 
veil,” that “[h]er voice was musical, but unlike that of either of my friends,” and that her “hair of 
a shining raven black” was “curiously braided.” However, he also seems to recognize her 
sameness to the cottagers, noting that she possesses “a countenance of angelic beauty and 
expression” and that “her eyes were dark, but gentle, although animated; her features of a 
regular proportion, and her complexion wondrously fair, each cheek tinged with a lovely pink” 
(106). Erin Garrett comments that “[i]mplicit to the creature’s descriptions of Safie is a 
juxtapositioning of dark with light, of spirit with flesh, of the hidden with the revealed” (150). In 
this juxtaposition of lightness and darkness, human sameness and Orientalist otherness, Safie 
becomes, in Garrett’s words, “an inverted human mirror for the unnatural and marginalized 
creature” (146).  
As if to reinforce Safie’s status as one who is marginalized and ethnically different, her 
back story indulges in no small amount of Islamophobia. We discover that her father, a wealthy 
Arabian merchant, was unjustly imprisoned by the French government, and the ever-
sympathetic Felix assisted in his escape. “The Turk” recognizes Felix’s love for Safie and, “to 
secure [Felix] more entirely in his interests” (111), disingenuously offers his daughter’s hand in 
marriage. Safie herself has more in common with her mother, “a Christian Arab, seized and 
made a slave by the Turks….who, born in freedom spurned the bondage to which she was now 
reduced.” Safie’s mother, we discover, raised her daughter as a Christian and taught her “to 
aspire to higher powers of intellect, and an independence of spirit, forbidden to the female 
followers of Mahomet.” After her mother’s death, Safie remains committed to her teachings, 
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feeling “sickened at the prospect of again returning to Asia, and being immured within the walls 
of a haram” and dreams of “a noble emulation of virtue” and “[t]he prospect of marrying a 
Christian, and remaining in a country where women were allowed to take a rank in society” 
(112). After he is freed, “the Turk,” who “loathed the idea that his daughter should be united to 
a Christian” (113) flees with Safie in tow, leaving Felix and his family to be imprisoned by the 
French government and eventually exiled to Germany. Safie, however, manages to discover the 
location of the De Lacey cottage and slips away from her father’s house and travels to reunite 
with Felix. 
While Safie’s story may appear to have little in common with the Monster’s, it is her 
anomalous position as an independent-minded “Christian Arab” and her eminent desire to 
become an accepted member of a Christian European community—and to do so via assimilation 
into the domestic space—that invites the comparison. Indeed, while the narrative takes pains to 
emphasize Safie’s otherness, as “she is designated more often by ‘stranger’ and ‘sweet Arabian’ 
than by her own name” (Garrett 150), her Christianity, European values, and “wondrously fair” 
complexion simultaneously render her a strong candidate for membership in the De Lacey 
family. As it turns out, Safie is in fact quite eager to assimilate into the western world, and this 
swiftly defuses her transgressive potential; Anca Vlasopolos, for example, claims that any 
challenges the Arabian Safie might pose to European domesticity are thwarted and “absorbed” 
by her Westernization (132).  
In the cottage, Safie learns language, history, and economics from her beloved Felix. The 
latter instructs his bride from Volney’s Ruins of Empires, and Safie, along with the eavesdropping 
Monster, learns “of the slothful Asiatics; of the stupendous genius and mental activity of the 
Grecians; of the wars and wonderful virtue of the early Romans—of their subsequent 
degenerating—of the decline of that mighty empire; of chivalry, Christianity, and kings” (108). 
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Of particular note is John Bugg’s observation that in this scene “the creature aligns himself with 
Safie as they both react tearfully to the story of imperial expansion into the Americas” (663), the 
Monster relating how “I heard of the discovery of the American hemisphere, and wept with 
Safie over the hapless fate of its original inhabitants” (108-109). I propose that this “alignment” 
represents a moment in which both Safie and the Creature recognize their kinship with 
indigenous people who suffered a “hapless fate” at the hands of European colonizers (109). 
What is particularly intriguing about such a reading is that it points to a moment of almost-
mutual sympathy; in weeping together over the plight of a subjugated group of ethnic Others, 
Safie and the Creature are fleetingly and symbolically bound together in the ties of sympathetic 
identification. While of course Safie is unaware of the Monster’s existence and emotions, this 
brief moment forces the reader to acknowledge and collapse the triangle of Arabian Other, 
monstrous Other, and absent colonized Others. In so doing, the Creature’s metaphorical 
position as a colonized subject is raised, and his actual position as a secret member of the De 
Lacey household is momentarily destabilized out of the margins and closer to the hearth. 
Bugg further notes, however, that Felix’s lessons also reinforce the barrier between the 
Creature and white, middle-class humanity. Upon learning about “the division of property….that 
the possessions most esteemed by your fellow-creatures were high and unsullied descent 
united with riches,” and that “[a] man might be respected with only one of these advantages; 
but, without either, he was considered, except in very rare instances, as a vagabond and a slave” 
(109), Frankenstein’s Creature “deduces his position within such a taxonomy,” recognizing that 
he himself “is property,” and that, like Caribbean slaves, his only chance at freedom lies in 
rebellion (Bugg 663, original italics). While the acquisition of cultural knowledge undoubtedly 
improves Safie’s standing in the De Lacey household, it paradoxically urges the Monster back 
towards “savagery” and thus further away from the human threshold, as his reflections cause 
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him to lament “Oh, that I had for ever remained in my native wood, nor known nor felt beyond 
the sensations of hunger, thirst, and heat!” (109)  
I would further suggest that the Monster’s lack of property also highlights his status as 
an undesirable Other. Consider that Safie’s arrival seems to coincide with the De Laceys being 
raised out of poverty and into a more economically comfortable position. After Safie has settled 
in, the Monster observes that “a greater degree of plenty reigned [in the cottage]. Felix and 
Agatha spent more time in amusement and conversation, and were assisted in their labours by 
servants. They did not appear rich, but they were contented and happy” (117-118). Because it 
was revealed earlier that Safie fled her father’s home with “some jewels that belonged to her, 
and a sum of money” (114) it is reasonable to suppose that Safie’s wealth is the prime 
contributor to the economic well-being of the household. The Monster, in contrast, claims to 
possess “no money, no friends, no kind of property” (109), thus reinforcing his undesirability in 
contrast to Safie’s value. Furthermore, Safie’s wealth seems to be echoing stereotypes of 
Eastern affluence; her father’s position as “a Turkish merchant” who was ostensibly jailed 
because of “his religion and wealth” (111), yet who is also revealed to be an untrustworthy 
individual, invokes typical Turkish stereotypes. In contrast, as a penniless, physically monstrous 
Other, the Creature is more readily identifiable with Afro-Caribbean slaves. Howard Malchow 
has argued this position quite convincingly in his Gothic Images of Race in Nineteenth-Century 
England (1996), claiming that   
[b]y the early nineteenth century, popular racial discourse managed to conflate such 
descriptions [as are applied to the Monster’s physical characteristics] of particular 
ethnic characteristics into a general image of the Negro body in which repulsive 
features, brutelike strength and size of limbs featured prominently. Frankenstein’s 
creature, when we first see him, is defined by a set of clichés that might be picked out of 
such literature. (18) 
 
Malchow also points out that abolitionist discourse during the “Napoleonic era” popularly 
represented black slaves as “a special kind of childlike, suffering, and degraded being” (14, my 
  198
italics), and indicates that the Monster, through his pathos, “childlike rage” (28), and revenge-
driven, violent unpredictability, (20) encompasses a strong range of slave stereotypes. I would 
argue therefore that, by evoking popular images of black slaves, Shelley is able to present the 
Monster as an Other who is less “desirable” as an equal companion than the moneyed, 
Christianized, and exotically beautiful Safie.  
This is not to say, however, that the Creature is a metaphoric African slave. Malchow 
wisely qualifies his reading by admitting that Mary Shelley probably did not intend  
to create a specifically Negro monster—elsewhere she writes of the Monster’s yellow 
skin—but rather that, reaching into childhood fantasy and imagination, she dredged up 
a bogeyman that had been prepared by a cultural tradition of the threatening Other—
whether troll or giant, gypsy or Negro—from the dark inner recesses of xenophobic fear 
and loathing. (18) 
 
As cited earlier, the Monster’s “yellow skin” and “straight black hair” has been read as an 
Orientalist move (Brantlinger 156), and Ann Mellor has confidently stated that “most of Mary 
Shelley’s nineteenth-century readers would immediately have recognized the Creature as a 
member of the Mongolian race” (2). To ask whether the Creature is black or Mongolian, though, 
is to miss the point; he is the uncategorizable, threatening Other, the ultimate anomaly, one 
who, unlike the safely Westernized Safie, “cannot be contained by the text” (Spivak 850), nor by 
any of the cultural or discursive forces that he is implicated in. As Jonathan Padley writes, 
“[w]hat now stands before Frankenstein is a physical embodiment of Derrida’s written 
catachresis: ‘a monstrous mutation without tradition or normative precedent.’ Frankenstein’s 
creation is beyond his [or anyone else’s] comprehension” (204-205). 
In the second chapter of this study, I related how the magistrate and manhunters in 
Caleb Williams must accuse and contain the Irish-disguised Caleb despite his apparent 
innocence in the matter of the Royal Mail robbery. I described how these men are unable to 
fathom how one who appears to be a beggar can be in legitimate possession of fifteen guineas, 
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or how such a man’s skin can have “all the sleekness of a gentleman” (243). To the magistrate, 
Caleb may not be guilty of the crime he has been accused of, but his failure to fit into 
boundaried categories damns him nonetheless. Likewise, Gines and his magazine publisher 
brother see through Caleb’s Ashkenazi disguise because he writes “poetry and morality and 
history…extremely fine” even though he appears to be “no more than a Jew” (264). 
Frankenstein’s Monster is similarly uncategorizable and as a result suffers a similar fate of 
persecution, since it is utterly unthinkable to the people he encounters that this “no more than 
a Monster” can hold a love for virtue and a desire for domestic companionship. When he tries to 
reach out to the elder De Lacey, who is blind, Felix and the women suddenly return to the 
cottage and the former beats the Monster. Later, the Creature observes Felix telling another 
man, presumably his landlord, that he intends to move immediately because the Creature’s 
actions have led him to believe that “[t]he life of [his] father is in the greatest danger” (123). 
Shortly thereafter, the Creature rescues a girl who has fallen into a river, and in response her 
“rustic” father shoots him in the shoulder (125). In both of these episodes the Creature is 
attempting to cross over into the domestic space—in the case of the De Laceys he wishes to join 
the family; in the case of the “rustic” and his daughter, the Monster is performing the role of a 
protective father. And in both of these cases, the Creature’s deformed appearance causes the 
recipients of his benefaction to assume that he intends to commit violence.  
When these early attempts to win sympathy fail, the Creature reverts to savagery. The 
De Laceys’ rejection causes him to flee into the forest, where he describes how “I gave vent to 
my anguish in fearful howlings. I was like a wild beast that had broken the toils; destroying the 
objects that obstructed me, and ranging through the woods with a stag-like swiftness…I, like the 
arch-fiend, bore a hell within me; and, finding myself unsympathised with, wished to tear up the 
trees, spread havoc and destruction around me, and then to have sat down and enjoyed the 
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ruin” (121, 122). Similarly, after the peasant father shoots him, he reports that “[t]he feelings of 
kindness and gentleness, which I had entertained but a few moments before, gave place to 
hellish rage and gnashing of teeth. Inflamed by pain, I vowed eternal hatred and vengeance to 
all mankind” (125-126). The bestial imagery of the first passage and the vow of vengeance in the 
second can lead to only one conclusion: as with Caleb Williams, the denial of sympathy and the 
foreclosure of domestic companionship effaces the civilizing impulse. 
Nevertheless, one must recognize that this moment in the text is a tipping point in some 
ways, but not in others. On the one hand, the Monster does not slip into an irredeemably 
“savage” state after the De Lacey episode. Even after his rejection, exposure to the natural 
world still inspires the Creature with “feelings of kindness and gentleness” which are only 
broken by the rustic’s gunshot. And even after this, the Monster still attempts to enter the 
human community, presenting himself to Victor’s child brother William in the hopes that the 
latter’s youth and innocence will make him more amenable to the Creature’s appearance (126). 
And of course, even after William rejects him, and he murders the boy and frames Justine 
Moritz, the Monster still holds out hope that Victor will make him a mate who is “as deformed 
and horrible as myself” (128). On the other hand, the Monster’s definitive break with the De 
Laceys also represents a shift in his desires and expectations; realizing that it is impossible for 
him to find a place in a “normal” domestic arrangement, he seeks alternative possibilities. 
Companionship with the female monster in the “vast wilds” of South America is the obvious 
example, yet his designs on William Frankenstein are similarly transgressive. When he sees the 
boy, he impulsively decides to “seize him, and educate him as my companion and friend.” When 
William resists, the Monster advises him “I do not intend to hurt you” and ominously declares 
“‘Boy, you will never see your father again; you must come with me’” (126). Because the 
Creature is “‘[u]rged by [an] impulse” to perform what amounts to a kidnapping, we can 
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conclude that he has certainly become more “savage” since his adventure with the De Laceys 
and the rustic; however, his initial desire not to harm William—until of course he discovers the 
boy’s parentage—and his genuine longing for the boy’s companionship indicates that he is still 
seeking some approximation of a companionable domestic arrangement, albeit a queer one. 
This movement from normative domesticity to queer domesticity is, I argue, 
interestingly signaled by the destruction of the De Lacey cottage. After he loses all hope of being 
accepted into this family’s household, the Creature destroys the garden and burns down the 
cottage (123-124), yet he does so well after it has become clear that the family has chosen to 
abandon their home. He certainly has many opportunities to harm the people themselves; when 
Felix chases him out of the cottage, he relates how he “could have torn [Felix] limb from limb, as 
the lion rends the antelope,” and fantasizes “with pleasure” about “destroy[ing] the cottage and 
its inhabitants, and…glutt[ing] myself with their shrieks and misery” (121). Later, he continues to 
reflect on causing “injury and death,” but when he remembers “the mild voice of De Lacey, the 
gentle eyes of Agatha, and the exquisite beauty of the Arabian…these thoughts vanished, and a 
gush of tears [read: a sentimental outpouring] somewhat soothed me” (123). In sparing the De 
Lacey family but destroying their derelict home, I suggest that the Creature is dismantling the 
central icon of normative domesticity in what amounts to a purely symbolic act—not only are 
the De Laceys safely elsewhere, but also they have no economic stake in this house, as Felix’s 
conversation with the landlord reveals that they were renters (123). This action suggests, then, 
that the Monster is rejecting normative domesticity as an institution. In dismantling one 
structure, however, the Creature recognizes that he must replace it with something else—
hence, his attempts to engage a new, anomalous form of domesticity first with William—who 
must die since he is not only a privileged member of the, for all appearances, normative, 
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domestic establishment, but also because he belongs to the Frankenstein household, which is 
the chief signifier of hegemony in the Monster’s world–and later with the female monster.  
“I no longer see the world and its works as they before appeared to me”:  
Loss of Sympathy, Loss of Civilization 
As I have mentioned throughout this chapter, Victor’s refusal to create the female 
Monster represents a refusal to recognize the self in the Other. However, this does not prevent 
the Monster from recognizing the correspondence between his social desires and Victor’s. In 
what can perhaps be seen as an extreme example of Johanna Smith’s “quid pro quo,” the 
Creature famously vows “I shall be with you on your wedding-night” (146) when he realizes that 
Victor intends to deny him his own “wedding night.” Victor, of course, is somewhat absurdly 
blind to the implications of this remark, remaining convinced that he, rather than Elizabeth, will 
be the target of the Monster’s violence. Indeed, it does not require much of a leap to say that 
Elizabeth’s subsequent death effectively parallels the destruction of the female Creature. 
Considering this parallel, along with the other correspondences we have noted between the 
Monster and the Frankenstein family (i.e., Elizabeth’s sameness and difference in relation to the 
Monster, the Monster’s anomalous positioning and the Frankensteins’ multivalent dynamics, 
etc.) it can be concluded that the joint deaths of the female Creature and Elizabeth signal that, 
when the colonial subaltern remains “undomesticated,” he will turn his wrath against the 
European family, a move which of course has subversive implications for the broader social 
establishment. The wider applicability of the Monster’s familial violence gains further credence 
when we consider his final actions in relation to the final actions of Caleb Williams.  
Essentially, the Creature’s loss of his mate and his subsequent murder of Elizabeth can 
be seen as dynamically similar to Caleb’s loss of a domestic life in Laura’s family and his 
subsequent condemnation of Falkland in open court: Caleb’s being barred from the Welsh 
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community turns his “sympathy to gall,” while the Monster relates that, when he murdered 
Elizabeth he had “cast off all feeling, subdued all anguish, to riot in the excess of [his] despair” 
(187, my italics). Also, as we have seen, both Caleb and the Creature put up with a great deal of 
abuse before their final “loss of sympathy,” and both offer their antagonists ample 
opportunities for reconciliation. Furthermore, both Caleb and the Creature indirectly kill their 
enemies. In Caleb’s case, Falkland dies seemingly because of the strain caused by the trial and 
his public disgrace; in the Monster’s case, Victor dies as a result of the strain caused by his 
lengthy pursuit of his creation across the Arctic. And finally, both of these persecuted characters 
close their respective narratives by expressing remorse for the destruction they have caused, 
highlighting their persecutors’ admirable qualities, and placidly accepting their inevitable 
effacement. Compare the following concluding passages, from Caleb Williams and Frankenstein, 
respectively: 
I record the praises bestowed on me by Falkland, not because I deserve them, but 
because they serve to aggravate the baseness of my cruelty. He survived this dreadful 
scene but three days. I have been his murderer. It was fit that he should praise my 
patience, who has fallen a victim life and fame, to my precipitation!...Falkland,  I will 
think only of thee, and from that thought will draw ever fresh nourishment for my 
sorrows! One generous, one disinterested tear I will consecrate to thy ashes! A nobler 
spirit lived not among the sons of men. Thy intellectual powers were truly sublime, and 
thy bosom burned with a godlike ambition…thou enteredst upon thy carreer [sic] with 
the purest and most laudable intentions. But thou imbibedst the poison of chivalry with 
thy early youth; and the base and low-minded envy that met thee on thy return to thy 
native seats, operated with this poison to hurry thee into madness…I began these 
memoirs with the idea of vindicating my character. I have now no character that I wish 
to vindicate. (325, 326) 
 
‘But it is true that I am a wretch. I have murdered the lovely and the helpless; I have 
strangled the innocent as they slept, and grasped to death his throat who never injured 
me or any other living thing. I have devoted my creator, the select specimen of all that is 
worthy of love and admiration among men, to misery…You hate me; but your 
abhorrence cannot equal that with which I regard myself…He is dead who called me into 
being; and when I shall be no more, the very remembrance of us both will speedily 
vanish…thou [Frankenstein] didst seek my extinction, that I might not cause greater 
wretchedness; and if yet, in some mode unknown to me, thou hadst not ceased to think 
and feel, thou wouldst not desire against me a vengeance greater than that which I feel. 
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Blasted as thou wert, my agony was still superior to thine; for the bitter sting of remorse 
will not cease to rankle in my wounds until death shall close them for ever. (188, 189) 
 
It was necessary to quote these passages at length in order to account fully for all of the 
remarkable similarities between them. Where Caleb praises Falkland’s “nobler spirit…among the 
sons of men,” the Monster identifies Victor as “the select specimen of all that is worthy of love 
and admiration among men”; both individuals slip into an archaic, pseudo-epic speaking style as 
they address their absent persecutors, with Caleb deploying phrases such as “thou enteredst 
upon thy carreer [sic]” and the Creature uttering statements like “thou didst seek my 
extinction”; both speakers denigrate themselves, as Caleb accuses himself of “baseness” and 
“cruelty” while the Monster identifies as a “wretch” filled with self “abhorrence”; and both 
speakers resign themselves to oblivion, either of “character” or of “death” and faded 
“remembrance.” 
 Considering that Mary Shelley dedicated the first edition of Frankenstein to “the author 
of Caleb Williams,” it should not be surprising that critical comparisons of these two texts are 
nothing new. Isabelle Bour, for example, points out that “[t]he father-son relationship initially 
present between Caleb and Falkland strongly parallels that between Frankenstein and his 
creature; similarly, both novels offer a series of reversals of the positions of the pursuer and the 
pursued” (814). Prior to Bour, A.D. Harvey performed a close reading of the two novels, arguing 
that Caleb Williams is essentially about humanity’s “basic predicament, trapped, alone and 
defenseless in the face of society,” whereas Frankenstein has less to do with societal rejection 
and more to do with being “hunted down, not by fate, not by social forces, but merely by a 
bogey of [one’s] own creation.” For Harvey, “Caleb’s relationship with Falkland is seen in the 
context of society as a whole, whereas Frankenstein’s relationship with his creature is 
essentially private, existing apart from the rest of human existence” (26). Nevertheless, the 
inherent similarities between these two texts—not to mention the inherent danger in labeling 
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the public and the private as mutually exclusive spheres—leads me to believe that Harvey’s 
reading deserves further scrutiny.  
Specifically, I suggest that the similarities between Caleb’s and the Monster’s closing 
monologues indicate that Frankenstein, like Caleb Williams, represents how a loss of 
sympathy—brought about by the foreclosure of domesticity—ultimately leads to the failure of 
civilization. As I argued earlier, Caleb’s bringing down Falkland destabilizes the entire deluded 
community, as foreshadowed by Collins’s claim that to expose Falkland as a tyrant is to “change 
all my ideas, and show me that there [is] no criterion by which vice might be prevented from 
being mistaken for virtue” (310). Likewise, the Monster’s actions have done nothing but 
undermine and ultimately destroy the already problematically-positioned Frankenstein 
household. The Creature’s murder of William and framing of Justine, for example, causes 
Elizabeth’s “whole system of values” to collapse (Bour 821) in that Justine’s potential guilt and 
the violent zealousness of the accusing mob has so shaken her belief in human sympathy that 
she is left to remark “men appear to me as monsters thirsting for each other’s blood” (88). As 
the primary figure of female sensibility in the novel, Elizabeth’s loss of faith signals that “[t]he 
ethics of sensibility is now untenable, but no other value system has replaced it” (Bohr 821). As 
in Caleb Williams, if sympathy is in fact the “primary civilizing ingredient,” then it is not 
surprising that its effacement (and lack of a replacement) should be followed by the dissolution 
of the Frankenstein household.  
Indeed, despite Alphonse Frankenstein’s admonitions that the family should “transfer 
our love for those whom we have lost, to those who yet live” and that Victor should bear in 
mind that “[o]ur circle will be small, but bound close by the ties of affection and mutual 
misfortune…new and dear objects of care will be born to replace those of whom we have been 
so cruelly deprived” (164), such domestic platitudes have no currency in the face of the 
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unstoppable Other. Alphonse’s homespun advice and general failure to understand the 
problems assailing his household—at one point Victor comments that “[m]y father’s care and 
attentions were indefatigable; but he did not know the origin of my sufferings, and sought 
erroneous methods to remedy the incurable ill” (159)—point more broadly to the failure of the 
benevolent patriarchy. The privileged Alphonse, who “came like a protecting spirit” to his 
destitute bride-to-be Caroline Beaufort, and who sheltered her “as a fair exotic is sheltered by 
the gardener” (41, 42) cannot, it seems, shelter his adult children from the rage of an ill-used 
subaltern. In fact, his advice that Victor marry Elizabeth as quickly as possible in an attempt to 
repair the fractured Frankenstein family is what ultimately precipitates both her death and his 
own, as the news of Elizabeth’s murder proves to be too great a shock for him, and he dies in 
Victor’s arms (170). 
As for the nightmarish wedding-night itself, it clearly suggests—even before Elizabeth’s 
murder—that the intervention of the subaltern disrupts the normative perpetuation of the 
bourgeois family unit. Victor’s fears and his earlier preoccupation with building the female 
Monster delay his marriage to the point where Elizabeth wonders whether or not he “love[s] 
another” (161), and the Monster’s threat causes him to dismiss his new wife to bed alone while 
he spends their wedding-night watching for intruders (167). The Frankenstein family, heretofore 
known for its remarkable ability to extend and reproduce itself, dwindles to almost-nothingness 
in a matter of pages as even the fundamental act of sexual reproduction is foreclosed, the young 
husband substituted in the bridal chamber by his anomalous, illegitimate, dispossessed “son.” 
This “loss of civilization” also plays out psychologically in the Frankenstein circle. In 
Victor’s case, we see an uncanny doubling taking place between creator and creature in that, 
after constructing his own double, Victor resists easy classification as either man or monster. A 
prime example would be his implication in the Creature’s crimes. After he destroys the female 
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monster and is forced to go ashore in Ireland, the townspeople believe he is guilty of Clerval’s 
murder because witnesses saw the Monster escaping by boat and believed it to be Frankenstein 
(152). More significant however, is Victor’s tendency to identify himself with his creation 
whenever the latter commits a crime. Upon being shown Clerval’s corpse, he exclaims, “‘[h]ave 
my murderous machinations deprived you also, my dearest Henry, of life? Two I have already 
destroyed; other victims await their destiny’” (153). Furthermore, a domestic representative is 
mistaken for the Monster when Victor is in prison in Ireland and, for no apparent reason, 
believes that his visitor—who turns out to be Alphonse Frankenstein—is the Monster (156). This 
dynamic is also dramatically exemplified in Justine Moritz’s own identification with 
monstrosity—her confessor harangues her into admitting to William’s murder by denying her 
absolution and “threaten[ing] and menac[ing]” her until she “almost began to think that [she] 
was the monster he said [she] was” (83). Although truly innocent and fully conscious of it, 
Justine doubts her own nature and even her own actions, thus further corrupting the integrity 
and moral certainty of the “civilized” domestic realm. 
 While it is not difficult to read the above challenges to the domestic space—the 
effacement of sympathy, the displacement of the benevolent patriarch, the curtailing of 
reproduction, and the psychological destabilization of “virtuous” characters—as attacks on the 
broader social structure, Shelley makes the societal implications of the Monster’s actions even 
clearer when she identifies the failures of the justice system. While Justine’s unfair execution is 
the obvious example, it is far more interesting to consider Victor’s rather inexplicable attempt to 
report the Creature to a criminal judge. The magistrate, rather than scorning Victor’s tale as the 
ravings of a madman, seems willing to believe in the Monster’s existence, but expresses 
concerns about the accused’s ability to evade capture. “‘I would willingly afford you every aid in 
your pursuit,” the judge offers, “but the creature of whom you speak appears to have powers 
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which would put all my exertions to defiance. Who can follow an animal which can traverse the 
sea of ice, and inhabit caves and dens where no man would venture to intrude?” (171) The law’s 
inability to contain the Monster not only points to the latter’s anomalous status but also 
suggests that his mere nature allows him to foil easily the existing power structures. And 
because the aspects of his nature which allow him to “traverse the sea of ice” are also those 
aspects of his nature which render him “hideous”—which in turn prevents him from claiming 
membership in the domestic economy and thus causes him to lose his sympathy in the first 
place and therefore to vow “eternal hatred and vengeance to all mankind” (126, my italics)—
then it can be concluded that the Creature’s position as a metaphoric colonial subaltern who has 
been denied a share in domesticity situates him, like Caleb Williams, as an anomalous, 
disenfranchised figure whose exclusion goads him into destabilizing the existing structure of 
both the public and private spheres. 
The Failure of Aesthetics 
Drawing on David Marshall’s The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: Marivaux, Diderot, 
Rousseau, and Mary Shelley (1988), Isabelle Bour notes that “[r]epeatedly repulsed, the creature 
diagnoses the failure of sensibility,” a failure which originates with Victor, who “cut[s] himself 
off from nature” and from his family while laboring on his creation, only allowing himself brief 
“interludes of emotional expansion,” as when he travels through Chamounix after the death of 
Justine (821, 822). Bour’s argument points to an intrinsic link between sensibility and the 
sublime as they are represented in Frankenstein—both are assumed to be humanizing 
discourses in the sense that they are meant to expand the self and promote benevolence and 
humility; both are overarching concepts meant to help sustain the white, bourgeois self and its 
institutions; and both are ultimately doomed to failure in this novel. 
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Earlier in this chapter, I cited Elizabeth Bohls’s intriguing claim that Shelley’s use of 
multiple narrators “unsettles narrative authority and points in the direction of cultural 
relativism. It interrupts the universalizing monologue with which European culture tries to 
impose its values, notably aesthetic value, around the world” (25). While I do agree with her 
ultimate conclusions that “Frankenstein indicts aesthetics as an inherently imperial discourse, 
structured by principles of hierarchy and exclusion,” and that “[a]esthetics binds together a little 
community, a microcosm of polite British society, marred by its subordination of women and 
colonization of non-European peoples” (34), I believe that it is important to emphasize that, like 
sympathy, aesthetic discourse still fails as a colonizing force in this novel, and that the failure of 
these forces inevitably results in the breakdown of the illusion of domestic stability. This, in turn, 
provides further support for one of this chapter’s central claims, that Frankenstein highlights the 
symbiotic, inseparable relationship between the home and the imperial effort.  
On the one hand then, aesthetics can indeed be seen as “imperial discourse—one of the 
languages of high culture, seemingly far removed from the practical tasks of empire, but actually 
helping produce imperial subjects to carry out those tasks” (Bohls 25). This reading, similar to 
many of the claims I have made in earlier chapters, points to aesthetics as a coding device which 
enables and justifies imperial enterprise. By having “a non-European [become] an aesthetic 
subject, while the subject who sets the standards and judges aesthetic value is white and 
European” Shelley is creating a somewhat Burkean space in that “Burke’s negro woman, like 
Frankenstein’s creature, ‘naturally’ inspires a negative aesthetic response in a ‘standard’ subject. 
The doctrine of the standard of taste forms part of an aesthetic ideology that extrapolates the 
viewpoint of an educated white European man to a universal standard and contributes to 
justifying colonialism and slavery” (31). Again, the sublime, imagined to be a universal, 
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boundary-breaking concept, ironically acts as a provincial discourse which sustains the power 
group and promotes the status quo. 
On the other hand however, one must bear in mind Nancy Fredricks’s provocative claim 
that “[t]he sublime settings in the text…provide a space where the marginalized can be heard. In 
contrast to the power of beauty, which works to contain and maintain social distinctions and 
hierarchies, the sublime in Frankenstein opens the way for the excluded to challenge the 
dominant discourse” (178). Considering that the sublime in Frankenstein empowers the doomed 
subaltern while at the same time not successfully performing any of the “positive” functions 
that it did in Radcliffe—uplifting the downtrodden protagonist, resituating the foreign within a 
familiar discourse, helping to produce domesticity, etc.—I would suggest that Victor and his 
family attempt to make sense of their conflicted world by viewing it through the “civilizing” lens 
of aesthetics, yet aesthetics, like sympathy, is ultimately ineffective as a universalizing force in 
this text. Beauty is exposed as a marginalizing discourse, and sublimity “belongs” to the Monster 
and the Monster alone. 
The failure of both the sublime and the beautiful in Frankenstein is most succinctly 
represented in an often-overlooked passage that appears near the end of the novel. As Victor 
and Elizabeth cross Lake Como by boat after their wedding, Victor silently observes “the mighty 
[Mount] Jura opposing its dark side to the ambition that would quit its native country, and an 
almost insurmountable barrier to the invader who would wish to enslave it” (166). Victor offers 
no further commentary on Jura’s perceived role as a “barrier,” yet an attentive reader will 
notice the irony of this moment. As a representative of the sublime, Jura has not succeeded in 
its role as a force meant to stand against “the ambition that would quit its native country,” since 
Victor has in fact followed his ambitions by traveling to Ingolstadt and creating the Monster. 
Likewise, Jura has also failed in its second task since the Creature has, with great ease, managed 
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to scale the Alps to “invade” the Frankenstein household and, in a sense, “enslave” Victor. 
Furthermore, by referring to the mountain as a protector of the “native country” rather than the 
Frankenstein home, Victor effectively conflates the national and the domestic, thus suggesting 
that the failure of aesthetics as an insulating discourse has implications which stretch well 
beyond the hearth.   
As Victor looks wistfully on the sublime, Elizabeth similarly observes “how the clouds, 
which sometimes obscure and sometimes rise above the dome of Mont Blanc, render this scene 
of beauty still more interesting” (166). In her reading of this scene, Bohls remarks that Elizabeth 
resembles “a tour guide” with her observations on the beautiful, yet concludes that “[t]his 
female aesthete is too passive and colorless to be much of a force in the novel” (26). I would 
elaborate on Bohls’s assertion by noting that Elizabeth’s commentary turns out to be little more 
than a failed attempt to distract herself and Victor from their gloomy situation, as Victor 
observes: “Thus Elizabeth endeavoured to divert her thoughts and mine from all reflection upon 
melancholy subjects. But her temper was fluctuating; joy for a few instants shone in her eyes, 
but it continually gave place to distraction and reverie” (166). Unlike in The Italian, where Vivaldi 
and Ellena observe the sublime and the beautiful aspects of a particular landscape—“‘See,’ said 
Vivaldi, ‘where Monte-Corno stands like a ruffian, huge, scared [sic], threatening, and 
horrid…‘Mark too,’ said Ellena, ‘how sweetly the banks and undulating plains repose at the feet 
of the mountains; what an image of beauty and elegance they oppose to the awful grandeur 
that overlooks and guards them” (185, 186)—this does not act as a “bonding” moment for 
Victor and Elizabeth. Recall that in the latter scene Vivaldi is characterizing the sublime as a 
force which must be overcome because, as Ellena’s future husband, he must surmount the 
benevolent patriarchy which “overlooks and guards” the beautiful heroine in order to claim her 
as his wife. In this way the scene in The Italian gestures, as I argued in the previous chapter, 
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towards marriage and the “natural” reproduction/perpetuation of domesticity. This, however, is 
not the case for the Frankensteins; the sublime only reminds Victor of his own failings, and the 
beautiful is a “passive and colorless” object which can only be observed and appreciated in 
passing. 
Unlike in Radcliffe then, the sublime in Frankenstein becomes entirely the province of 
the Monster, the subaltern. While it is true that Radcliffe’s villains are also characterized in 
sublime terms, it can be argued that they are only as sublime as the heroines make them out to 
be. Kenneth Graham raises an excellent point when he notes that, seen through Emily St. 
Aubert’s eyes, Udolpho’s Montoni is represented as a “smouldering, passionate demon-lover.” 
However, when ‘[v]iewed objectively, Montoni’s life forms a pattern of unfulfillment. He 
gambles in casinos but loses. He is ambitious to be a military leader but becomes only a robber 
captain, one whose capture is perfunctory when the narrative has no further use for him. 
Despite his displays of passion and energy, he lacks sexual drive” (167). In Frankenstein, 
however, there is no disputing the Creature’s size, strength, mobility, and inability to be 
contained by the text. Unlike Montoni, who is only sublime because Emily imagines him to be, 
the Monster’s power and influence is beyond question. And because, as Fredricks has observed, 
majestic landscapes provide a space in which the Monster can speak and make his will known, 
sublimity in nature is also compromised as a site of affirmation and control for Victor. 
Sublime and Beautiful Landscapes 
Frankenstein’s most noteworthy example of the sublime in landscape appears shortly 
after Justine’s death, when Victor travels through “the near Alpine valleys” to Chamounix 
“s[eeking] in the magnificence, the eternity of such scenes, to forget [him]self and [his] 
ephemeral, because human, sorrows” (89). His observations of the scenery are distinctly 
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Radcliffean in their invocations of divinity, tendency to inspire a soul-expanding courage, and 
indulgence in flights of fancy: 
[t]he immense mountains and precipices that overhung me on every side—the sound of 
the river raging among the rocks, and the dashing of the waterfalls around, spoke of a 
power mighty as Omnipo[tence]—and I ceased to fear, or to bend before any being less 
almighty than that which has created and ruled the elements, here displayed in their 
most terrific guise…Ruined castles hanging on the precipices of piny [sic] mountains; the 
impetuous Arve, and cottages every here and there peeping forth from among the 
trees, formed a scene of singular beauty. But it was augmented and rendered sublime 
by the mighty Alps, whose white and shining pyramids and domes towered above all, as 
belonging to another earth, the habitations of another race of beings. (89) 
 
Victor’s reasons for seeking out the sublime in landscape are somewhat different from 
Radcliffe’s heroines’, however. While in both cases the viewers are attempting to gain succor 
and a sense of empowerment, Radcliffe’s heroines are, as I argued in the previous chapter, also 
working to assimilate a foreign landscape by triangulating it through a familiar aesthetic, 
Christianized discourse. Because the Swiss Alps present scenes remembered from Victor’s 
boyhood (89) they are not “foreign” to him and therefore do not need to be “tamed.” Rather, 
Victor is returning to that which is already familiar in what can be described as an attempt to 
locate a constant within his shifting, unstable life: “Six years had passed,” since he last visited 
Chamounix, and he notes that “I was a wreck – but nought had changed in those savage and 
enduring scenes” (89, original italics). This observation constructs the sublime as a dependable, 
universal force; no matter how much the world may be changed by havoc-raising subalterns, 
this sacred space of “maternal nature” “whisper[ing] in soothing accents” remains untouched 
(90). Indeed, the use of the term “maternal” and Victor’s memories of visiting Chamounix 
“frequently during [his] boyhood” (89) ties the sublime with the domestic here. However, 
whereas in Radcliffe the sublime’s domesticating potential is primarily raised when the heroine 
is viewing a landscape with her beloved at her side, and such episodes look towards future 
marital companionship, Frankenstein places this dynamic on its head. Victor gazes at the 
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sublime while he is alone and is reminded only of his family’s happy past; in fact, Elizabeth never 
enters his mind during these moments.  
 It might seem problematic then to read the sublime as an imperializing discourse in this 
case. While it is true that Victor is not engaging in the same kind of appropriating rhetoric that 
Adeline, Emily, and Ellena do, the fact remains that he is still using the sublime as a way to avoid 
his guilt and thus marginalize, in his own mind, the subaltern he has created. Furthermore, 
Nancy Fredricks has made the provocative claim that “[i]t is not the sublime itself that is being 
critiqued in the book…but hubris in the face of its unlimited power” (185). The most 
consequential examples of this hubris are, as Fredricks relates, Victor’s desire to unravel the 
sublime mysteries of nature by breaking through the “ideal bounds” of “life and death” (58), his 
eager acceptance of Professor Waldman’s directive that natural scientists ought to “penetrate 
into the recesses of nature, and show how she works in her hiding places” (53). However she 
also notes that Victor displays a similar disregard for the powers of landscape—while traveling 
through Chamounix, for example, he is undeterred by a sudden thunderstorm, pompously 
declaring “[s]till I would penetrate [the mountains’] misty veil, and seek them in their cloudy 
retreats. What were rain and storm to me?” (91) Considering how closely the language in the 
latter quote mirrors the words of Professor Waldman, I would suggest that Victor’s burning 
desire to climb the mountain echoes his earlier “fanatical” wish—to borrow Fredricks’s term—to 
defy the “natural order” by creating life out of death. What might otherwise be a “stock” 
sublime scene is therefore transformed into a symbolic representation of Victor’s “colonial” 
journey of creation. 
Furthermore, by having Victor’s journey climax not in “an experience of ‘solitary 
grandeur,’” but rather in “an unsettling encounter with the once abandoned and now very angry 
creature” (186) Shelley challenges sublimity’s status as a rhetorical system through which the 
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“civilized” viewer can claim supremacy over the subaltern. As Fredricks relates, “[i]nstead of the 
self-aggrandizement Victor seeks when he journeys to the mountain top, he finds himself 
engaged in a dialogue with one so far excluded from his narrative. He comes face to face…with 
his own limitations in the face of the ‘other’” (186).
61
 Like Moses climbing Mt. Horeb to meet 
with God in the form of a burning bush and receive his commission to free the Israelites, Victor’s 
ascent terminates in a meeting with the god-like Creature who ultimately charges him with the 
task of building a female Monster. Rather than somehow taking on a “divine aspect” though—
recall the “spiritual barriers” that Radcliffe’s heroines cultivate after enjoying communion with 
the sublime and their subsequent ability to strike their oppressors with a momentary sense of 
awe—Victor is shown just how powerless he truly is in the face of his creation. Indeed, when he 
returns home to his family from this conference, Victor is hardly a figure of Radcliffean faith and 
fortitude; he claims that “[m]y haggard and wild appearance awoke intense alarm…I felt as if I 
were placed under a ban—as if I had no right to claim their [his family’s] sympathy—as if never 
more might I enjoy companionship with them” (132). Rather than strengthening him in the face 
of foreign “oppression” and edging him closer to a state of happy domesticity then, his 
encounter with the sublime and the Monster that inhabits it renders him more alien. 
In light of the problematic nature of sublimity in this novel, it is tempting to conclude, as 
Anne Mellor does, that Mary Shelley celebrates “the beautiful over the sublime” via her 
idealization of Henry Clerval (104). Indeed, Clerval is a likeable, if innocuous, character who, 
while journeying with Victor, is greatly pleased with the “Fairy-land” visions that characterize 
their trip up the Rhine. In fact, Clerval explicitly privileges the beautiful over the sublime, 
                                                 
61
 Barbara Freeman reaches a similar conclusion when she notes that “geography [in Frankenstein] 
produces neither peace of mind nor aesthetic pleasure, but rather a vision of and an encounter with 
monstrosity. Each time a sublime landscape is depicted, it is linked to the Monster’s appearance…[t]he 
landscape is the same as Kant’s—that of Nature in al her might and majesty, but the effect (and affect) 
produced is not” (24). 
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commenting that “[t]he mountains of Switzerland are more majestic and strange; but there is a 
charm in the banks of this divine river….[o]h, surely, the spirit that inhabits and guards this place 
has a soul more in harmony with man, than those who pile the glacier, or retire to the 
inaccessible peaks of the mountains of our own country” (137). Victor is touched by his friend’s 
words, and briefly digresses from the narrative to characterize Clerval, with “[h]is wild and 
enthusiastic imagination,” as a Wordsworthian child of nature, even anachronistically quoting a 
few lines from “Tintern Abbey” (137). For Mellor, Clerval’s “valuing the picturesque and the 
beautiful above the sublime…affirms an aesthetic grounded on the family and the community 
rather than on the individual” (138). 
I, however, am more inclined to agree with Bohls’s implication that the beautiful is a 
colonizing force, and Fredricks’s contention that it is not the sublime but hubris in the face of 
the sublime that Shelley is critiquing. Likeable as Clerval appears, his statement that “the 
spirit[s]…who pile the glacier, or retire to the inaccessible peaks of the mountains of our own 
country” are less “in harmony with man” acts as an unwitting marginalization of the Monster. 
Unknowingly, Clerval is doing essentially the same thing that Victor does—reinforcing the 
Creature’s alterity and implying that this alterity indicates inferiority. My point is further borne 
out by the doubling which takes place between Victor and Clerval a mere few pages later. 
Though an emotionally fragile Victor sees “an insurmountable barrier placed between me and 
my fellow-men” he is still able to enjoy Clerval’s company to an extent, and his ability to do so 
can perhaps be attributed to a key similarity that the two men share: namely, Clerval is an 
aspiring colonizer. Victor reports that  
in Clerval I saw the image of my former self; he was inquisitive and anxious to gain 
experience and instruction…He was also pursuing an object he had long had in view. His 
design was to visit India, in the belief that he had in his knowledge of its various 
languages, and in the views he had taken of its society, the means of materially assisting 
the progress of European colonisation and trade. In Britain only could he further the 
execution of his plan. (139) 
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Clerval’s desire to join the British imperial effort, and his comment that “‘I could pass my life 
here [in Cumberland and Westmorland]…and among these mountains I should scarcely regret 
Switzerland and the Rhine’” (141) is the closest Shelley gets in the novel to implicating England 
itself. However, considering just how closely Clerval’s colonial aspirations are juxtaposed with 
Victor’s scientific ones, and considering the text’s emphatic statement that “[i]n Britain only 
could [Clerval] further the execution of his plan”—an entirely unnecessary line in terms of the 
surface narrative—I believe it is safe to conclude that the text is subtly yoking Victor’s creation 
of the Monster with British imperialism. While this observation is certainly not unexpected, I 
would add that by transposing Frankenstein and Clerval in this way, it also becomes difficult to 
parse out the differences between the intended functions of the sublime and the beautiful in 
the text. In other words, if the beautifully-inclined Clerval is “the very image” of the sublimely-
inclined Victor, and if both men are colonizers in a sense, then it can be argued that both men 
are attempting to use their aesthetic discourse of choice to achieve unwholesome ends—
indeed, as we have seen, Victor is using the sublime-in-landscape to “kill his guilt” and thus 
purge himself of responsibility for his creation, while Clerval is using the beautiful-in-landscape 
to devalue the sublime and, by proxy, the Creature.  
Along these lines, it is also interesting to note that both the sublime Alps and the 
beautiful countryside affect Victor in similar ways—the “sublime and magnificent scenes” of the 
mountains “afforded [Victor] the greatest consolation [he] was capable of receiving” though 
“they did not remove [his] grief” (90, 91); likewise, during his trip along the Rhine, Victor’s 
“spirits [are] continually agitated by gloomy feelings” even though he “drink[s] in a tranquility” 
from the surrounding beauty (136), and the natural wonders of England’s romantic Lake District 
bring him an “enjoyment” which is nevertheless “embittered both by the memory of the past, 
and the anticipation of the future” (140). The fact that the sublime and the beautiful are 
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virtually indistinguishable in terms of the limited effects they have on Victor’s mood suggests 
then, that aesthetic discourse has failed its practitioners as a universalizing force. 
Aesthetic Beings: Monstrosity and Beauty 
Perhaps popular aesthetics fail in this text because the Monster himself is, first and 
foremost, an aesthetic being. Jonathan Padley notes that Victor’s ostensible interest in his 
project is scientific, yet he (and everyone else) reacts primarily to the Creature’s great size and 
hideous features (197). Nóra Séllei points out that the Monster “is the most embodied creature 
in the whole novel…[and] he is the most repulsive because of his very physicality, because of 
being the body” (85). While I agree that the Monster is defined primarily in terms of his 
physicality, I would also add that Elizabeth is almost as heavily “embodied” in the text, though in 
a more “positive” way—note the parallels I earlier observed between Victor’s description of her 
and his description of the Monster. To claim that the Creature and Elizabeth, as primarily 
aesthetic beings, are “embodied” touchstones of sublimity and beauty may at first feel overly 
obvious. However, such an ascription takes on greater meaning when one considers that both of 
these individuals are, as I argued earlier, anomalous figures—the Monster is anomalous partly 
because of his “unnatural birth,” partly because of his unclear racial coding, and partly because 
of his lack of a constructive role in the world;  Elizabeth’s anomaly stems partly from her status 
as a redundantly white adoptee from a dark-skinned, poor family, and partly from her 
multivalent position within the Frankenstein household. Furthermore, both individuals enter the 
Frankensteins’ circle as a result of a colonial-inflected intervention—the Monster is born out of 
Victor’s desire to “break through bounds” and “enlighten a dark world,” while Elizabeth is 
“rescued” from brown people by Caroline and Alphonse Frankenstein. Hence, if the two figures 
who most clearly embody aesthetic discourse are anomalous figures who are also, to different 
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extents, “subalterns,” then the whole system’s ability to universalize human experience, 
assimilate the Other, and assuage colonial guilt is undermined. 
To elaborate on the sublime’s association with the subaltern in this text, I refer once 
again to Elizabeth Bohls’s conclusion that “Frankenstein indicts aesthetics as an inherently 
imperial discourse, structured by principles of hierarchy and exclusion. Aesthetics binds together 
a little community, a microcosm of polite British society, marred by its subordination of women 
and colonization of non-European peoples” (34). For Bohls, the fact that “subordination” and 
“colonization” are the underlying forces which “bind together” the Frankensteins’ community 
illustrates that “[w]estern civilization, viewed from the inside, has not got its parts put together 
quite right,” an indictment which “is confirmed when we see this disproportion reflected from 
the outside—blown up in the monstrous mirror that is Frankenstein’s creature” (28-29). 
Understood from this position, the Monster’s inherent sublimity—which is produced by his size, 
grotesqueness, and seeming omnipresence—can be read as an ironic co-opting of this 
imperializing discourse: what Victor has essentially done is project and concentrate all of 
western culture’s fears and dysfunctions into his sublime creation. In further support of this, 
Barbara Freeman has effectively argued that “Frankenstein makes explicit and dramatizes what 
Kant’s analytic contains but cannot say, demonstrating that the shape of the sublime…is 
precisely that of monstrosity” (21, my italics).
62
 To this I would add that sublime objects are such 
because, according to Kant, they “convey the idea of their infinity” as a result of “the 
inadequacy of even the greatest effort of our imagination in the estimation of the magnitude of 
an object” (94). Hence, the Creature is sublime not just because of his enormous frame and 
uncategorizability, but also because he is fated to act as a gargantuan metaphor: in his ethnically 
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 Kant, with his moralistic agenda to “shield [the sublime] from the mostrous [sic] object’s ‘destructive’ 
force” (Freeman 22-23) would likely not have seen the Creature as a sublime being because he is 
“monstrous” and thus “destroys the purpose which constitutes” his conception (Kant 91).  
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unstable body and “unnatural birth” he bears the overwhelming weight of that which is 
simultaneously systemic and unthinkable—namely, western fear and guilt about both the 
colonial subaltern and the shortcomings of the anomalous domestic space.  
 Taken in this context then, it is not surprising that Victor—as a privileged member of the 
current system and all of its attendant justifications—should initially have envisioned and 
“selected his [creation’s] features as beautiful” (60) only to be shocked by the hideousness of 
the whole. Indeed, in strictly literal terms, it seems somewhat unbelievable that Victor should 
have been blind to the Creature’s ugliness until its animation. I would therefore argue that the 
various dysfunctional aspects of western civilization—colonial subjugation and domestic 
anomaly being the most relevant—which are embodied in the Monster cannot be recognized as 
undesirable until they are seen as a whole and in relation to each other. Individually the 
Monster’s “features” may appear “beautiful” and his “limbs” may be “in proportion,” yet taken 
together, the effect is monstrous: the “yellow skin” cannot cover “the work of muscles and 
arteries”; the “lustrous black” of the hair and the “pearly whiteness” of the teeth may appear 
pleasing, yet they create “a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes” (60). Tellingly, there is a 
similar dynamic at play in how one perceives the sublime, as Kant explains:  
in order to get the full emotional effect of the size of the Pyramids we must avoid 
coming too near just as much as remaining too far away. For in the latter case the 
representation of the apprehended parts (the tiers of stones) is but obscure, and 
produces no effect upon the aesthetic judgement [sic] of the Subject. In the former, 
however, it takes the eye some time to complete the apprehension from the base to the 
summit; but in this interval the first tiers always in part disappear before the 
imagination has taken in the last, and so the comprehension is never complete. (90) 
 
Likewise, the Creature’s appearance seems to have no effect on Victor while he is building it 
because he is “too close”; “the first tiers” of monstrosity “in part disappear before the 
imagination has taken in the last,” and thus he does not fully comprehend the extent of the 
Creature’s hideousness until he has essentially “stepped back” and apprehended the whole. 
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Considering that Victor’s motives are, as we have established, inherently selfish and later 
superimposed over Henry Clerval’s desire to engage in the imperial project, we can therefore 
see the Creature’s coming-to-life and Victor’s belated recognition of its monstrosity as indicating 
a moment of clarity—the sanitizing veil of aesthetic and moral discourse slips, and Victor is 
forced to confront not only the vast, interrelated network of his culture’s sins but also his own 
implication within those sins. Perhaps the sublimity of Chamounix was able to lift his spirits 
during his “boyhood,” but now he has come face-to-face with the sublime, overbearing 
knowledge that he and his kind are producers of monstrosity. Is it any wonder, then, that he 
flees in horror from his creation? 
Conclusion 
It is always welcome when chronology aligns with an argumentative arc. In my chapters 
on Godwin and Radcliffe, we saw these authors’ largely uncritical confidence in the inherent 
power and goodness of sentiment, domesticity, aesthetics, and their imperialistic valences. In 
this chapter, we have seen Mary Shelley’s far more skeptical take on these discourses. While I 
feel that any argument that Frankenstein’s critical view marks or in some way symptomatizes a 
larger political turning-point would require a level of historical excavation that extends beyond 
the scope of this study, I do think that it bears repeating that Mary Shelley’s robust experiences 
as a traveler had a hand in her sympathetic portrayal of the Other. In her and Percy Shelley’s 
History of a Six Weeks' Tour through a part of France, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland; with 
Letters Descriptive of a Sail Round the Lake of Geneva and of the Glaciers of Chamouni (1817), 
for example, she laments the destruction that Napoleon’s army has wrought on the French town 
of Nogent, writing that 
[n]othing could be more entire than the ruin which these barbarians had spread as they 
advanced; perhaps they remembered Moscow and the destruction of the Russian 
villages; but we were now in France, and the distress of the inhabitants, whose houses 
had been burned, their cattle killed, and all their wealth destroyed, has given a sting to 
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my detestation of war, which none can feel who have not travelled through a country 
pillaged and wasted by this plague, which, in his pride, man inflicts upon his fellow. (19) 
 
Indeed, the final lines of the above excerpt possess a particular resonance for this study—one 
cannot feel a true “detestation of war” or subjugation until one has at least “travelled through a 
country pillaged and wasted by [these] plague[s].” While Mary Shelley of course only 
experienced this kind of devastation secondhand, she undoubtedly witnessed more than her 
father, who was largely an armchair intellectual, or Ann Radcliffe, who either rarely or never 
visited the countries she wrote about, basing her famous landscape descriptions on paintings 
and travel narratives.  
In light of her biography and the sentiments expressed in Frankenstein therefore, I 
conclude that the well-read, well-traveled, and politically-informed Mary Shelley recognized the 
potentially appropriative nature of sensibility, sublimity, and domesticity, and, unlike William 
Godwin and Ann Radcliffe, used her most famous work to contest these elements of popular 
discourse. In bidding the “hideous progeny” that was her novel “go forth and prosper” then, 
Shelley offers an “implicit critique of the utilitarian vision of an engineered society” (Spivak 848) 
by leveling a powerful challenge against the mutually-reinforcing alliance of empire, moral 
philosophy, aesthetics, domesticity, and fiction. 
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